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Summary
Central to Realism’s framing of the international are its conception of the inside/outside
structure of political form and the idea of a state of nature. This thesis provides a
materialist critique of these conceptions. Its starting point is that the Marxist criticism of
Realism has fallen short because Marxism in IR has constructed no theory of the political
and as a result it has been unable to answer Realism’s perception of the ‘tragic’ and
unchanging nature of international political existence. To remedy this deficiency, the
thesis both establishes an alternative understanding of Marx for IR and draws upon
Adorno’s extension and deepening of Marxian critical theory. The argument next
elaborates a reading of Marx’s theory of capital that reveals a considerable degree of
hitherto unappreciated thematic congruence with Realism’s understanding of the
international as a timeless scene of entrapment. It then mobilises Adorno’s philosophical
anthropology to explain this similarity, focusing on the critical accounts of abstraction in
both Marx and Adorno. Finally, it uses these theoretical elements to address the question
of political form directly, taking up specific aspects of Carl Schmitt’s, Giorgio
Agamben’s and Walter Benjamin’s thinking concerning sovereignty and the exception
and reading them through the frame of Adorno’s critique of the concept. The result is a
critical theory of political form that: (i) can explain, without conceding to, the Realist
conceptions both of the necessary inside/outside structure of the political and of the
international as a timeless state of nature; and (ii) can demonstrate an instrinsic
theoretical connection between the global nature of capital and the bounded and delimited
form of the political in a way that has not been achieved before in IR.
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Epigraph
The frontier between Baden and Bavaria ran between Ottorsfszell and
Ernsthal. It was marked by posts on the highway with imposing coats of
arms in the provincial colors spiraling round the posts, blue and white on
the one side, if I remember right, and red and yellow on the other. There
was a generous space between the two. That was where I liked to walk on
the pretext, which I did not actually believe, that this empty space
belonged to neither of the two states, that it was free, and that I could hold
sway there as I wished. I did not mean this seriously, but that did not
diminish my pleasure. In reality, what I probably liked were the state
colors whose limits I felt I had escaped. I had a similar feeling in
exhibitions like the ILA [the International Aerospace Exhibition] at the
sight of the countless flags that fluttered in harmony next to one another.
The feeling of the International was familiar to me from home and also
from my parents’ guests, from whom I heard names like Firino and
Sidney Clifton Hall. That International was no centralized state. The peace
it promised was brought about by the festive assemblage of different
things, the colorfulness of the flags and the innocent frontier markings
which, as I was not a little astonished to discover, brought about no
change in the landscape. The land they enclosed, however, and which I
myself occupied, was a no-man’s-land. Later, during the war, this word
came to be used for the devastated space between the two fronts. But it is
the faithful translation of the Greek—Aristophanic—word that I
understood at the time all the better, the less I knew of it: utopia.
Adorno, ‘Amorbach’
(quoted in Claussen 2008, p.50)
1Introduction
The idea of this thesis developed from two linked perceptions concerning the
situation of Marx’s thought in International Relations. The first was provoked by recent
debates with IR Marxism,1 debates whose inconclusive nature suggests that Marxist
thinking in the discipline has now reached an impasse, arriving at a point where it is
posing itself theoretical problems that its long-established modes of intellectual
procedure are unable to resolve, or even to formulate in a way that captures the full
extent of the issues. So, setting aside the specifics and considering the controversy from
a wider perspective, these intra-Marxist discussions over the status of the states system
within global capitalism can be seen to have a significance in themselves in relation to
the present situation of Marxist theory in IR quite beyond the merits of any of the
individual contributions: on the one hand IR Marxism has at last come to realise that it
must focus theoretical attention in a concerted way on the central problematic of the
discipline – the existence of the international itself; but on the other, it has been unable
to provide any really convincing explanations. Such a situation of theoretical deficit
may frustrate, but it also provides an opportunity for reflection, both on what should be
the objects of enquiry for thinking that claims a Marxian inheritance and on Marx’s own
theory – what type of theorising it is and what its contemporary import is, what it means
to ‘do Marx’ at this distance and in this historical juncture. That the current debates are
happening only now, after several decades of Marxist thought in IR, serves to make
clear in retrospect that IR Marxism has, to an important degree, continually fallen short
of its own proper ambition as radical theory. For, while other approaches may be able to
content themselves with examining how the world works, assuming many
determinations as simply given, thinking that draws upon Marx should ask the deeper
question of what it is, try to rend the veil of appearances. The point of theory in the
spirit of Marx is to denaturalise the forms of the social world, to reveal the rigidified
objective structures of social being as semblance, the estranged products of the subject’s
own activity that it does not recognise as such. Thus, in the tradition of critique
inherited from German Idealism, Marx’s theory of capital does not simply provide a
description of the functioning of the capitalist economy as one historical economic form
                                                
1
 See Cambridge Review of International Affairs 2007 and 2009 and Anievas 2010 for the main
contributions.
2among others; rather, it seeks to grasp why there is an ‘economy’ as an apparently
objective sphere of human existence in the first place, how the object becomes an
economic thing and what that means. Correlatively, in the field of IR, it would be
necessary not merely to develop a distinctively Marxist account of the workings of
geopolitics, specifically in its contemporary capitalist form,2 but to show why there is
geopolitics at all, why there is such a thing as ‘the international’ as a mode of human
existence. Only through this critical enquiry might it then be possible to address the
associated question, the focus of current interest, of the connection between the
international and global capital: within an increasingly integrated world, an integration
driven by the myriad exchanges of the world market but taking place in numerous other
spheres, there continue to be many separate political entities – so why do all the other
forms of integration not produce political integration? The recent discussions have had
the great merit of opening up enquiry into these questions that are fundamental to the
discipline, while at the same time making it clear that if Marxian theory is to provide
any answers, then the meaning of Marx in IR has to be reconsidered. In that sense, the
current impasse is freighted with possibility.
The second perception, also derived from the recent debates, concerns the
relation of Marxian thought to Realism. For E.H. Carr, Marx was, at least in his most
effective thoughts, a kind of Realist, exposing the (economically) interested nature of all
pretensions to universality, and their basis in brute power.3 Such undermining of liberal
eirenism has always been a significant element within Marxist thinking in IR, and
continues to provide a point of association with Realism. However, despite a shared
hostility to liberalism (albeit hostilities that live off different centres), it has been much
more usual in recent times for Marxism in IR, like most radical theory in the discipline,
to regard Realism as the enemy. This is not simply because Realism defines the
mainstream. Rather, it results from the seemingly unbreachable limits that Realism
places upon the meaningfulness of social change. The deepest thing that Realism in IR
says – although says by implication rather than in a theoretically self-conscious way – is
that there is something inescapably irrational about the form of the political. The latter
may be the medium of human freedom, self-determination and universality, but, so
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 Still the ambition of the most recent Marxist contribution, Colás and Pozo 2011.
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 Carr 2001, pp.64–8.
3Realism argues, any political space is always delimited and particularistic,4 creating a
division of inside and outside such that there is a persistent and antagonistic
contradiction between the whole and the parts, the individual political ‘unit’ and the
system of which it forms an element (to use Kenneth Waltz’s terminology). For
Realism, the political, seen from the perspective of the international, is really just a
modality of human self-preservation. Given these assumptions about political space, the
international is necessarily imagined by Realism as an intractable problem: the domestic
scene, the inside space, is the place of order, intentionality and the pursuit of the good
life; but the international, the outside, lacking any superordinate authority, remains
ungoverned, anarchic and conflict-ridden.5 Within the political space, humans may hope
to achieve control over their own lives and some measure of progress; the international,
by contrast, knows no progress and no qualitative change, remaining always dominated
by the imperatives of survival and the perennial problems of war and peace. The history
that takes place within the scene of the political thus has an unreality about it, a
semblance quality, remaining forever trapped within the timeless state of nature of the
international. It is perhaps Realism’s most profound insight that through the political
humans are both free and unfree: free because political being separates them from
enthrallment to nature, unfree because it ensnares them within the anarchic space of the
international. At the level of the whole, the totality, humanity remains unaware of itself
and not in control of its own existence – there is not and never has been a global social
subject.6 In IR, Realism is thus a doctrine of the necessary limits of human reason: if the
political is badly particularistic in its very form, then no change in the organisation of
the inner space qua political space is possible that would remove human society from
the fateful condition of the international. We are trapped.
All radical theory in IR struggles, in one way or another, against the boundaries
imposed by Realism. But for none is the issue so important as for Marxist thought,
which, as the inheritor of the leading motif of German Idealism – freedom –, has as its
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 Or, as Carl Schmitt puts it: ‘All law is “situational law”’ (Schmitt 2005, p.13).
5
 As classically expressed by Martin Wight (Wight 1966b).
6
 Raymond Aron expresses a similar idea: ‘As long as each collectivity must think of its own safety at the
same time as of that of the diplomatic system or of the human race, diplomatic-strategic behavior will
never be rationally determined, even in theory’ (Aron 2003, p.17). From this perspective, the many
arguments that neo-Realism, in particular, is misguided in its emphasis on anarchy, which is deemed a
limited heuristic, are, at best, of only subsidiary relevance because they miss the important point: that for
as long as the political has existed, so has the international, and that the latter severely constrains the
freedom of the former.
4deepest impulse liberation from ‘all the muck of ages’.7 Realism’s necessary limits
violently and directly cut across the telos of Marxian thought: freedom, in an emphatic
sense, cannot be reconciled with Realism’s vision of the political and the international.
A dawning awareness of the meaning of this tension between Realism and Marxism is
again perceptible in the themes of the recent debates in IR Marxism: in attempting to
understand international relations, should Marxists incorporate a necessary ‘realist
moment’8 into their theoretical constructions or would to do so be to introduce into the
body of historical materialism a sort of poison, an element that it cannot assimilate and
that would ultimately corrode it from within? Can Marxism take up Realist thematics
and make use of them, and, if so, how, without endangering its own innermost being?
Ultimately, what should Marxist thinking make of the actuality of Realism? Something
of the unresolved ambivalences at work here, in truth the continued disarray and
confusion of IR Marxism in relation to Realism, is evident in the fact that the same
Marxist who argues for the inclusion of the ‘realist moment’ in Marxist IR elsewhere
scorns Realism as nothing but ‘a theoretical articulation of the spontaneous ideology of
state managers’9 and its expression of the intractable contradictions of political action as
just hypocritical ‘Statesman’s Lament’.10 High-handed dismissal of Realism as mere
ideology is of long tradition in IR Marxism: years ago, Robert Cox proclaimed neo-
Realism to be just ‘the ideological form abstracted from the real historical framework
imposed by the Cold War’,11 a historical period in which the ‘apparent stability or fixity
in power relations favor[ed] the problem-solving approach’;12 in his early work, Justin
Rosenberg suggested that ‘realism sounds plausible because it articulates commonly
held common-sense assumptions about world politics’13 and that in IR, as a
predominantly US discipline, Realism is the natural expression of the ingrained
characteristics of American social science: positivistic, problem-solving, funded by
influential private or state-connected bodies, and subject to a demand for policy-
relevant studies; and Benno Teschke is vehement in his denunciation: ‘The reasons for
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 Marx and Engels 1968, p.87.
8
 Callinicos 2007, p.542.
9
 Callinicos in Callinicos and Rosenberg 2008, p.83.
10
 ibid., p.108.
11
 Cox 1986, p.211.
12
 ibid., p.210. Aside from its skewed chronology – Theory of International Politics was published in
1979 and neo-Realism rose to pre-eminence during the 1980s and 1990s, as the Cold War ended –, this
argument is just too crude in its unmediated reading off of theoretical developments from the surface of
contemporary history.
13
 Rosenberg 1994, p.29 (emphasis in original). It should be noted that Rosenberg’s view of the
importance of Realism has changed substantially in the meanwhile.
5Neorealism’s continuing dominance are manifold. Academic socialization into an
Americanized discipline … reinforces a vocabulary and a collective disciplinary mind-
set that narrows the options for free thought. The lure of consultancies and the prospects
of involvement in the political establishment – advice for the prince – short-circuit
critical thought.’14 However, such criticism is only ever external to the matter at hand,
abstract negation, and is unable to grasp whatever of truth there might be in Realism. So
Realism keeps returning, unscathed, and Marxism remains perplexed by what to do with
the seemingly inescapable ‘realist moment’. In fact, the Marxists do protest too much:
insistence that Realism’s centrality to the discipline is due only to circumstantial
reasons, serviceability to power interests, and denial that it has grasped fundamental
determinations with a force and clarity that Marxism has never managed serve only to
mask the depth of the wound Realism inflicts. This has been the characteristic split
personality, a sort of theoretical schizophrenia, of Marxist IR in relation to Realism: on
the one hand confident dismissal of the latter as empty appearance, a phantasmagoria of
reified ideological illusions easily seen through; and on the other, the continual and
inadequately mediated recurrence of the structures and determinations Realism insists
upon within the analyses produced by IR Marxism. In assuring themselves that they are
already free from Realism, the Marxists have remained under its spell.
These two motivating perceptions are linked because, in IR, Realism is the
theory of the international.15 No other theoretical position has consistently focused with
such clear-headedness on the central fact of the discipline: the existence of a fragmented
global political space composed of a plurality of political entities. That is why Realism
has for so long constituted the theoretical centre of IR; and what it means is that the
critique of Realism is also the critique of the international, and vice versa. That
Marxism in IR has been unable convincingly to comprehend either Realism or the
international brings the Marxist theorising that goes on in the discipline itself into
question. The recent discussions of the so-called many-states problem were brought to a
close with a typically Marxist gesture of setting aside abstract theory and debate, rolling
up one’s sleeves and getting on with what actually matters, intellectual work that is
relevant to the real world, thought devoted to practice: ‘Yet perhaps the time for
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 Teschke 2003, p.274.
15
 Justin Rosenberg formulates the problem thus posed to radical theory: that Realism ‘is the only
international theory we have, but it is nevertheless the wrong one’ (Callinicos and Rosenberg 2008, p.99).
6methodological clarification is past. What is needed now is substantive analysis that can
test the rival theoretical constructions and—more importantly—help us better
understand the confusing and dangerous world in which we find ourselves.’16 But this is
just an evasion, really a confession of theoretical failure. For it is precisely the point
that, for all its complaints about reification, Marxism in IR has never managed to
understand the abstractness of Realism (especially neo-Realism) or the form problem of
the political17 and hence the condition of the international – its notorious ‘timelessness’.
The innumerable substantive analyses of processes of power, imperialism, hegemony,
resistance and struggle, the seemingly tangible stuff of history, instead simply remain
blind to the problem posed by Realism and always fall short of the thing that most
urgently calls for critique. Such realism leaves Realism untouched. Rather, the
inconclusive nature of the recent debates demonstrates the necessity of rethinking the
use of Marx in IR. If Marxian thought is to be brought to bear in a compelling way on
the central problems of the discipline, then a different Marx will have to be discerned.
Such a Marx cannot remain, as it were, a pre-Realist one. Instead, in thinking through
the possible meaning of Marx in IR, it would be necessary to reflect on what history, the
experience of the 20
th
 century as expressed through Realism, has done to Marx and
Marxism.18 There is here a paradox: on the one hand the world is more overwhelmingly
capitalistic than ever, and so to that extent, despite all of the enormous process of
development in the meanwhile, the fundamental categories of Marx’s critique, as the
thinking of capital, remain indispensable;19 but on the other, politically the world looks
more like neo-Realism than it does anything envisaged in the Communist Manifesto.
World-spanning capital does not generate its own supersession from within itself but
produces an ungoverned international political space comprising a multitude of sharply
delimited nation-states, identical ‘units’ iterated across the globe. In that sense, neo-
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 Callinicos 2009, p.103.
17 Norberto Bobbio describes it as ‘the ABC of the theory of the state’ that it has ‘two faces’, one turned
in towards its citizens, the other turned out towards other political entities (Bobbio 1987, p.197). What is
meant by ‘form problem of the political’ in this thesis is this inside/outside structure, the bounded,
delimited and particularistic form of the political; ultimately, why the political produces what Realism
conceives of as the ‘ontology of danger’ (Odysseos 2002) in the anarchic condition of the international
state of nature.
18
 The intention here has nothing in common with, for instance, Andrew Linklater’s attempt to synthesise
Marxism and Realism with the hope of producing a sensible middle way ‘beyond’ them both, the
excesses of each tempered by the insights of the other (Linklater 1990). The aim is the reverse: to mediate
the two through their extremes.
19
 See Adorno 2003a, his 1968 speech as outgoing chair of the German Sociological Society, in which he
argues that, despite the immense historical changes since Marx’s time, and despite aspects of his
theorising having been disproved by history, nevertheless the basic categories of Marx’s critique of
capital remain constitutive of modern society, which is incomprehensible without them.
7Realism is the political expression of advanced capital on the international scale. That
Marx’s expectations for human social and political development with the transcendence
of capital and class society have been so thoroughly confuted through the development
of the very societal process of which he remains the seminal theorist affects profoundly
the meaning of his theoretical corpus. The evaporation, as a mere phantasm, of the
future once confidently foreseen beyond capital produces a crisis of the latter’s
intelligibility; and so Marxian theory becomes a historical enigma, at once more
obscure and more urgent.
In an essay from 1929, ‘Night Music’, written amid the prolonged death throes
of the liberal epoch, Theodor Adorno reflected for perhaps the first time on a subject
that would always preoccupy him: the historical fate of works of culture,20 the ageing of
the great products of the bourgeois Spirit. Characteristically, it is the objectivity of the
process that he strives to articulate: ‘It is vital to remain mindful of the fact that changes
take place within the works, not simply in the people who interpret them. The state of
truth in works corresponds to the state of truth in history.’21 There is no finished, sealed-
off object that remains always self-identical through time and is simply regarded in
different ways at different moments, in an external manner. Nor is the interpreter, in
nominalist fashion, radically separate from the work. Rather, both participate in history,
which acts on the essence of the work itself, its interior. ‘History has unlocked the
works and revealed the original essences within them, has made them evident; they
become visible only through the disintegration of their morphological unity in the form
of the work.’22 Through this process of corrosion, the immediate self-evidence of the
work, its speaking quality, is irretrievably lost, while its stored-up significance is
released: ‘the truth character of the works is tied precisely to their disintegration. … In
reality, those essences separate from the work, layer by layer, when their hour has
come, and none can be restored to the work once gone. There is no choosing between
them, and all that our power of insight can do is ensure the realization of those essences
which form part of the full currentness of the work.’23 This is the experience that Marx’s
oeuvre has undergone, many of its constitutive layers that formed the phenomenon of
‘Marxism’ stripped away by history, gone forever. For Adorno, in 1929, it was apparent
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 In this case, as often with Adorno, musical works.
21
 Adorno 2009, p.86.
22
 ibid., p.82.
23
 ibid., pp.88–9.
8that what had been lost from bourgeois music was its substantiality as the expression of
subjective freedom; the tense, precarious unity of subjective intention and objective
form – the subject’s realisation of itself as form, achieved with the greatest force by
Beethoven – had finally dissolved. In much the same way, it may be said that what has
gone from Marx’s work are the layers of its conscious intentionality, that whole aspect,
ranging across the entire corpus and charged with such rhetorical pathos, that speaks of
his confidence in the immanent movement of history: that, through the class struggle
and the dialectic of the forces and relations of production, the human subject, in the
figure of the revolutionary proletariat, was historically on the point of reclaiming for
itself alienated objectivity in a society of unfettered, limitless productivity. This
vanished side of Marx, his conviction that his own version of the immanent dialectic of
history was the rightful inheritor of the bourgeois-idealist Hegelian one, and that the
constructive power of Labour would actually fulfil what idealism could only
deceptively promise, shaped subsequent Marxist thought right into its innermost forms.
But it is not all of Marx. ‘With the departure of the transcendental substance, critique
also leaves the realm of subjective immanence: its position becomes transcendental.
Certainly it cannot undo the muteness of the remaining work; by viewing the work and
its substance as separated through time, however, it looks upon the muteness of the
work itself, and the contours of the mute work are of a very different nature from those
of the speaking work.’24 History has passed the positive Marxist vision by, dissolving it
in the process, but it has also revealed the contours of the ‘mute’ Marx, the negative,
critical element of Marx’s thinking, more clearly; a Marx whose themes – critique of
ideality, of capital, of domination, and of society as second nature – have a depth and
resonance beyond his own subjective understanding of them. It is this element that
thinks the objectivity of society and history most deeply, and that still demands
interpretation. After Marxism, Marx becomes more, not less, radical.25
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 ibid., p.92.
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 An instance of this is the eclipse of so-called Marxist economics by the burgeoning field of value
theory studies, an altogether deeper – indeed, ontologically totally different – exploration of the meaning
of Marx’s theory of capital as a critique of political economy. It is probable that such a development
could not have occurred while the traditional Marxist political vision still held sway: so long as Labour
was unproblematically assumed to be the solution to the exploitative system of capital, the critical scope
of the theory was obscured. (Rubin 1972 and Rosdolsky 1989 are classic statements in value studies, and
Elston 1979, Backhaus 1980, 1992 and 2005, Postone 2003, Arthur 2004 and Reichelt 2007 provide
representative more recent contributions; see also the journals Capital & Class and, in particular,
Historical Materialism, which have carried much of the English-language value theory debate. Not
coincidentally, some of the pioneers of the value theory revival, including Hans-Georg Backhaus and
Helmut Reichelt, were students of Adorno’s.)
9Adorno, the other major theoretical inspiration for this project, grasped the
problem of the historical meaning of Marxian theory very precisely. Much of his
thinking aims at opening out the critical thematics broached but often left in an only
fragmentary or embryonic state in Marx’s thought, in particular the critique of idealism.
In doing so, Adorno would go substantially beyond Marx,26 but his differences from
Marx are, in a sense, the truest form of loyalty to the latter’s legacy:
Though [Adorno’s] materialism vies with Marx’s own, it is distinctly a form of
Marxism, and most of all in the sense that the restoration of the content [i.e. the
primacy of the material] relies on an insight that can be followed from
antiquity’s critique of lex talionis, to Rousseau, to Kant, to Fichte’s critique of
capital punishment, and most of all to Marx: that there is nothing that can be
traded for life that is its equal. Wage does not compensate either in maximums or
minimums; the internal structure of the wage relation is necessarily life robbed
and sacrificed. This insight was a given for Adorno; pushed, it could be called
the meaning of his thought. And while he was completely aware that Marx’s
theory of class struggle did not begin to comprehend the whole structure of
domination and failed to carry through the critique of life as labor, still Adorno
could not have imagined that anything could be hoped for socially that would not
somehow make good on this fundamental insight into the inequality of
exchange.27
Adorno was, of course, notoriously distanced from practical Marxism, espousing no
form of political involvement or theory, and it might appear eccentric that so apolitical a
figure should be a central theorist for a work in IR.28 Yet, long after the extinction of
Marxism as a political force, and amidst the contemporary crisis of any political action
that is not simply the maintenance of the liberal-capitalist status quo, Adorno’s thinking
itself perhaps reveals layers that were once obscure, a kind of political content and
significance that far transcends the horizon of even radical politics. As with Marx and
the Idealists, the Idea of freedom informs every word Adorno wrote, and his thinking
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 Where Adorno dissents from Marx, either explicitly or, more often, by implication, it is where he
perceives unreflected idealist elements within Marx’s would-be materialist thought.
27
 Hullot-Kentor 2006, pp.161–2.
28
 In Perry Anderson’s judgement from the mid-1970s, Adorno took the most extreme position of any of
the figures of ‘Western Marxism’: ‘A final alternative was to abandon both enrolment and any discourse
within politics altogether: Adorno’s stance in post-war Germany’ (Anderson 1977, p.44). For Anderson,
whatever the other merits of Adorno’s thought, to which he is not insensible, this is disastrous because it
is an article of dogma for the orthodox Marxist that really meaningful theory is only possible through
active unity with the Labour movement. Adorno’s thinking, by contrast, hostile to collectivism in any
form, consciously lives off its isolation, the individual subject’s capacity for experience (see Adorno
2005a, ‘Dedication’; Adorno 2001b, ‘Quality and The Individuated’; and Hullot-Kentor 2006, pp.162–3).
10
was deeply and consciously shaped by the movement of history, society’s
developmental process of which freedom would have to be the determinate negation.29
So, just as in the 1930s and 40s Realism came to dominate IR as global political
catastrophe exploded the illusory nature of liberal convictions concerning historical
progress, the same events caused Adorno to rethink the philosophy of history and the
meaning of materialism,30 pushing them further than Marx. And in the mid-1960s,
Negative Dialectics is explicit at the outset that it takes up the burden of theory again
after the failure of Marxism as practice: it opens with the declaration, ‘philosophy,
which once seemed outmoded, remains alive because the moment of its realization was
missed,’31 and goes on, with incomparable gentleness, almost in an undertone, ‘perhaps
the interpretation that promised the transition did not suffice’.32 Adorno’s continual
concern with the concept and with abstract epistemological issues has, at root, the most
practical intention: critical theory is to come to self-understanding through self-
reflection for the sake of a better practice, one that will not remain trapped within
determinations it does not understand and that destroy it.33 This was to be achieved
through unremitting engagement with the heights of identity philosophy, taking up what
Marx had broken off and left unfinished. For if, as Adorno argued, philosophy as
idealism has never managed to be more than just the reflection-form of the actual,
exploitative, practice of antagonistic society, then, conversely, the constitutive
categories of the philosophical tradition tell the deepest truths about the false condition.
Only through materialist theory, a negative dialectics, that comprehends the formal
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categories in their highest degree of abstraction would a true practice be able to liberate
itself.
The thesis, then, is an attempt to formulate a materialist critique of Realism.34 It
tries to grasp what Adorno would call the truth content of Realism, without in any way
conceding to Realist essentialising. In doing so, the movement of the chapters as a
whole is from Marx to Adorno. Marx’s oeuvre, in struggling to free itself from
idealism, is shot through with cross-cutting and contradictory theoretical tendencies;
part of the argument of the thesis is that the historical developments that gave rise to
Realism in IR in the 20
th
 century destroyed the idealist elements of Marx’s thought, and
that Adorno realised this more clearly than anyone else, making that historical
experience central to his own thinking about idealism and materialism. Adorno’s
materialism, unthinkable without Marx, is nevertheless more rigorously thought through
than Marx’s. However, Marxism in IR, especially in relation to Realism, has usually
relied, consciously or not, on those traditional Marxist assumptions and forms of
theorising that are, at this historical distance, at best of doubtful validity, at worst
defunct; thus, as argued here, it has struggled to understand Realism. Chapter 1
therefore attempts in a more extensive way to situate the current impasse of Marxism in
IR and to identify the question that the debate appears to be revolving around without
being able to resolve. It argues that Realism poses a much more serious challenge to
Marxist thought than Marxist IR has been willing to admit, and that the central issue is
Realism’s conception of the nature of the political, and therewith of the international.
Surveying the major trends in IR Marxism, it is shown that none has developed any
critical theory of the political, indeed that most remain completely blind to the problem
and that this theoretical deficiency goes back to Marx’s own thinking. Hence, in the
field of international politics, they are always vulnerable to Realism. The chapter
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of its content’ (Hullot-Kentor 2006, p.161); that is, materialism would be a thinking that does justice to
the object.
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concludes by suggesting that the currently dominant form of Marxist research in IR,
causal-historical studies, is inadequate for the critique of Realism and that a different
kind of theory needs to be developed, focusing on the theme of materialism.
The substantive argument thereafter is essentially constructed in three stages.
Chapter 2 addresses the question of history, demonstrating that there is a whole side of
Marx’s thinking that is thematically closely related to Realism. It shows that the major
strategy of the established Marxist attack on Realism is to counterpose historical
dynamics and change (driven by class struggle, revolution, and so on) to Realist stasis
and repetition. Again, it is suggested that such a critique can only remain external to
Realism: first, because Realism can allow for, and is perfectly aware of, any amount of
historical change within the form of the international but insists, in a way unanswered
by IR Marxism, that the condition of the international itself does not change; and
secondly, because it fails to grasp why Realism empties out history as it does, what the
meaning of that evacuation is. The chapter goes on to argue that the Realist discourse
can be understood as, in an emphatic sense, mythic; that all its major themes are drawn
from the realm of myth and that it imagines the international as a mythic domain, an
objective structure of unfreedom, endless repetition and entrapment. It then goes on to
show that this conception, so far from being alien to Marx’s understanding of the rule of
capital, is deeply congruent with it. Marx’s entire analysis of capital is pervaded at
every level with the themes of myth: capital is itself myth. This suggests a very different
understanding of the relation between Realism and Marxian theory, and the meaning of
history in both, from that put forward by IR Marxism.
Having established this thematic correlation between Marx’s theory of capital
and Realism, Chapter 3 concentrates on explaining why capital should be understood as
mythic. The central theme is the critique of abstraction, or the ideal. From its
beginnings, in the texts on Hegel, Marx’s thinking deals in a satirico-critical way with
questions of ideality, which he continually denounces as producing an inverted reality
in which the ideal dominates the real and which holds back the movement of history. In
the critique of political economy, ideality is the structuring principle, as, through the
development of the categories of the commodity form, money and capital, the entire
system is shown to be a gigantic, compulsive labyrinth constructed by the self-moving
abstraction, value. The chapter then shows how, after the failure of Marxism-as-politics
13
and in the shadow of fascism, the critique of idealism was taken up and pushed
substantially further by Adorno, notably in Dialectic of Enlightenment, in his
speculative construction of the philosophy of history: the identity of myth and
modernity.
In light of the elements of the critique of idealism thus developed, Chapter 4
then finally turns to the decisive question of the political and the problem of its form. It
takes up specific themes from Giorgio Agamben and Carl Schmitt concerning
sovereignty and the state of exception and reads these through Adorno’s critique of the
structure of the concept, the instrument of ideality. The argument is that the forms of
generality and universality of the concept and of the political are the same and that that
generality, rooted as it is in domination, is necessarily delimited and particular. The
chapter goes on to explore what Agamben sets up as the ‘debate’ between Schmitt and
Walter Benjamin over sovereignty and the exception and shows how the themes of that
debate are taken up by Adorno in Dialectic of Enlightenment as part of the critique of
constitutive subjectivity, which can thus be read also as a critique of the political. This
sheds light on fundamental issues of IR concerning political form and the international
as state of nature.
The Conclusion tries to draw these various threads together, setting out the
answers to the research aims, and elaborates some of the implications of the overall
argument for thinking about IR theory and the meaning of Realism.
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Chapter 1
----
Marxism and Realism
Introduction: This chapter establishes the research aims of the thesis. After situating
the current debates in Marxist IR, it identifies the question that they revolve around as
being Marxism’s relation to Realism. This has two aspects: 1) how to understand
political multiplicity, and its relation to capitalism, without conceding to Realist
essentialising; and 2) more importantly, how to respond to Realism’s conception of the
‘tragic’ nature of the international, what is termed here ‘the challenge of Realism’. The
key issue that links these is Realism’s idea of the intrinsically delimited and
particularistic nature of political form. A survey of the major schools of IR Marxism
shows that none has developed a substantial and coherent theory of the political and so
none has been able to get beyond the Realist idea of the international. The chapter then
shows that this flaw can be traced back to Marx’s own thinking about social
transformation and its lack of a critical account of political being. It concludes by
arguing that if the challenge of Realism is to be met, a different sort of theory from the
causal-historical kind currently prevalent in IR Marxism needs to be developed, and that
this might be achieved through pursuing the philosophical thematic of materialism in
Marx.
***
Marxism and the International
In one sense, the international, as the totality, has always been the proper scale
of Marx’s theory. The intrinsically expansionary, globalising dynamics of capital,
identified by Marx as early as the Communist Manifesto, lent to the tradition of Marxist
thought from the beginning a perspective beyond that of the single society, and led to
socialist and communist political agitation and activity being self-consciously
‘international’ in their intentions even in the 19
th
 century. As such, ‘Marxist thought on
international relations pre-dates its [i.e. IR’s] formal establishment as an
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institutionalized field of study’.1 Yet, for all its affinity with the global view, Marxism
in IR has had great difficulty grasping the central problematic of the discipline: the
international. While Marx and Engels wrote extensively on contemporaneous world
events, their interest was largely one of analysing the tendency of those developments in
order to assess the possibilities of revolutionary political action. International relations
presented a practical problem rather than a theoretical one: the fragmentation of global
political space was registered empirically but not penetrated by theory.2 This deficiency
was not made good in the Classical Marxist theories of imperialism developed in the
early 20
th
 century.
3
 Certainly, as the 19
th
-century expectation of socialist revolution in
Western Europe was confounded and capitalist accumulation reached further into the
periphery and the non-capitalist world, imperialism theory, in comparison with the
international thought of the founders of historical materialism, represented a concerted
attempt to derive epochal global political dynamics from the development of capital.
The expansion and intensification of colonial and imperialist activity by the core and
aspiring capitalist powers of Europe, and with it the inter-imperialist rivalry that
culminated in the First World War, were linked both to the world economic crisis of
1873–98 and, more deeply, to a transformation in the process of accumulation and the
social instantiation of capital: the transition to the era of monopoly capitalism. The
theory of imperialism, in its various articulations, deeply shaped subsequent Marxist
thought, both rhetorically and at the more far-reaching level of the conception of theory
construction, pioneering within Marxism ‘two kinds of intermediary analysis that, while
of a higher resolution than general theorizing about the capitalist mode, operate at
different levels; respectively, that of a specific phase of capitalist development and that
of a determinate historical moment – in other words, of epoch and conjuncture.’4 The
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 Marx’s inaugural address to the International Working Men’s Association, from 1864, is characteristic.
It concludes with the rallying cry that the European ruling classes’ foreign policies ‘in pursuit of criminal
designs, playing upon national prejudices, and squandering in piratical wars the people’s blood and
treasure … have taught the working classes the duty to master themselves the mysteries of international
politics; to watch the diplomatic acts of their respective governments; to counteract them, if necessary, by
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individuals, as the rules paramount to the intercourse of nations.
The fight for such a foreign policy forms part of the general struggle for the emancipation of the
working classes.
Proletarians of all countries unite!’ (Marx 1992c, p.81).
Rhetorical exhortations aside, the simple laws of morals and justice, whatever they may be, have proved
insufficient to solve ‘the mysteries of international politics’.
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 The classic collection on theories of imperialism is Owen and Sutcliffe 1983.
4
 Callinicos 2005, p.355.
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epoch would be the overarching phase (the Age of Imperialism, for instance); the
conjuncture, the particular event or confluence of circumstances (at its most specific,
say, August 1914). Analysis and theorisation in terms of epoch and conjuncture became
and remain staple within Marxist thought, and Marxist theorising as it has developed
within International Relations from the 1970s is no exception, although the inherently
global nature of the discipline encourages such analysis at a notably high level of
generality. This mode of historical thinking, eliding with historical sociology, has been
the trade mark of Marxist thought generally within IR, from periodisations of the
development of the capitalist world system, through debates on the transition from
feudalism to capitalism and the emergence of the modern states system, down to
conjunctural analyses of the trajectories of particular instances of national development
and the numerous critical accounts of Western, in particular US, imperialism. However,
for all its achievements, the whole of this tradition remains immanent to the problematic
of IR: the context of political multiplicity is assumed and the focus of interest is tracing
the dynamics of geopolitics and, more broadly, social development, read through the
lens of the growth of the capitalist world market. The international itself is not made the
object of critique.
The onset of globalisation at the beginning of the 1990s, followed by the turn to
a self-declaredly militarised foreign policy by the leading capitalist power, have
sometimes been held to vindicate the continued relevance of Marxist thought after the
polarisations of the Cold War and its eclipse as radical theory especially in the 1980s5 –
the Communist Manifesto hailed as announcing globalisation avant la lettre and the
foreign policy stance of the Bush administration evidencing, once again, the perennial
necessity of imperialist rivalry to the dynamics of capitalism. But Marxism’s
engagement with other theoretical positions in IR during the same period has revealed
that the matter is more complex than a straightforward reaffirmation of orthodox
Marxist manners allows. The Marxist critique of globalisation theory was to the effect
that, far from announcing a new dawn of global integration, overcoming inter-state
rivalry through the networks of civil society, promoting human rights and liberal
governance, the phenomenon was best explained as the latest round of the intrinsically
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expansionary dynamics of the capitalist accumulation process, with all the unevenness
and contradictions that that necessarily entailed, and that, conjuncturally, the precipitate
end of the Cold War unleashed in the early 1990s forces of integration on a global scale
that had been accumulating for at least twenty years.6 To a significant extent, the
Marxist account was aligned with the narrower Realist critique of liberal
internationalism in the 1990s, which doubted whether the new era had surpassed inter-
state rivalry, that is, had radically transformed the nature of international politics.7 With
the turn of the millennium, the stridently aggressive foreign policy posture of the US
government provoked on the Marxist left a revival of the old theories of imperialism
(never absent from the mainstream of Marxist discourse but here given a shot in the
arm), updated to apply to the latest global situation but recognisably indebted to the
Classical Marxist legacy. However, where the critique of globalisation had indicated
common ground with Realism and its ‘sometimes splendid demolitions of liberal
ideology’,8 the arguments of the thinkers of the so-called New Imperialism make plain
the cost of any such accommodation. For, where Lenin and the other early 20
th
-century
theorists of imperialism had needed geopolitical conflict as an integral part of the theory
because such competition between the major capitalist powers provided the opportunity,
the space, for revolution in the semi-periphery, a century later the inevitability of
geopolitical rivalry had been definitively subsumed to the Realist tradition in
international thought. If the economic reductionism of the old Leninism could not be
maintained, what was to be the status of geopolitics within any updated concept of
imperialism? This issue has coalesced with the investigation within Marxist historical
sociology of the specifically international dimension of the process of capitalist
development, the causal importance within the expansionary dynamic of capitalism of
the fractured, multiple nature of global political space, to form the question formulated
by Alex Callinicos: ‘Does capitalism need the state system?’9
Cleaving to the theory of imperialism yet desirous of avoiding its hard
economism, Callinicos proposes10 a conception of ‘capitalist imperialism as constituted
by the intersection of, respectively, capitalist and territorial logics of power and
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 Together with other theorists, notably David Harvey (see Harvey 2005, esp. pp.26–30).
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economic and geopolitical competition’.11 In this way, the state system, geopolitics, is to
be incorporated non-deductively into the broader theory of capital, as an independent
determination to be introduced as one moves from Marx’s abstract theorisation by
degrees closer to reality. The relation between the two logics is apparently to be
conceived of as contradictory and dialectical rather than functionally one-sided.12 ‘One
implication of this’, as Callinicos admits, ‘is that there is, necessarily, a realist moment
in any Marxist analysis of international relations and conjunctures’.13 At a simple
analytical level this is, perhaps, reasonable enough: geopolitical considerations do
indeed form part of international politics and ought therefore to find a place within any
causal account. Beyond that, however, all the important questions remain unanswered.
For Callinicos purports simultaneously to incorporate geopolitics into a theory of
capitalism and to leave it as an autonomous element. Gonzalo Pozo-Martin is quick to
see the problem: ‘if the territorial logic of competition is autonomous, does it follow
that we must relinquish an attempt to explain its determinations from the perspective of
historical materialism?’14 Allowing a ‘realist moment’ immediately reopens the painful
theoretical gap that Callinicos was otherwise trying to close, for it leaves the ‘territorial
logic’, geopolitics, as itself something simply posited and underived: the theory of
capital is supposed to explain why there is a capitalist logic of competition, but what is
to explain why there is a territorial, political logic? In truth, the ‘New Imperialism’ has
done little to remedy the deficiencies of the older imperialism theory regarding the
relation between capitalism and the states system. Where the earlier theory, along with
its economic reductionism, ‘took the nation state as a social relation in its plural
manifestations—the states system—as given, failing to problematize, much less
theorize, the fact that nation states were “relevant units” in the world economy’,15 the
new one, in flight from economism, replaces this failure with a hypostatisation of the
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territorial logic that the state system is said to articulate.16 Nonetheless, the debate over
the New Imperialism has served to suggest the specific tension between Marxism and
Realism: Pozo-Martin’s doubt about Callinicos’s Realist moment, about whether
Marxism can in any way afford an accommodation with Realism, senses without
developing the fact that Realism, pre-eminent theory of the geopolitical, presents a
specific problem for Marxist thought, a problem that is more far-reaching than the latter
has been willing to admit.
The Challenge of Realism
What is it that underlies the meditations on the intransigence of international
conflict in Realist thought in International Relations? What is it that makes Realism the
central theory of the discipline? Justin Rosenberg observes with regard to the relative
philosophical resources of liberalism and Realism in IR: ‘in International Theory, I
think it would be truer to say that it is liberalism which is intrinsically shallow, and
Realism which, for all its problems, is connected to a circumstance of profound
significance.’17 That circumstance is the fact of ‘inter-societal coexistence’, the
‘political fragmentation’ of humanity.18 This kernel of Realist thought has been set out
axiomatically by Robert Gilpin.19 Three assumptions underlie the Realist view of
international political life:
The first is the essentially conflictual nature of international affairs. … The
second … is that the essence of social reality is the group … in a world of
scarce resources and conflict over the distribution of those resources, human
beings confront one another ultimately as members of groups, and not as
isolated individuals. Homo sapiens is a tribal species, and loyalty to the tribe for
most of us ranks above all loyalties other than that of the family. In the modern
world, we have given the name “nation-state” to these competing tribes and the
name “nationalism” to this form of loyalty. True, the name, size, and
organization of the competing groups into which our species subdivides itself
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do alter over time—tribes, city-states, kingdoms, empires, and nation-
states—due to economic, demographic and technological changes. Regrettably,
however, the essential nature of intergroup conflict does not. The third
assumption that I believe characterizes realist thinking is the primacy in all
political life of power and security in human motivation.20
Realism in IR is based upon a strong claim about the nature of political existence: that
mankind, as !"#$%$&"' ()"', has always been divided into, or organised itself into,
political communities, of one sort or another, that are inherently limited and
particularistic, creating group identities – insiders and outsiders, friends and enemies,
countrymen and foreigners. Whatever the multitude of economic, cultural and other
interactions between societies, of incalculable number in the present but doubtless
existent in some measure as far back as ethnology and archaeology can trace, the
boundary, what in the course of development hardened into the political boundary, has
not been effaced. The inside, the space of politics, may be the arena in which the pursuit
of the good life is made possible, but the character of its constitution is such that
externally it always remains within the state of nature, the domain of sheer survival.
What Realism thus perceives with unequalled clarity is that the form of the political
simultaneously creates internal unity and external division. So, as the Realists can easily
concede, the configurations of the political, the modes of organisation of the inner
space, may undergo immense historical change, from at least the ancient polis through
to the modern nation state, as do, with them, the dynamics of international relations in
particular eras, but the condition of the international, the global political being of
humanity, does not essentially change, remaining always fractured and prone to
conflict. It is from this circumstance of fragmentation, of multiple particularist political
communities, with borders (whether formally defined or not) creating divisions of
inside and outside, always interacting but always potentially hostile, that Realism
deduces the inevitable periodic recurrence of war and derives the invariant abstraction
of geopolitics.
The implications of the circumstance of inter-societal coexistence for Marxist
theorising, especially in IR, are substantial, and have been most extensively, if
idiosyncratically, set out in a too little noted article by R.N. Berki from 1971. Berki
opens with the assertion that ‘the very existence of international relations poses a
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serious, and perhaps intractable, problem for Marxism’,21 because ‘international
relations presuppose the horizontal division of mankind into nations or states, and since
Marxian thought postulates the absolute unity of mankind as its ideal, problems relating
to horizontal group diversity are much more centrally relevant to the Marxian doctrine
than it is usually thought.’22 In a summary overview, Berki observes that in
‘conventional Marxism’23 classes rather than nations or states are the decisive actors in
history, and it is the struggle between classes, not inter-state conflict, that occupies the
centre of attention. In this view, the state, an apparatus of political domination, is a
product of class conflict, organised to maintain the system of exploitation internally,
and externally to facilitate the overseas expansion of the bourgeois class. Competition
for markets among a globally self-divided bourgeoisie generates recurrent (though not
constant) inter-state war. The result is that, ‘nations themselves, in Marxian theory, are
not absolute, but historical, and hence ephemeral, units’,24 and the proletariat, having a
unity of interest in overthrowing bourgeois society, is essentially a nationless class.
However, Berki then turns to Kenneth Waltz’s Man, the State and War to expose a
problem with this line of thinking. In his explication of the second image, Waltz had
surveyed the development of socialist and Marxist thinking on international issues up to
the outbreak of the First World War and drawn the conclusion that the argument that
peace can be achieved through the internal perfection of states is faulty. Berki
comments, ‘Waltz’s question is legitimate: “Is it capitalism or states that must be
destroyed in order to get peace, or must both be abolished?” The distinction between
these two phases, or tasks, is certainly warranted in point of theory.’25 Elaborating, he
observes that:
The problem … is whether the disappearance of the “state” after the overthrow
of capitalism refers only to its internal character as an agency maintaining
oppression and exploitation of one class by another … or also to its external
function, which can be defined as organizing and promoting the interests of a
group of people distinguished by their permanent occupation of a certain
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geographical area. It does not matter, of course, whether now one calls it
“state”, “nation,” or “community,” or the “administration of things” … as long
as what is meant is a plurality of these units.26
Berki notes that Marx and Engels in their practical political thinking were sometimes
enthusiastic in their support of national independence and separateness (as, for example,
in relation to Ireland and Poland) and he traces the historical phases (or traumas) in the
20
th
 century through which Marxist theorists and political figures professing an
adherence to Marxism not only came to terms with political diversity, the separateness
of nations, but embraced it – the fracturing of the European working class parties along
national lines around the First World War, the establishment of ‘socialism in one
country’ in the USSR in the 1920s, the use of Great Russian nationalism by Stalin in the
1930s, the Soviet-Yugoslav split in 1948, and so forth. The observable tendency ‘is to
afford more and more implicit recognition to the ideal of a non-antagonistic world
community consisting of separate national units.’27 Such an accommodation with
political Realism, with the seeming givenness of national diversities, might appear
simply to be a normal development as the doctrine grapples with recalcitrant reality.
However, Berki goes further and asks: ‘can Marxism afford this compromise? Does it
make any sense in terms of Marxian thought, to talk about non-antagonistic diversity?
Can Marxism at all entertain the idea of liberated but separate nations living peacefully
side by side, without thereby losing its coherence?’28 It is not necessary to concur with
all aspects of Berki’s reading of Marx’s early works to see the force of the argument,
which is that it is not possible to reconcile Marx’s idea of a condition of universal
human freedom with nations, understood not simply as the modern nation state but,
more broadly, as particularist political communities that form divisions of inside and
outside, and claim a right over a territorial area and the resources contained therein. For,
it inevitably produces a disabling fragmentation of any possible universalism when each
‘nation’ appears as, in a sense, an ‘owner of property which, in the context of a
community of nations, appears as “private property” pure and simple.’29 It is difficult to
know what non-antagonistic diversity might mean in a developed world of all-round
interconnection because ‘the point is that nations cannot help but be self-regarding, as
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long as their position is that of owners of property in a wider community characterized
by economic interdependence.’30
Berki’s argument suggests the profound difficulty that Waltz’s second image
argument poses for Marxism: that the particularist, inside/outside character of political
communities means that they are always unreconciled, at least potentially antagonistic,
and that among those communities internal politics may be hierarchic and ordered in a
great variety of ways, but international politics is always essentially anarchic. It is here
that the real and continuing power of Realism lies, as Justin Rosenberg has recently
argued at some length. Piqued by Alex Callinicos’s dismissal of Realism as
impoverished in comparison with the richness of the tradition of liberal thought,
Rosenberg, in a sense malgré lui-même, rises to a defence of the profundity of Realism
in its grasp of the seemingly intractable dilemmas of international coexistence. While
‘the substantive political analyses of neo-Realist writers [are] disablingly thin’, the
relationship between Realism and liberalism ‘is somehow more complex – and more
paradoxical – than any simple contrast of “rich” and “thin” implies.’31 The status of
Realism within IR arises from the fact that ‘there is a real sense in which liberalism (and
actually most Marxist thought) is not, and does not possess, an international theory’;32
that is, it is only Realism that has attended with the necessary seriousness to the central
premise of IR as a discipline: geopolitical fragmentation and its consequences. From
this fact of fragmentation Realism derives its normative resources and its ethical stance:
‘an ontological critique of easy, self-serving universalisms; a highly developed moral
and practical sense of the tension between ends and means; and a genuinely tragic
appreciation of the anarchically inscribed conflict of particularist (national) and
common (international) interests.’33 Problems of political life that are in some degree
resolved in the inner space of domestic political community, are re-opened in the
international domain: internally ‘legitimate’ violence appearing externally as
threatening military potential and the instability endemic to managing the relations of
sovereign entities in an anarchic field unmediated by superordinate authority. What
Realism grasps is that these problems of the ‘ethical irrationality’34 of the world assume
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their most intractable form in international relations because there is no higher level at
which they can be resolved: the nature of the political is such that the rationality and
order of the delimited political space continually issue in the irrationality and disorder
of the international. Realism’s insistent emphasis on anarchy, the balance of power, and
the tragic, fallen nature of international politics simply says, again and again, that at the
level of the whole, the totality, humanity remains blind, stumbling in the dark. The
political, the modality of human self-determination, is, at the level of the international,
perennial unfreedom. ‘This fatality … is the deeper issue to which Realism is
connected.’35
Marxism and the Political
It is from its conception of the essential nature of political form that Realism
develops its bleak vision of the unchanging, anarchic character of international politics,
and the question of the political is the ground on which any radical challenge to Realism
must take place. How have the major schools of Marxist thought within IR approached
this issue? What conceptions of the political can be found in their work?36
World-Systems Theory
Immanuel Wallerstein, progenitor of the world-systems approach, took as his
preferred object of study not the history and development of individual states, but
‘world-systems’, integrated production networks within which those individual states’
trajectories of development are placed: ‘a world-system is a social system, one that has
boundaries, structures, member groups, rules of legitimation and coherence.’37 The
peculiarity of the capitalist world-system, the primary object of study, is that it is a
uniquely long-lasting world economy, containing within itself a multiplicity of political
units. There is a fit between economic and political forms: because capital operates
beyond the bounds of any one unit, the multiple units give it a structural freedom of
manoeuvre. What, then, are these political units and what role do they play within
Wallerstein’s theorising? While deploring the application of the word ‘state’ to pre-
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capitalist political entities because it spuriously implies historical continuity, it seems
that nevertheless all such units can be categorised under a general rubric: ‘any political
structure which ha[s] some authority network (a leading person or group or groups, with
intermediate cadres enforcing the will of this leading entity).’38 In this view, the state is
a structure of power projection and is a site of continual contestation between interest
groups seeking to use the means of such state power to ‘improve the particular group’s
ability to profit, directly or indirectly, from the operations of the world market. The
state is the most convenient institutional intermediary in the establishment of market
constraints … in favor of particular groups.’39 World-systems theory’s interest in the
state is thus in how it functions as a possible lever of accumulation on the world market.
The state is viewed as a mechanism that social classes, and fractions of classes, seek to
capture and, through using its power apparatus, secure for themselves a larger share of
the total global surplus product. In the core part of the world economy, the construction
of a strong state machinery and of a national culture are means by which to protect
disparities generated by the world-system and form ‘an ideological mask and
justification for the maintenance of those disparities.’40 Further, ‘emphasis on local
culture serves well to deflect local internal conflict, creating instead local solidarity
against the outside. If … local dominant strata feel themselves oppressed by higher
strata of the world-system, they are doubly motivated to pursue the creation of a local
“identity”.’41 Everything is thus to be explained in terms of hard material interests: the
state is an instrument of domination and power projection, and particularist political
identity is a sort of ideological illusion conjured up by dominant groups to further their
interests.
The long-standing critique of this conception of political community, one first
voiced by Theda Skocpol, is that it is one-sided – politics is functionally derived from
accumulation strategies on the world market. A two-stage reduction is involved: ‘first, a
reduction of socio-economic structure to determination by world market opportunities
and technological production possibilities; and second, a reduction of state structures
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and policies to determination by dominant class relations.’42 Although Wallerstein’s
work had ground-breaking importance in that it decisively broke with the conception
that capitalism develops in a series of discrete national economies and treated it rather
as a global system, nevertheless, as Simon Bromley observes, not only did it involve ‘an
illicit form of economic reductionism, but perhaps more important was the simple
inversion of the Realist problematic effected. For if Realists derive the properties of the
structure from the characteristics of the component parts, Wallerstein simply reverses
the procedure; the actions of the parts … are derived from the functional needs of the
whole.’43 Thus in Wallerstein’s approach not only is the problem of the form of the state
not given due recognition, but the anterior question of the particularist, bounded nature
of the political is simply avoided or not recognised, given that, in familiar Marxist
fashion, classes and class fractions are the exclusive centre of attention, the privileged
actors within the dynamic of the world-system.
Other leading world-systems theorists, such as Christopher Chase-Dunn and
Giovanni Arrighi, take a similar approach. Responding to Skocpol’s criticisms of
Wallerstein, Chase-Dunn asserts that ‘the interstate system itself is the fundamental
basis of the competitive commodity economy at the system level. Thus the interaction
of world market and state system is fundamental to an understanding of capitalist
development.’44 State system and world economy reinforce and reproduce each other:
political fragmentation facilitates the mobility of capital and the uneven development of
capitalist production means that dominant classes in core powers export capital to other
areas, which process restrains those core powers from attempting to impose political
dominance through conquest. Nevertheless, as with Wallerstein, states are still seen as
essentially functional to the interests of class fractions on the world market: ‘States are
the organizations which are often utilized by the classes that control them to help
appropriate shares of the world surplus value. Market forces are either reinforced or
regulated depending on the world market position of the classes controlling a particular
state.’45 Whether or not these arguments successfully answer the charges made by
Skocpol of reductionism, what can be said is that the question of the form of the
political is wholly beyond the purview of this theoretical perspective. Much the same is
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true of Giovanni Arrighi. In his major work, The Long Twentieth Century, he blends
together concepts drawn from Braudel, Weber and Gramsci to produce a theoretical
framework of capitalism as the ‘top layer’ of the economy, haute finance, which is
highly mobile and is competed for by multiple state structures, which, in turn, require a
world hegemon to define the rules of international order and conduct. The story is one
of a spiral sequence of hegemons, each larger and more global in scope than the last,
that shape the development of the capitalist world economy – the Italian city states, the
Dutch Republic, England, then the USA (and then, possibly, China46). As with
Wallerstein and Chase-Dunn, this is an international theory to the extent that it
recognises and attempts to theorise the dynamic, interactive nature of development
among a multiplicity of political units (with a heavy emphasis on the overdetermining
nature of the world economy), but that fact of multiplicity is not itself problematised.
Indeed, all three of these theorists regard the transcendence of capitalism as being a
single world state that would politically regulate distribution, suggesting not only that
the basic problem posed by capitalism is simply a question of the distribution of the
output of the production process, but also that political multiplicity has no deep
significance in itself and poses no special theoretical problems in terms of thinking
about a world beyond capital.
Neo-Gramscian Theory
Where the world-systems theorists have been criticised for a reductionist view
of the state, neo-Gramscian theory has been concerned to crack open Realism’s ‘billiard
ball’ conception of the closed national territorial totality and demonstrate how the state,
and by extension the states system, is a site of contestation for a range of conflicting
social forces of production. The singular, homogenous state is replaced by the idea of
‘state-society complex’ and thereby the internal structure and development of states
through various class alliances and modernisation programmes can be traced, using the
Gramscian conceptual terminology of ‘historic blocs’, ‘passive revolution’, ‘hegemony’
and so forth. The international dimension impinges on this conception of the domestic
in that it is recognised that ‘complexes of production relations, classes, and historic
blocs do not exist in isolated national compartments. They are linked to a world order
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that bears directly on them, as well as influencing them through their national states.’47
The novelty of the neo-Gramscian approach is the extension of the Gramscian concepts
to the international sphere, especially the concept of ‘hegemony’, by which, in the
original Gramscian context, a dominant class co-opts subaltern classes to its project of
national development and maintains their support more by consent than coercion, and,
in its new international sense, the dominant class of the leading state, through alliances
with like-minded classes or class fractions in other states, constructs a particular world
order. The focus of much neo-Gramscian theorising is the periods of transition between
historical world orders – how one breaks down and a new one is constructed – with a
view to determining whether the current conjuncture constitutes a historical moment of
transition and, if so, what the possibilities are for a broadly anti-capitalist/anti-
imperialist hegemonic project. Accordingly, most of, for instance, Robert Cox’s major
work is taken up with what is effectively a narrative of the constitution and dissolution
of first British 19
th
-century and then American 20
th
-century hegemonies.48
The problematic of the states system has been attended to from a neo-Gramscian
perspective by Mark Rupert.49 Central to the argument is a reading of the concept of
‘alienation’ as found in Marx’s early writings. Under capitalist relations of production,
by which the worker is freed from personal relations of domination but is also divorced
from direct access to the means of production, alienation works on multiple levels: the
worker is alienated from the product of his own labour, which under the regime of
private property belongs to the capitalist; he is alienated from his own life-activity, the
process of self-objectification through labour, because his labour is always for an
(antagonistic) other; and ‘estranged labour involves the alienation of human beings
from one another, and of the individual from the species’50 (this final alienation
producing homo economicus, hero of traditional liberal theory). These multiple
alienations are said to generate, at the general societal level, the separation of economics
and politics, and the abstraction of the purely political state characteristic of capitalist
societies; thus, ‘the very existence of the kind of states portrayed by neo-realist theory
presupposes relations of alienation in which “politics” assumes an identity distinct from
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“economics” and attains its own institutional form of expression.’51 The result of this
bringing together of Marx’s early writings and IR theory is that ‘international politics
may then be critically understood as a kind of second-order alienation. That is,
international politics concerns itself with the mutual estrangement of political
communities which are themselves constructed within relations of alienation.’52
To the extent that Rupert’s approach limits itself to a theorisation of the
constitution and nature of capitalist geopolitics, it cannot fully go behind its target, neo-
Realism, because the Realist claim about the multiplicity of political communities
extends well beyond the capitalist epoch: to explain the nature of one historical form of
geopolitics is not to explain geopolitics itself. Further, to speak of the separation of
economics and politics simply assumes the validity of the two determinations rather
than making them the object of critique. But, more specifically, Rupert’s argument
exposes the question of the applicability of Gramsci’s concepts to the study of IR. The
solution Rupert poses to the problem of international alienation is a political practice
that ‘overturns the hegemony of state-based conceptions of politics [and] mediates
between various “national” groups whose political practices had been contained within
such conceptions, and enables their active participation in the construction of a global
political community.’53 This appears to envisage a political strategy that self-
consciously aims to transcend national boundaries. By contrast, Robert Cox, in his
seminal article introducing the Gramscian conceptual apparatus into IR, insisted that an
anti-capitalist hegemonic strategy must be based at the national level: ‘A significant
structural change in world order is, accordingly, likely to be traceable to some
fundamental change in social relations and in the national political orders which
correspond to national structures of social relations’ and so, consequently, ‘the national
context remains the only place where an historic bloc can be founded, although world-
economy and world-political conditions materially influence the prospects for such an
enterprise.’54 What Cox’s stipulation reflects is that Gramsci’s theoretical thinking about
political praxis was centred on the national context and thereby assumed the political
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space. As Randall Germain and Michael Kenny put it: ‘Throughout the Prison
Notebooks [Gramsci] is clear that socialists have to embed their arguments within the
soil of national political and popular cultures; hence the power of his understanding of
the concept of the “national-popular”.’55 In discussing the extension of the concept
‘historic bloc’ from the national to the international sphere, Stephen Gill and David Law
contend that, as an international idea, it means more than simply an alliance of capitalist
interests across national boundaries: ‘It implies that elements of more than one class
were involved, its basis was more organic and rooted in material and normative
structures of society.’56 But can such concepts be smoothly transferred ‘across national
boundaries’ from the domestic to the international? Germain and Kenny argue that
Gramsci’s understanding of the state-civil society complex assumed the national context
and that, ‘to speak of a specifically Gramscian reading of civil society divorced from its
necessary relationship to the state is therefore to obscure the way in which the
relationship of the two analytical categories comprises for Gramsci a single social
entity.’57 In the international domain, despite all talk of a developing ‘international
state’, no such state structure exists; rather, ‘national states remain the only political
authorities capable of taking public decisions and acting with governmental authority in
world politics today.’58 This surely makes problematic the use of Gramscian concepts in
the discussion and analysis of ‘international civil society’ and global social forces.59
Those concepts are specifically predicated on the national context and thus presuppose
the particular characteristics of the political and the national/international distinction
central to Realist thinking.60 To deploy them in  analysis of international relations serves
largely to obscure, rather than to expose and explicate, the problematic of political form
and of the multiplicity of particularist political units that Realists insist upon. To this
extent, neo-Gramscianism in IR reiterates rather than critically explores the familiar
national/international contradiction. To echo a prominent neo-Gramscian’s own
injunction concerning the necessity of historicisation of Gramsci’s thought, it might be
said that the challenge of Realism serves to reveal ‘what might be historically limited in
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a Gramscian way of thinking about alternative historical and contemporary
circumstances.’61
Political Marxism
The work of Political Marxists in IR in many respects served to focus the
problem of the international and its relation to the development of capitalism. Marx and
Engels, Benno Teschke observes, did not ‘develop an integrated theory that
incorporates the historical efficacy of international relations into their conception of the
overall course of world history’62 and ‘this relative absence of the geopolitical has left a
problematic legacy within Marxism’.63 Hannes Lacher suggests that a result of the
increasing interest of Marxists in the question of how international relations and
capitalism are to be understood together is that the main issue to be studied has
developed: where the theorists of classical imperialism were concerned to explain the
changing behaviour of states whose existence was assumed, ‘the question that has
emerged as central in recent years is how the existence of an interstate system in the
capitalist epoch can be explained in the first place.’64 Surveying the Marxist IR literature
that took inspiration from the so-called State Debate within Marxism in 1970s,65 Lacher
suggests that while that approach can explain the necessity of the state (in the singular)
to capitalist society, it cannot answer the question posed by Fred Halliday: ‘why, if
there is a world economy in which class interests operate transnationally, there is a need
for states at all. What, in other words, is the specificity and effectivity of distinct states
within a single economic totality?’66 Although, after the State Debate, Marxism came to
recognise that ‘the state’ exists only in the plural, as system of states,67 Political
Marxists have pushed the issue further, making the emergence of the modern form of
political multiplicity, the capitalist international, a central focus of their research.68 The
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theoretical apparatus deployed is derived from Robert Brenner, his purported
reconstruction of Marx as a ‘theory of social property relations’. Teschke sets out the
basic theoretical position thus: ‘the constitution, operation, and transformation of
geopolitical orders are predicated on the changing identities of their constitutive units.
Social property relations, mediating the relations between the major classes, primarily
define the constitution and identity of these political units.’69 For this framework, in
traditional fashion, ‘class conflict remains the primum mobile of history’70: a dominant
class of exploiters extracts surplus from a subordinate class of producers, and analysis
focuses on tracing the outcomes of the various class strategies of reproduction pursued
and on the struggles between classes over property in the output of the production
process. In line with this theoretical focus, Teschke calls for a conceptual shift from the
orthodox Marxist problematic of ‘relations of production’ to a revised problematic of
‘relations of exploitation’, especially so in regard to pre-capitalist societies (in this
instance, feudal Europe), because ‘a focus on the logic of exploitation overcomes the
danger of conceiving the pre-capitalist “state” and “economy” as two separate
institutional spheres and foregrounds the class-mediated nexus between political force
and economic appropriation.’71 This is because, schematically, in pre-capitalist societies,
the economic and the political were organically connected: the producers had direct
access to the means of production and therefore the ruling class’ reproduction was
secured through direct domination, through relations of lordship, what Brenner calls
‘political accumulation’; whereas, in capitalist society, where the worker is freed both
from immediate relations of domination and direct access to the means of production,
the economic and the political are separated, a regime of absolute private property
comes into being, the purely political state is abstracted from society, and individual
capitalists and workers are compelled to pursue ‘economic’ strategies of reproduction
through the market (the capitalists having the advantage of ownership of the means of
production).
But Brenner’s theoretical construction, Marx bowdlerised, is wholly inadequate
to the depth of the problem of the political. Examining Brenner’s conception of social
conflict, Simon Bromley observes that on Brenner’s account of the pre-capitalist world
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of settled agriculture political power essentially means the organisation of a ruling
lordly class in order to wield authority over the direct producers and that the structure of
property rights was such as to make possible the reproduction of this group of exploiters
at the expense of the dominated class. This means that, as Brenner conceives it, ‘rule
was always ipso facto a form of coercive domination over peasants and other
subordinate groups’,72 economic exploitation coercively enforced by the threat or use of
violence. Bromley is surely correct that this could only constitute an outer boundary of
political life,73 ‘rather than an adequate characterisation of the pre-industrial historical
record’,74 the reason being that political community cannot be explained in terms of a
simple opposition between exploiters and exploited. He cites the Marxist anthropologist
Maurice Godelier to the effect that ‘for relations of domination and exploitation to be
formed and reproduced in a lasting fashion, they must be presented as an exchange,
and as exchange of services’ and that such exchange is not mere ideology and is not
reducible to brute domination, ‘otherwise the movement which engendered estates,
castes, classes and the state … would not have forged ahead’.75 And Bromley also notes
the argument of the  Marxist historian John Haldon that crucial for state-formation is ‘a
degree of acceptance of that state as normatively desirable, especially by elites, but even
by the broader populace from which it draws its resources.’76 The central point is that
‘politics is always about much more than class domination and exploitation’.77 Indeed,
Bromley argues that it is the case that ‘at the root of all organised – that is, social –
power there is an element of more or less conventional co-ordination … however
limited the co-operating sub-group and however much domination is involved in its
relationship with others.’78 In order to have any plausible conception of political form, it
is essential to see that the class division does not in any way straightforwardly negate
the coherence and unity of the political body.79 The crudity of Brenner’s conception
leaves its mark on the work of the IR scholars who draw on him for theoretical
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inspiration. In Benno Teschke’s more than 300-page book on the origins of the modern
states system, there is a mere one paragraph80 that obliquely touches upon the issue of
the political, only to pass over it immediately. A work devoted to debunking the ‘myth
of 1648’ as the seminal moment of the co-genesis of capitalism and the modern form of
political community, the nation state, and that attempts instead to demonstrate the
absolutist (and, it is asserted, non-capitalist) origins of the latter, contains no substantive
theoretical discussion of the concept and meaning of the political – a startling omission.
For all the emphasis on ‘attentiveness to historical specificity and the agency of
historically situated actors’81 and rejection of structuralist rigidity, the historical
sociology of Political Marxism clings to a notably simplistic version of the traditional
Marxist mono-causal reading of history, class conflict (rebranded as ‘struggles over
social property relations’ or ‘strategies of reproduction’), and as a result much else falls
outside its reach. While class conflict, strategies of reproduction and the contestation of
property rights may in part explain, at some level, the dynamics of social formations,
processes of change over time, and thereby the characteristics of particular eras of
international relations, they surely do not grasp what is involved in the constitution of
political community; rather, they already tacitly presuppose the existence of a structured
social space in which those conflicts take place, and thus cannot reach as far back as to
explain what the political is, and therewith what the international is. Further, there is
nothing in the ‘theory of social property relations’ that is capable of explaining how
political space could come into being or of grasping its form problem. The ironic truth
is that the Political Marxists have no theory of the political.82
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Uneven and Combined Development
In his recent work, Justin Rosenberg83 has arguably gone further than any other
Marxist IR theorist in trying to explicate just what lies behind Realism’s dominance of
the discipline of IR, attempting to develop ‘an alternative theoretical framework—one
which has the same intuitive simplicity as the balance of power, but which enables us
finally to recover the lost history of international relations, breaking with the old theory
which has shown us only an empty, meaningless struggle for power’.84 To recover this
history, he has been centrally concerned with elaborating Trotsky’s theory of ‘uneven
and combined development’, how developmental processes are refracted through the
varying configurations of different social formations, creating specific and frequently
unstable hybrids of combined development. From the beginning, Rosenberg has been
concerned to push Trotsky’s idea as far as possible, to generate a ‘general abstraction’,85
one that would capture a fundamental characteristic of the historical process as a whole.
This evolving theoretical perspective is designed to incorporate precisely the issue
central to Realism, the multiplicity of political units. Thus, in the course of a critique of
Rob Walker’s argument that the international, and its attendant dilemmas of inside and
outside, is the product of the peculiarly modern resolution of the spatial dimension of
politics by means of the concept of sovereignty, Rosenberg proposes a more far-
reaching grounding of the ‘problematic of the international’.86 Arguing that Walker’s
reduction of the international to one of its distinct historical forms constitutes ‘an illicit
collapsing of the general into the particular’,87 Rosenberg, instead, drawing on Marx’s
mooted procedure of concept formation in the 1857 ‘General Introduction’ in the
Grundrisse, argues for a clear conceptual distinguishing of the two, and for a general
abstraction of ‘the international’ (akin to a general abstraction of ‘production’ or
‘labour’). However, at this point, a curious discrepancy enters the argument. Rosenberg
notes that the idea of the international rests on the anterior concept of the political, and
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therefore for a general abstraction of the international to be generated, this prior concept
must first be explicated; so, ‘a successful general abstraction of the “the international”
presupposes a prior general abstraction of the “the political”.’88 But the general
definition of ‘the political’ then given turns out already to presume what it is supposed
to define: ‘the political dimension of any social order comprises the means which it has
developed (whatever they may be) for arriving at, and giving effect to, collectively
binding decisions and rules.’89 This is a definition of an aspect internal to political
community (‘of any social order’), not of the political itself; it assumes the constituted
political space rather than enquiring into how that space comes into being. Nor is there
anything in this definition to suggest why political communities exist in the multiple.
Indeed, in Rosenberg’s argument that fact is simply empirically derived – ‘given that no
social order has ever yet been coextensive with humanity as a whole’90 and ‘we need
only the empirical assumption itself: in the known field of human history, social orders
have always co-existed’.91 Thus, at this crucial point in the argument, the explication of
the central problem of Realist thinking is sidestepped.
The critique of Rob Walker stands at the beginning of Rosenberg’s investigation
of uneven and combined development, and he has since unfolded the implications of the
term in a series of articles. But the issue of the political remains problematic. In a recent
contribution,92 Rosenberg attempts to derive political multiplicity from uneven and
combined development via an appropriation of Barry Buzan and Richard Little’s
account of the emergence of the political, and therewith the international, in the long
pre-historical transition from hunter-gatherer groups to settled and ultimately state
societies. Despite the evident significance of the historical account, it is clear that what
is actually provided is a series of sociological factors, centred on the development of
social hierarchy, and internal differentiation and complexification, which are then said
to give rise, in a way that is unspecified, to something designated ‘the political’. There
is again a disjuncture in the argument, which can only be awkwardly leapt over, not
properly bridged: what ‘the political’ actually is, what its conceptual specificity is,
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remains undetermined and obscure.93 The causal sociological factors are of great
importance, but they do not suffice of themselves to explicate the political. For that, it
would be necessary to interrogate such categories as sovereignty, autonomy, law and
juridical order, but it is doubtful whether historical sociology is capable of that register
of conceptual inquiry.94 As a result of this deficit, the reasons Rosenberg provides for
the existence of political multiplicity can again only be functional rather than properly
conceptual, contingent rather than intrinsic: ‘since the level of development of early
states does not enable any one of them to engross the whole of the human world, their
hardening inside/outside division necessarily congeals into finite entities’ and ‘because
the causal range of social relations and interactions within which they congeal far
outruns … the reach of any centralized political power, the existence of these early
states is likely to stimulate reactive developments of social differentiation and proto-
state formation beyond themselves, leading to the emergence of further “political”
entities.’95 In the absence of a theorization of the concept of the political, this approach
risks conceding too much to Realism. For all that Rosenberg’s account, importantly,
shows the political and the international to be historically emergent, the causal,
sociological manner of analysis, focused on processes of development, renders it
incapable of grasping the political qualitatively. It thus remains caught in the Realist
trap: for, if it is not possible to specify what something is, it is impossible to think what
might be different from it. The investigation of the explanatory potential of the idea of
uneven and combined development may well solve the problem of the Realist
(especially neo-Realist) reification of geopolitics as a domain separable from the wider
compass of ‘the social’, reconnecting the international to the domestic and thereby
generating a more adequate analytic of social development per se; but it does so at the
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expense of effectively naturalizing the Realist concept of political community, its
necessarily ‘closed’ nature and the potential for conflict produced thereby. The
historical-sociological mode of research into uneven and combined development can
only ever ground Realism in social theory rather than surpass it critically. In truth, the
Realist problematic squats at the root of uneven and combined development, rather than
being exposed and explicated by it.
Revenge of the Political
The concept of the political exists as something repressed within Marxist
theorising, something thought to be long since overcome that yet persists in making its
presence painfully felt. None of the various Marxist approaches extant within IR has
sought to subject the political itself to theory.96 Rather, it appears as an element that is
simply given and immediate. The problem of political form remains a blind-spot,
although it is hard to see how the many-states problem, let alone the challenge of
Realism, can be resolved without a theory of the political. As a result, Marxism in IR
remains vulnerable to Waltz’s ‘second image’ critique and Berki’s argument. The
consequences of this theoretical absence can be read in the entanglement of Marxism,
both as theory and practice, in the historical fate prescribed by Realism, the continuing
fragmentation and anarchy of international politics. This failure to inquire into the
meaning and significance of the political is traceable back to the ambivalence of Marx’s
own thinking. On the one hand, ‘Marx consigned the whole sphere of politics to
ideology.’97 There is a moment of world-historical freedom, not to be discarded, in this
brusquely achieved rupture. The hardened surface of the social is broken through: no
longer is society to be entranced and deluded in its self-understanding by forms of
appearance: politics, law, religion and philosophy. Politics is not, any more than those
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others, to be hypostatised into something existing in-itself, something autonomous and
self-sufficient.98 ‘The exponents of [the festishistic] conception of history have … only
been able to see in history the political actions of princes and States, religious and all
sorts of theoretical struggles’,99 but the Marxian approach is to show that politics
receives all its substance and contents from elsewhere, from the societally mediated
process of the interaction of humans with nature. Marx’s historical materialism had in
the mid-19
th
 century and continues to have a decisively progressive aspect: he and
Engels ‘wished for the revolution as one of the economic relationships in society as a
whole, in the fundament of its self-preservation, not as the changing of the ground-rules
of domination, its political form.’100 Only such a change in the basis of society’s very
existence could bring about the world-historical transformation that they hoped for, the
break from prehistory, and the purpose of the decades-researched, never completed,
study of political economy was to enable that break by laying bare how it is that society
actually reproduces itself, what form the interaction with nature takes in capitalist
society, what it means that the object is a commodity.
Yet, at the same time that the ideological appearance of politics is stripped away
by devastating criticism, the political itself is left standing; the content of politics is
revealed as arising out of the antagonistic nature of society’s mode of reproduction, the
organisation of the exploitation of nature, but the form of the political, the space in
which politics occurs,101 is not subjected to critique. If politics is seen through as
appearance, it is nevertheless not explained how the societal process of the productive
interaction with nature generates the distinctive form of the political. The critique of
political economy can be considered a quasi-transcendental account of economics –
what are the conditions of possibility for such a thing as an ‘economy’ to exist at all? –
but no such radical questioning is brought to bear on the political element: it is not
explained why economics is political economy. So the political itself remains obscure,
unillumined by the light of critique, with the result that the relationship between the
political existence of humans and the categories derived from the critique of the societal
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production process remains unexplained. Paradigmatically, in the Communist Manifesto
Marx and Engels write both that ‘the working men have no country’102 and that ‘the
struggle of the proletariat with the bourgeoisie is at first a national struggle. The
proletariat of each country must, of course, first of all settle matters with its own
bourgeoisie’.103 The proletariat both transcends the national context and yet is bound to
it in a dialectic that is never properly explicated. ‘Since the proletariat must first of all
acquire political supremacy, must rise to be the leading class of the nation, must
constitute itself the nation, it is, so far, itself national, though not in the bourgeois sense
of the word.’104 But in what sense of the word? The nation, the modern political
community, remains in Marx’s thought the scene of the drama even despite the
sublation of the class struggle. The form of the political is to be filled with a radically
different content, but it is never made clear whether or how this revolutionary change of
content itself changes the nature of the form, or whether the form as such can receive so
different a content.105 Consequently, despite being brusquely negated (at least as high
politics), the political continually recurs throughout Marx’s oeuvre in a theoretically
undigested way as marking out the space within which revolutionary activity is to
occur, from the early critical works in expectation of revolution, through the texts on the
failure of emancipatory struggles in France, to the late Critique of the Gotha
Programme  and documents for the First International. The contradiction of
internationalism and national revolution remains latent and unaddressed.106 This
ambivalence towards the political, its simultaneous negation and retention, is preserved
within the Marxist tradition right through to the various strands of Marxism within
contemporary IR. The World-Systems theorists and Political Marxists, for instance, are
at an extreme in their refusal to grant any theoretical substance to the specificity of the
political,107 to how and why a bounded political space is created, and yet the political is
continually and massively present within their work, at least at a brute empirical level –
how could it not be, when their studies are entirely devoted to analysing the differential
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development of political communities within the growth of capitalism? The same is true
generally of Marxism within IR: the political is always there (necessarily so, given that
much of Marxism within IR takes the form of historical-sociological studies) but always
as an unacknowledged element, something regarded as unproblematic, something not
worked through theoretically. Yet it is precisely the very form of the political that
Realism says creates the anarchic, unchanging and essentially conflictual arena of the
international, and that forces each community into the fatality of the unending struggle
for survival that constitutes international politics.108 This is the problem that has
returned, still unresolved, in the recent CRIA debates.
Materialist Theory
Thus far, this chapter has argued that IR Marxism has not met the challenge of
Realism because, following Marx, it has not developed any theory of political form.
This final section takes the critique a stage further, linking this failure to the kind of
theorising characteristic of Marxism in IR and thereby suggesting the necessity for a
different approach if Realism is finally to be comprehended.
 The ambivalence of Marx’s thinking about the political is part of the wider
ambiguity that runs through his conceptualisation of social transformation, which in
turn derives from the unfinished nature of his critique of idealism. Communism was
supposed to grow out of capitalism as the proletariat supplants the bourgeoisie: capital
produces its own gravediggers and class society sublates itself. The revolution thus
takes place within the same political space that the bourgeois class has established. It
both transforms history and is, equally, within it, of a piece with it: the decisive change
evolves out of history by the latter’s own momentum, the logical final step as the
irresistibly developing forces of production at last throw off the restrictions of class
society. This peculiar structure of the revolutionary vision – simultaneously inside and
outside its historical setting – is bound up with the complex question of Marx’s so-
                                                
108
 The underdeveloped nature, at worst disingenuousness, of Marxist or socialist political thinking is an
established theme of even sympathetic critics (see, for example, Dunn 1984 and Bobbio 1987). However,
the perspective afforded by IR and Berki’s argument reveals that the issue reaches further than the
intractable contradictions of any Marxist political practice: it is the form of the political per se that poses
the problem.
42
called ‘farewell to philosophy’.109 In the 1840s German society, so Marx thought, was
trapped in the past by its infatuation with idealist ‘mysticism’ and it was to dispel such
intoxicating reveries that he turned to the analysis of actual social categories, ultimately
those of political economy. Yet even in doing so, Marx stayed true to the Hegelian
dialectic, which was to be wrested from the camp of reaction and won over to the
revolutionary cause.110 Hegel would be stood back on his feet: the rational kernel of the
dialectic of absolute idealism made evident through explication of the workings of the
societal process of production. This materialist dialectic may set the idealist one the
right way up, bringing out explicitly the historical process of objectification through
social labour that is cloaked in the movement of Spirit in Hegel’s philosophy, but in
important respects it does not break more radically with the structure of the Hegelian
philosophy of history, and to that extent stays within the horizon of bourgeois thought.
The motor of the dialectic is revealed to be the movement of antagonistic society rather
than the self-actualisation of the Concept, the Absolute Idea to be the latest form of
class exploitation, but there remains a trust in the efficacy of the historical process, that
the movement of the dialectic will itself produce its sublation. The culmination of the
immanent movement of history is to be not bourgeois society but the communist one.111
In essence, then, the Marxian conception remains within the logic of the historical
process, which the proletarian revolution is to crown.
In the same way that Marx attacked idealism but retained the dialectic, Marxism
rejected bourgeois politics as mystificatory but yet espoused a revolutionary politics
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that was to take place in the same political scene. Politics, like the dialectic, was to be
won for the revolution, but it was never asked whether the political can actually admit
of ‘revolutionary politics’ (or, for that matter, whether the dialectic can be anything
other than idealist).112 The history of Marxism emphatically suggests otherwise. This
problem profoundly affects a main current of Marxist thinking. For, confident in the
possibility of revolutionary political action, the characteristic idea of Marxist political
thought was that analysis should identify the various (class) forces and trends active in
the social field at any particular time and, if it was acute enough, specify the
opportunity that opens for concerted intervention: to recognise both the tendency and
the critical moment, and to strike.113 It was to be theory devoted to practice: by an act of
spontaneity, the revolutionary movement inserts itself at the decisive moment into the
societal sequence of cause and effect and seizes power. The immanent historical process
was thus assumed to be susceptible of transformation. This may indeed have seemed
plausible in Marx’s mid-19
th
 century context, when society was much more fluid, open
and transparent in its structure and relations than it was to become:114 when the
proletariat was still not integrated into society proper; when, even in an advanced
country such as France, the structure of bourgeois society was sufficiently pliable that it
still made sense, in fact was at the forefront of critical insight, to analyse politics, in the
manner of The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, in terms of Bonapartism, class
fractions and so on; when it seemed a reality to be able to change the world by taking to
the streets and erecting barricades;115 and, above all, when the revolution appeared
imminent and all theory and practice were to be devoted to that tremendous prospect.
But history gave the lie to Marx’s confidence in the historical process and the
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movement of the universal – the belief in the revolution.116 From about the decade of
Marx’s death, the integration of society in the advanced countries accelerated such that
by the early 20
th
 century the socialist parties had succumbed to reformism as the more
plausible hope for their cause and the ambition of revolution had migrated to the
Russian semi-periphery where the old order was crumbling without the new having yet
come into being and the opportunity of fundamental change appeared to offer itself.117
Revolution in this backward context required a considerably more developed awareness
of the international situation than had ever seemed necessary to Marx, who expected the
breakthrough to take place in the powerful metropolitan centres – hence the
development of the theory of imperialism, which in important respects transfers the
mode of Marx’s political thought to the international sphere.118 Imperialism theory, with
its analysis in terms of epoch and conjuncture, continued to have a transformational
ambition, being intended to inform and guide revolutionary practice. Through the
second half of the 20
th
 century, however, as capitalist society became ever more deeply
entrenched and consolidated, actually existing socialism a despotism confined and
integrated into the world system, and the meaning of revolutionary political action
vanishingly obscure, the form of this sort of traditional causal analysis was retained but
its substance progressively drained away. So, the surveys of the contemporary scene to
be found in Marxist journals in recent times, precise and perceptive though they often in
many respects are, increasingly constitute not much more than dismal and exhausted
tracings out of the inexorable advances of capitalism and its accompanying
depredations. They tend towards ordinary historical narrative, but with a long-suffering,
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oppositional tone.119 The result is a crisis of the meaning of Marxist thinking as radical
theory. For, the causal-historical analysis that has for so long been characteristic of
Marxism ultimately drew its energy and validity from the positive Marxist vision of
political action and social transformation, the possibility of revolution; to the extent that
that vision waned and then became extinct, the interest and faith in causality and in
tracing the immanent patterns and dynamics of the historical process have been
rendered dubious. In truth, the immense intensification since Marx’s time of the
integration of social existence through the exchange relation means that the actuality of
contemporary society cannot be reached in the old way, through the old style of causal-
historical theory; society’s irrationality, its absolute subsumption and domination of the
individuals who both compose it and are helpless before it, escapes such thinking.120 The
real development of capitalist society has superseded the kind of theory intended to
transform it, and if society no longer seems to permit any intervention, let alone
fundamental change, the critical value of causal explanation becomes obscure. The
theorising that it was once thought would lead beyond the condition of unfreedom that
Realism is a part of has failed in its ambition, and so Realism returns unvanquished.
That causality as enlightenment has succumbed to the judgement of history
necessarily affects radical theory in IR, especially the nexus between Marxist thinking
and historical sociology,121 a  sub-discipline whose very aim is ‘the provision of an
approach to global structures that allows for an understanding of change and
causality.’122 A perception of this is what perhaps underlies the dissenting essay that
Steve Smith contributes to a volume otherwise celebratory of the fruitfulness of the
historical sociology/IR dialogue. Initially, historical sociology in IR was thought to be
‘an approach that, by disputing both the mono-causal logic of realism, and the
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functional undifferentiation of its core unit (the state), challenged the fundamental
assumptions of realism, and thus was one of a group of approaches said to be
alternatives’ to the mainstream,123 to be one of the so-called reflectivist challengers.
Smith no longer considers that to be the case, for reasons concerning the conception of
knowledge and understanding characteristic of historical sociology: while the latter
would not accept all of the epistemological assumptions of the rationalist mainstream, it
does at least share ‘the commitment to naturalism, as revealed in an appeal to causal
analysis’124 and to what he calls its materialism. Because of these shared epistemological
and methodological commitments, historical sociology and mainstream IR have more in
common than the former might care to admit: ‘Both historical sociology and rationalist
international relations accept one model of how to analyse the social world. Both
therefore, are part of the social science enterprise, in the narrow sense used in the
United States. Accordingly, both deem causal analysis as appropriate to the social
world.’125 What Smith objects to in such an approach is that it remains external to the
subjects of history; in seeking to explain how and why things happen, it neglects to
investigate what they are, what they mean as modes of human existence, the complex
ways in which subjectivity and social being are constituted (a formation of subjectivity
that is prior to conscious self-understanding). For historical sociology, as for the
mainstream, ‘understanding is ultimately reducible to explanation’, meaning causality.126
The construction of theories of large-scale social change, whatever its merits, does not
provide the critical insights into the changing forms of subjectivity that a radical theory
should. In fact, Smith declares, not only is it not part of the reflectivist challenge, but
‘contrary to the self-image of historical sociology as a radical account of human history,
there are in fact few barriers to a fruitful debate between materialist historical sociology
and rationalism.’127
Smith does not reject historical study altogether, advocating a Foucauldian style
of investigation into processes of power and the forms of subjectivity it creates. For
him, it is self-evident that thinking that draws on Marx can contribute little to this new
radical enterprise because Marx’s mode of thought converges with that of the
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mainstream: ‘Marx’s holist explanatory approach, but especially his materialism, leads
fairly straightforwardly into causal analysis and a social theory that fits within “the
social science enterprise”.’128 Is Marx, then, a dead dog? Is the use of Marx limited to a
form of causal-historical analysis whose critical status has become doubtful? It is telling
that, for someone who elsewhere129 rightly stresses the importance of the accurate use of
philosophical terms, especially epistemological ones, in the social sciences, Smith
should be so careless when it comes to materialism. Evidently, what he means by
materialism is the sociological usage concerned with an individual’s motivation: that
the behaviour of social actors is driven by pursuit of their ‘material’ interests as they are
derived from their position in the societal process of production and distribution.130 But
when Marx is described as a materialist in opposition to, say, Hegel as an idealist,
something much more important and far-reaching than that is at issue. Philosophical
idealism is, in nuce, the claim ‘that thought constitutes, shapes, or is identical with, its
objects’131, that the subject, as the locus of reason, has a sort of ontological priority
before the object and that the concept is the truth of the latter. Idealism and materialism
are epistemological positions that concern the fundamental relationship between the
subject and the object, between conceptuality – form – and the world. The various
strands of post-structuralism, one of which Smith favours, may all be said to be, in their
different ways, what Adorno termed Ausbruchsversuchen (‘outbreak attempts’) from
the metaphysical and epistemological restrictions of traditional subject-centred
philosophy. And if that long tradition of Western thought reached its furthest peak of
self-understanding in German Idealism and Hegel, then Marx’s critique of philosophy,
his materialism, although certainly underdeveloped and insufficiently worked out,
should be understood as the decisive beginnings of the critique of the constitutive
subject, and its conceptual achievements that philosophy has always glorified. ‘Marx
had emphasized historical materialism as opposed to the vulgar-metaphysical kind. He
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thereby drew it into the philosophical problematic … Since then materialism is no
longer a counter-position to be voluntarily taken up, but the epitome of the critique of
idealism and of the reality for which idealism opts, by distorting it.’132 On this
understanding, idealism, traditional philosophy, has always been the encoded expression
of the reality of the antagonistic social world, and materialism is its most far-reaching
critique.133 It is through pursuing the perspective on materialism that Marx opens that
the form problem of the political and the challenge of Realism’s conception of the
international can be comprehended. Doing so, however, requires developing a different
reading of Marx, and of the relation of Marxian theory to the thematics of Realism,
from that prevalent in IR. It is to these tasks that the subsequent chapters of this thesis
are devoted.
***
Conclusion: The purpose of this chapter was to identify the research aims of the
thesis. It has argued that Marxism in IR has not resolved the question of its relation to
Realism and has therefore remained unable to transcend the Realist idea of the
international. It has shown that the various strands of IR Marxism have neglected to
develop a theory of the political that could surpass Realism’s conception and that this is
a legacy of Marx’s own thinking about social and historical change, which also failed to
make the political itself an object of critique. In conclusion, it was suggested that to
remedy this deficit requires establishing a different research focus, setting aside the
interest in constructing casual-historical theorisations that currently defines the use of
Marx in IR and developing the materialist elements of Marx’s thinking.
The research aims are therefore: to develop a materialist critique of Realism, one that
would be able to meet the challenge Realism poses to any theory of freedom by
comprehending, without conceding to, its vision of the international as a ‘tragic’ state of
nature. In particular, this involves articulating a theory of political form that would be
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able to explain Realism’s conceptions of the political and of the international, and their
connection to capital, without naturalising them.
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Chapter 2
----
History and Prehistory
Introduction: This chapter begins the substantive rethinking of a materialist
understanding of Realism. It focuses on the question of history. The opening sections
survey the contrasting historical thinking of Realism and Marxism in IR: the former
bewitched by continuity and repetition, the latter, in opposition, focusing on change and
transformation. It is suggested that IR Marxism’s emphasis on historical dynamism fails
to grasp what is essential to Realism and, as critique, remains external to it. The chapter
then considers the Realist historical imaginary in more detail, arguing that Realism can
be understood as a mythic discourse: the principal themes of Realism come from the
sphere of myth and Realism imagines international political existence as a timeless
realm of unfreedom. Having established this reading of Realism, the argument turns to
Marx’s theory of capital, demonstrating that, at all levels of the analysis, Marx regards
capitalist society as the reiteration of myth. This reading of Marx brings his theory into
a configuration with Realism in a way that has not been done before and the chapter
concludes by suggesting that developing this side of Marx may lead to a deeper critique
of Realism.
***
Realism and History
Realism’s command of a position of theoretical pre-eminence within IR arose
through its defeat of so-called liberal utopianism during the period of the rise of
fascism, the failure of the League of Nations and the global conflagration of the Second
World War. The burden of Realism’s decisive argument1 was that the breakdown of the
liberal international order, inherited from the 19
th
 century, demonstrated that power
politics, international conflict and the struggle for national survival had by no means
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been eclipsed by the civilising effects of the spread of market relations and political
democracy, and their accompanying rational-legal norms: atavistic and immemorial
antagonism and aggression continued to inhere in the global order created by the
Western powers that proclaimed their commitment to freedom and equality and the
rights of man. Now, as before, Realism insisted, the international domain remains
unreconciled. At the heart of the Realist turn there lay, therefore, a paradoxical
announcement: the meaning of contemporary history is that there has been no history, in
any meaningful sense. The catastrophe of the present bespeaks its unchanging
continuity with the past. This problematic from the philosophy of history has continued
to shape Realist thought throughout the post-war period, right into even its most
modern, ‘scientific’, neo-Realist incarnations. Notoriously, Hans Morgenthau
elaborated his Realist theory of international politics on the assumption of an invariant
human nature, motivated at all times and in all places by a drive for power. The
philosophies of ancient China, India and Greece were the first to set out the laws of this
eternal logic of power and those archaic origins retain their compelling authority:
venerability in political theory is virtue, novelty is to be suspected.2 Kenneth Waltz
rejected Morgenthau’s explanatory reliance on human nature as too imprecise,3 but, as
always, the concern with invariance, the continuity within the discontinuity, remained:
‘One who believes that he can account for changes in international politics must ask
how continuities can be explained. … Although changes abound, continuities are as
impressive, or more so.’4 Waltz relocated the source of the continuities in the texture of
the international existence of human communities into the ‘third image’, the
decentralised, non-hierarchic structure of the international – the condition of anarchy –
and in neo-Realism the anarchic structure that characterises the international field is
taken as applying to the whole of human history, at least for as long as there has been a
multiplicity of political entities. For Realist thinkers, these invariant essences, the
unchanging character of human nature or the perennial structure of anarchy, mean that,
at the highest level, the level of the international, the history of humanity has the
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character of a tautology – nothing new, nothing actually different, ever occurs. Nor can
it occur within the limits identified by Realism as fundamental.5
The metaphysics of Realism is this fascination with tautology, ‘the striking
sameness in the quality of international life through the millennia’,6 permanent identity.
Certainly, history as historical fact and incident, even large-scale historical trends, has
its place within Realist thought, but because it can only be illustrative of the changing
embodiments of an identical structural essence it is necessarily history voided of
substance and life. In the Realist vision, the truth of the infinite, brilliantly coloured
detail of history is the grey-in-grey of the inexorable workings of the objective laws of
international politics. The characteristic impulse of Realist theory is to reduce the great
mass of material history provides, precipitating out a minimum number of axioms that
will comprehend everything: Morgenthau’s ‘six principles of political realism’,7 Waltz’s
parsimonious setting out of the implications to be deduced from the premise of anarchy,
and, more recently, John Mearsheimer’s statement of Realism’s ‘five assumptions about
the international system’.8 The ruthless search for the essence behind the appearance
renders the appearance itself – the actual historical existence of people – shadowy and
unreal, inherently null, just grist to the mill of anarchy and the balance of power. What
Realism perceives in history are the boundaries that constrain the meaningfulness of the
historical process. Change and development take place within the spaces marked out for
the political existence of human communities; but the international is what exists
outside those spaces and, as such, is itself without history, an eternal state of nature. The
concepts of political theory derive from life on the inside but can only be minimally
applicable to the outside, to the external existence of political communities. Hence the
enigma of international theory, ‘the recalcitrance of international politics to being
theorized about’,9 ruminated upon long ago by Martin Wight:
The reason is that the theorizing has to be done in the language of political
theory and law. But this is the language appropriate to man’s control of his social
                                                
5
 For Morgenthau, the constraints imposed by human nature are unchanging. Waltz’s emphasis on the
condition of anarchy leaves open the, at least theoretical, possibility of the transformation of the
international sphere from a decentralised anarchic realm into an organised hierarchic one, although it is a
possibility that he rejects, on Kantian grounds, as conducive of tyranny and civil war (see Waltz 1959,
p.228).
6
 Waltz 1979, p.66.
7
 Morgenthau 2006, pp.4–16.
8
 Mearsheimer 1994–5, p.10.
9
 Wight 1966b, p.33.
53
life. Political theory and law are maps of experience or systems of action within
the realm of normal relationships and calculable results. They are the theory of
the good life. International theory is the theory of survival. What for political
theory is the extreme case (as revolution or civil war) is for international theory
the regular case.10
The established discourse of politics and organised civil life stops at the border. The
reason for the theoretical centrality of Realism within IR is that it has insisted with
greater force than any other tradition on the specificity of this condition of the
international, the anarchic multiplicity of political communities, and the imperatives of
survival and power that derive from it. This is its great strength; but it is also what gives
rise to its characteristic ‘thinness’, its lack of substantive content.11 For, if ‘international
politics differ from domestic politics in being less susceptible of a progressivist
interpretation’,12 then international theory can only reflect this absence of historical
development, the essential self-sameness of the external existence of states. ‘Nothing
seems to accumulate’13 lamented Waltz of the inadequacies of international theory
construction. But what can accumulate in a state of nature, in which bare survival is
always the first necessity? The parsimony of Waltz’s own enormously influential
rethinking of Realism – his self-denying ordinance in theory construction – attests not
just his commitment to a would-be scientific methodology, but, in the most extreme
way, Realism’s vision of the ahistorical character of the circumstances in which
international existence is condemned to take place.14
Marxism and History
IR Marxism has concentrated its challenge to Realism on this conception of
history. Robert Cox, writing soon after Waltz published Theory of International
Politics, grouped both Waltz and Morgenthau together as neo-Realists who had
abandoned the substantial historical consciousness of an older Realist tradition in favour
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of ‘problem-solving theory’, inherently conservative, seeking only to manage the
existing order, not to transform it.15 Critical theory, intent upon far-reaching social
change, must seek to break this embalming of the present by rescuing the movement of
history and the human agency that produces it. To that end, Cox eschews the
structuralist Marxism of the Althusser school, which he suggests ‘shares some of the
features of the neorealist problem-solving approach’,16 in favour of ‘a Marxism which
reasons historically and seeks to explain, as well as to promote, changes in social
relations’.17 For Justin Rosenberg, in his early work, the trouble with Realism is that its
twin focuses on anarchy and on the state as ‘national-territorial totality’18 serve to stunt
theory by obscuring the social processes that produce the characteristic dynamics of
international relations in any given epoch: ‘If we displace for a moment the realist
concern with anarchy, we see that the history of the states-system has a live political
content … and it is apparent that to understand the realm of the political we need a
conception of historical agency as a dispersed property of human societies which state
organizations will always attempt to mobilize, but which is never reducible to state
policy.’19 In direct opposition to Realist ahistoricism, Rosenberg proposes what, in
Robert Keohane’s terms,20 might be designated a Marxist research programme, a
‘prospectus for an alternative history of the international system’,21 seeking to recover
for IR the immense historical upheavals – imperial expansion, migrations, revolutions
and world wars – associated with the global development of capitalist society, the actual
social content of the abstracted anarchy of the modern states system and its attendant
form of sovereignty. Cox’s and Rosenberg’s works were important early Marxist
contributions to what Benno Teschke identifies more generally as ‘the historical turn in
IR’22 – the investigation of the origins and history of the modern states system in
response to contemporary debates about globalisation and the supersession or
attenuation of state sovereignty. Teschke’s own work is positioned very much within
this new (that is, new to IR) historical orientation, which he specifically characterises as
a progressive movement within the discipline away from Waltzian neo-Realism,23 under
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whose captivating spell ‘history turns into a non-problem’,24 and away from overarching
or teleological abstractions from the historical process, towards theory that emphasises
the priority of historical particularity and the differential outcomes of localised
struggles. From this radically historicist perspective, the sin of Waltzian theory, in
particular, is that its reliance on the twin premises of anarchy and variations of
capability among the units makes it effectively useless for purposes of historical causal
explanation: ‘Waltz’s structuralist model – with the exception of the persistence of
anarchy itself – is completely indeterminate in its predictive and retrospective, that is,
historically explanatory, capacities.’25 Like Cox, but even more so, Teschke is hostile to
any manifestations of structuralist rationalism (detecting it residually even in
Rosenberg’s otherwise path-breaking work26) as straying too far from the vital energies
of the actual historical material and the in-principle open and alive potentialities of
human praxis. He proposes instead the heuristic of Robert Brenner’s ‘theory of social
property relations’ in order to bring into IR theory the (class) agency that, it is
purported, produces the movement of history and the transformations of social orders
and their modes of international relations.
The need of these representative Marxist contributions, both in their criticism of
the supposed ahistoricism of Realism and in their substantive content, is to deny the
constitutive elements of Realist theory in IR: the assumption of the specificity and
autonomy of the political and, with it, ‘the positing of a discrete environment of “the
international” in which the behaviour of states can be explained sui generis – requiring
the insulation of the international from the domestic.’27 The Marxists sense, more or less
obscurely, a deadly threat from Realism: if any concession is made to these Realist
axioms, then they would be trapped within the cage – political existence at the highest
level becomes timeless and ontological, removed from any possibility of meaningful
change through the human agency of transformative social movements.28 How Realism
thinks history has of course troubled other theoretical perspectives – John Gerard
Ruggie, for example, famously observed that anarchy as an explanatory concept
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‘provides no means by which to account for, or even to describe, the most important
contextual change in international politics in this millennium: the shift from the
medieval to the modern international system’29 – but the criticism has a particular
urgency for Marxist theorists. If the Realist premises are accepted, if the political – and
with it the international – can legitimately, in fact must, be conceptualised as somehow
separate from and not reducible to other social processes, then international relations
appear to be placed both beyond the reach of Marx’s theory of capital as a theory of
social form, as well as of the understanding of history of which it is a part, and beyond
any Marx-inspired emancipatory praxis. The imperative for Marxist theory, then, has
been to breach that Realist ‘insulation of the international from the domestic’, to
reconnect the outside to the inside and to fill the static and timeless realm of the
international with the life and movement of the history of social development. This
strategy has generally taken the form of demonstrating how changes of social form (in
some cases the move from feudal, or, more broadly, non-capitalist, to capitalist social
relations, in others epochal developments within the history of capitalism) produce
changes in the character and dynamic of international relations in any given period, and
showing how those changes of form are driven by ongoing class struggles generated
through the process of societal reproduction. In this way, the dynamic of history is to be
revealed as essential to IR theory, the empty political abstractions of Realism given
content, and the present revealed as in principle open and subject to change.
However, it may be doubted how far this strategy succeeds. Certainly, the
Marxists have produced deeper and more nuanced accounts of historical causation at the
international level than Realists relying on the skeletal structure of Waltz’s theory can
manage, but it is questionable whether counterposing historical content to Realist
abstraction meets the threat that Realism poses. In Theory of International Politics
Waltz is clear about the scope and limitations of his theory: ‘It can describe the range of
likely outcomes of the actions or interactions of states within a given system and show
how the range of expectations varies as systems change … but it cannot tell us just how,
and how effectively, the units of a system will respond to those pressures and
possibilities.’30 Already in 1959, Waltz was candid that ‘if the framework [the ‘third
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image’] is to be called cause at all, it had best be specified that it is a permissive or
underlying cause of war.’31 Twenty years later, he is emphatic that structural theory can
only explain the general, not the particular: ‘A theory of international politics will …
explain why war recurs, and it will indicate some of the conditions that make war more
or less likely; but it will not predict the outbreak of particular wars.’32 Waltzian neo-
Realism is designed to lay bare the systemic constraints that political entities of all sorts
are confronted by in the field of international politics; it does not seek to explain the
different ways in which they attempt to negotiate the imperatives of the system.33 It is,
as it were, a transcendental theory of the conditions of possibility of any international
existence as long as the international domain is an anarchic self-help system of multiple
units. To that extent, it can accommodate innumerable variations in the nature of the
units involved, provided the character of the basic system is not changed. Once this is
grasped, it becomes evident that none of the Marxist criticisms, nor their substantive
theorising, actually touches Realism, let alone counters the challenge it presents –
Realism can easily allow for changes of domestic social form so long as they are
‘changes in the system’ rather than ‘changes of the system’.34 In this sense, Marxist
theory in IR has always been pitched below the level at which Realism exists with its
greatest force. For a long time IR Marxism insisted that Realism’s abstraction was
unreal, simple reification, and could be set in motion by being resolved into the social
processes Marxism analysed. But the return of Realism undigested in the recent CRIA
debates demonstrates otherwise. In fact, it is the case that the Marxist contributions
serve to reinforce Realism by demonstrating, albeit inadvertently, that all the far-
reaching and historically epochal changes in ‘internal’ social relations they document
continually issue in and reproduce ‘externally’ the essentially anarchic, unpacified,
international domain that Realism insists upon. Class struggle and revolution have not
transcended international anarchy but perpetuated it; the dynamism of history has not
led out of the unreconciled and unfree condition of the international. Thus, it may be
said that the Marxists have not explicated or sought to grasp the historical dialectic of
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inside and outside, that is, shown why historical movement continues to reproduce
stasis. Rather, they have sought to reduce the outside to the inside, to drag the
ahistorical into the temporal and dissolve the static element in the flux of the dynamic.35
But to show variations of social relations within the form of the international, as the
Marxists have very successfully done, does not invalidate the form itself. The attack on
Realist stasis through the insistence on the onward development of history misfires
because it grasps Realism only abstractly, separating into bare opposition two moments
that should be thought together dialectically – continuity and discontinuity – and
prioritising one over the other. The Marxists’ critiques can thus only be external to
Realism while, simultaneously, their substantive theorising continues to be caught
within the Realist delineation of the condition of the international: in believing they
have escaped, they have remained trapped. The outbreak attempt fails.
Realism and Myth
Although it may be the case that the Marxist emphasis on historical change falls
short of Realism, it nevertheless contains an essential moment of truth that is not to be
gainsaid: its protest against the mythic character of Realism. For, without exception, the
major themes of the Realist discourse – timelessness, stasis, equilibrium, history as
cyclicality, the nullity of the particular, entrapment within a hostile objectivity – derive
from the sphere of myth, and the eternal unfreedom that it represents. This section
explores some of the key elements of Realist thinking in IR, both ‘classical’ and
modern, in order to explain what is meant in describing the Realist imaginary as one of
myth.
In the mythic experience, humans have separated themselves from submersion
in the natural world, are no longer undifferentiatedly and immediately ‘natural’, but yet,
despite that very separation, remain entrapped within a context that continues to
envelop and oppress them, subject always to external powers of nature that they cannot
control and whose existence they must just accept and adapt themselves to, even
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worship. In their liberation from the compulsions of nature, torn loose from non-
conceptual animality, they yet remain unfree, everywhere encompassed by what has
always been and cannot be changed. Hopeless enclosure within a totalised context of
immanence and the absence of any transcendent horizon of freedom define the mythic
world. It is impossible to break out, to escape, because there is no exit. Time and history
can thus only be repetition, having their image in the endless recurrence of the cycles of
nature. In such a context, the individual, as the specific, particular life, is restricted in its
development, does not yet really exist properly for itself – like everything else, it will in
the end simply be swallowed up by destiny, the implacable universal; and where
individuality is so constrained, moral autonomy has only the most attenuated meaning.
The world of myth is instead one of power, force and conflict, necessity and retribution.
To submit to and propitiate the mysterious and awful might of the ancient and
unmasterable forces that govern the world is as much as the individual can do to avoid a
terrible fate: hubris, self-exaltation, or the attempt, in the manner of Prometheus or
Icarus, to reach beyond the boundaries imposed, invites nemesis, vengeance. Realism’s
predilection for tracing its lineage back to at least Thucydides and the world of ancient
Greece is no mere innocent claiming of classical authority and dignity: it represents the
unbroken experience of involvement in myth, even through the long history of the
development of rational thought and towards political maturity. The Greek moment of
transition from prehistoric mythic thought to recognisably modern reason is also, more
deeply, one of continuity: the Realist perception is that for all its mastery of nature, its
scientific knowledge and civilisational achievements, society has never successfully
freed itself from archaic entrapment. Even when the sovereign self and the rational
concept have superseded belief in the old gods, the thematics of myth continue to hold.
So, for Realism, perennially the condition of the international, the whole that
encompasses the limited spheres of political freedom, remains one of heteronomous
compulsion and unvarying identity.36
Realism thinks the condition of the international in terms of these themes of
enclosure and compulsion characteristic of the mythic experience. So, confronted by the
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exigencies of international political existence, the immanence and objectivity of the
unchanging condition of anarchy, Realism counsels the virtue of the lesser evil,37
advising renunciation and admission of defeat, the forswearing of any ambition to know
the whole. Prudence, ‘the statesman’s supreme virtue’,38 and self-limitation are the wise
course for securing self-preservation. In accordance with this maxim, a recent
substantial Realist text that intends, against the self-aggrandising vainglory of modernist
social science, to renew the traditional wisdom of classical Realism by reference to
Greek tragedy, takes the latter as a model because ‘by making us confront our limits and
recognize that chaos lurks just beyond the fragile barriers we erect to keep it at bay,
tragedy can help keep our conceptions of ourselves and our societies from becoming
infused with hubris.’39 For this Realist, as for Morgenthau before him, human reason is a
weak and fallible instrument and it is dangerous, self-defeating folly to believe it
capable of grasping the Absolute. ‘No amount of knowledge or power can protect
against the kind of reversals tragic heros [sic] encounter or the suffering they bring on.
Knowledge and power make reversals more likely by encouraging hubris.’40 Humans
should know and respect the limits imposed and not imagine themselves to be genuinely
free, to be the equals of the gods; that way destruction lies. Thus the merit of Greek
tragedy, as Lebow sees it, is that it warns against such error, with its ‘fundamental
message … that human beings and their societies alike must recognize their limits and
learn to live within them.’41 Where self-limitation is wisdom in the face of unmasterable
and unknowable circumstances, the freedom of the political entity has an illusory or
insubstantial quality, and drastic restrictions are imposed upon the agency of the
political decision maker.42
 
Enclosed within the ungoverned state of nature of the
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international, the statesman, in deciding upon a course of political action, has no
substantive freedom, being inexorably and unavoidably caught up in an objectivity that
he can never hope to master or control.43 The substantiality of the political entity, its in-
itself, is rendered null and irrelevant in the face of the constant necessity for a cold-eyed
assessment of the balance of forces. Adapting himself to the objective circumstances,
the wisdom of the statesman is to renounce happiness or fulfilment in favour of the
pragmatic, realistic calculation of the necessities of self-preservation, cancelling himself
in accommodating to a reality that cannot meaningfully be changed. ‘A realist theory of
international politics, then, will guard against two popular fallacies: the concern with
motives and the concern with ideological preferences.’44 There is thus no correlation
between morally laudable subjective intentions and a happy result of policy. To imagine
oneself and to behave as if free within the oppressive, unfree whole is delusion,
blindness. Under the spell that binds together the mythic context, good intentions
untempered by judicious appraisal of the objective factors are always liable to be
twisted by the malevolent cunning of fate into disastrous outcomes:
Neville Chamberlain’s politics of appeasement were, as far as we can judge,
inspired by good motives; he was probably less motivated by considerations of
personal power than were many other British prime ministers, and he sought to
preserve peace and to assure the happiness of all concerned. Yet his policies
helped to make the Second World War inevitable and to bring untold miseries to
millions of people. Sir Winston Churchill’s motives, on the other hand, were
much less universal in scope and much more narrowly directed toward personal
and national power, yet the foreign policies that sprang from these inferior
motives were certainly superior in moral and political quality to those pursued by
his predecessor.45
                                                                                                                                              
impose unavoidable constraints. No attempt is made by Waltz to analyse the meaning of sovereignty or to
examine why and how freedom (sovereignty) and necessity (the constraints of the international) exist
together, indeed constitute each other. Similarly, Raymond Aron, at the conclusion of his discussion of
the difficulties involved in defining sovereignty, remarks, ‘personally, I should offer no objection to
abandoning this concept, because of the ambiguities it sustains’ (Aron 2003, p.743).
43
 In Morgenthau in particular, the figure of the statesman is invested with something of the pathos of the
tragic hero, an existential Everyman, exemplary in his exceptionality, who both raises himself above his
circumstances and remains trapped within them, caught in-between: ‘the statesman is indeed the
prototype of social man himself; for what the statesman experiences on his exalted plane is the common
lot of all mankind. Suspended between his spiritual destiny which he cannot fulfil and his animal nature
in which he cannot remain, he is forever condemned to experience the contrast between the longings of
his mind and his actual condition as his personal, eminently human tragedy’ (Morgenthau 1965, p.221).
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opposite of the expected utopia’ (Herz 1951, p.39).
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Catastrophe follows from the attempt to step outside the limits imposed and to think
directly in terms of the universal; pursuit of enlightened self-interest is the best course
for the preservation of the individual and the maintenance of the always ungraspable
whole. The totality remains something ever opaque and inscrutable, beyond the reach of
the individual, and the mediation of universal and particular does not produce reciprocal
enlightenment but is the domination of the latter by the former.
Similarly, for Waltz the varying motivations of political actors are beside the
point because in the international sphere they are continually thwarted by the objective
circumstances that obtain: ‘In the history of international relations … results seldom
correspond to the intentions of actors. … When and how internal forces find external
expression, if they do, cannot be explained in terms of the interacting parties if the
situation in which they act and interact constrains them from some actions, disposes
them towards others, and affects the outcomes of their interactions.’46 Indeed, the
demands of the perennial circumstances of anarchy so void the subjectivity of the
individual units involved that Waltz sees no difficulty, in fact a necessity, in reducing
them to qualitative identity in his theory, taking into account only quantitative
differences, variations in capability in the pursuit of survival.47 The continual pressure
exerted by the whole renders each particular null in itself, an empty ‘unit’, identical to
all others, a helpless executor of the higher laws that govern its existence.48 Like the
natural context of myth, in Realist thought the encompassing circumstance of anarchy,
the scene of international politics, is immemorial and unchanging, resistant to any
progress. History as societal development is enshrouded in a fateful condition that does
not itself develop: states and statesmen, polities and politicians, of varying ambitions
and capabilities, driven by different necessities and desires, come and go, but the whole,
the totality, always remains the same. ‘While men and gods may attempt in their short
span to assess their fates by a measure other than blind destiny, existence triumphs over
them in the end.’49 In the condition of anarchy, all states exist as if under a curse; as
Waltz emphasises again and again, the forces of circumstance are such that, whether
                                                
46
 Waltz 1979, p.65.
47
 ibid., pp.93–7.
48
 Thirty years before Waltz, John Herz was already writing that ‘because of the security competition
among the political units any new unit and its leaders have to adopt power as the basis of their politics’,
whether they want to or not (Herz 1951, p.25). This is an idea that, in philosophy-of-history terms,
Adorno and Horkheimer articulate in Dialectic of Enlightenment: ‘The awakening of the subject is bought
with the recognition of power as the principle of all relationships’ (Adorno and Horkheimer 2002, p.5).
49
 ibid., p.11.
63
they wish it or not, in their international existence states are compelled, out of the
imperatives of survival, endlessly to repeat the same few patterns of behaviour: war or
peace, alliance or opposition.50 Hence the ‘dismaying persistence’51 of the conflict-
ridden nature of the international domain, the condition of the international.52 Not to
understand or wilfully to contravene the binding rigour of the logic of anarchy is to lay
oneself open to destruction: ‘the requirements are imposed by an automatic sanction:
Departure from the rational model imperils the survival of the state.’53 Just as with the
mythic hero, failure to heed the higher necessities, whether out of vanity, vaulting
ambition or just carelessness, leads inexorably to downfall: ‘States are free to disregard
the imperatives of power, but they must expect to pay a price for doing so’.54
The single principle of order in the anarchic international domain is the balance
of power. Coeval with and as ancient as the condition of anarchy, it is ‘the masterpiece
of international politics’,55 the guiding logic that organises Realism’s understanding of
the dynamics of international relations. Indeed, a Realist theory of international politics
must, in large measure, be a theory of the workings of the balance of power.56 A concise
statement of this theory, though, was long hard to achieve. Martin Wight, in his
historical survey of usage of the term distinguished nine separate meanings,57 and ‘Inis
Claude noted [that] Morgenthau admitted to using the term in four different senses, and
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in practice added a fifth.’58 Morgenthau’s discussion of the concept in Politics among
Nations illustrates the difficulty involved. He is in no doubt about the necessity and
importance in international politics of ‘a configuration that is called the balance of
power’, chiding the presumptuous and moralistic ‘misconception [that] asserts that men
have a choice between politics and its necessary outgrowth, the balance of power, on
the one hand, and a different, better kind of international relations, on the other’.59 And
the substance of his survey, a sort of guide to policy options, is an overview of the
different patterns and structures involved and the methods available to the participants.
However, in his concluding ‘Evaluation’60 he confronts a conundrum. In its classical
configuration, among the states of Europe from approximately the 17
th
 century onwards,
the working of the balance of power ensured that the continent was not dominated by a
single country; ‘yet universal dominion by any one state was prevented only at the price
of warfare, which from 1648 to 1815 was virtually continuous and in the twentieth
century has twice engulfed practically the whole world’.61 Even the brief periods of
tranquillity ‘were preceded by the wholesale elimination of small states and were
interspersed … by a great number of isolated acts of a similar nature.’62 The stability,
order and rationality of the balance, its timeless elegance, was only achieved through
the irrationality of virtually relentless conflict and destruction, the weakest being
consumed in the struggle.63 Of what use can conscious regard for the balance then be as
a prescription for policy? Perplexed by the irrational means by which the rational
outcome of equilibrium is achieved, Morgenthau therefore concludes by expanding
upon the three main weaknesses of the balance of power as the guiding principle for
policy in international affairs: ‘its uncertainty, its unreality, and its inadequacy’.64 The
central point of Morgenthau’s criticism is the virtual impossibility of correctly
calculating, from among the innumerable variables, what policy would serve to
maintain or correct the balance. No individual state, which in any case must be
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concerned always with its own power status, can grasp the whole sufficiently to
formulate a course of action that would deliberately serve the balance. In international
politics subjective reason is inadequate to the objective whole.
Waltz draws the inevitable conclusion from the explanatory difficulty
Morgenthau becomes entangled in, removing all elements of foreign policy
considerations and reformulating balance-of-power theory in wholly objective terms.
Subjective factors of state motivation not only do not account for the creation and
perpetuation of balances of power, they serve only to vitiate the meaning of the theory.
If they were to be included, then:
one [would] not need a balance-of-power theory, for balances would result from
a certain kind of behavior explained perhaps by a theory about national
psychology or bureaucratic politics. A balance-of-power theory could not be
constructed because it would have nothing to explain. If good or bad motives of
states result in their maintaining balances or disrupting them, then the notion of
balance of power becomes merely a framework organizing one’s account of what
happened, and that is indeed its customary usage.65
Sweeping aside the assorted errors that result from attempting to ground the theory in
‘internal’ factors, Waltz is categorical: ‘Balance-of-power politics prevails wherever
two, and only two, requirements are met: that the order be anarchic and that it be
populated by units wishing to survive.’66 The theory becomes one of outcomes rather
than motives, of the results inexorably produced, often against their will, by the
uncoordinated actions of states with diverse motivations. Thus reformulated, balance-
of-power theory ceases to need assumptions of rationality or of subjective calculation of
the balance by any of the actors: ‘To contrive and maintain a balance may be the aim of
one or more states, but then again it may not be. According to the theory, balances of
power tend to form whether some or all states aim for universal domination.’67 What
Waltz sees is that the balance, the point of indifference, comes about not despite the
continual and multitudinous ambitions and strivings of the powers involved, but
precisely through them. The result of all the discontinuities, all the conflicts, is in the
end self-sameness, stillness; the sum of the factors involved is ultimately always zero.
The balance of power is revealed as a sort of global law of non-contradiction, which is
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realised only as the quintessence of all contradictions. Like the immemorial mythic
context, within which heroes arise, clash, and meet their end, the balance of power
serves continually to reinstate what always was, the eversameness of the unchanging
condition of anarchy.68 Equilibrium, the triumph of the empty identity of the universal,
is mythic stasis.69 What the theory, thus clarified, loses in immediate explanatory
capacity, it gains as the minatory expression of fate: ‘Realist theory predicts that
balances disrupted will one day be restored. A limitation of the theory … is that it
cannot say when. … Of necessity, realist theory is better at saying what will happen
than in saying when it will happen. Theory cannot say when “tomorrow” will come.’70
With all the baleful inexorability of the fulfilment of a mythic prophecy, reversal of
fortune is inevitable, but not predictable – vengeance may strike suddenly or hang over
its victim, foreordained, for many generations. But it is certain that any power that
waxes over-mighty, that offends against the laws that structure the condition of anarchy,
will eventually pay the price and be humbled, forced to make reparation for its guilt: ‘It
is so ordained that one atones at once, another later; but even should one escape the
doom threatened by the gods, it will surely come to pass one day, and innocents shall
expiate his deed, whether his children or a later generation.’71 The centrality of the
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condition of anarchy and the balance of power to the Realist vision explain the latter’s
essentially static conception of history, in which movement can at most be circularity or
cyclicality, the history of the rise and fall of great powers – always the same archetypal
story, merely in different guises.72 Nothing new, nothing qualitatively different may
ever establish itself. Just as in myth, all the sound and fury ultimately signifies nothing,
and time is issueless, the eternal return of the eversame. Statements to this effect from
the Realist literature are well known: ‘International politics is the realm of recurrence
and repetition’;73 ‘the texture of international politics remains highly constant, patterns
recur, and events repeat themselves endlessly’;74 ‘the behaviours of states, the patterns
of their interactions, and the outcomes their interactions produced [have] been repeated
again and again throughout the centuries despite profound changes in the internal
composition of states’;75 ‘the wealth of historic precedents which taught the eternal
recurrence of strife and conflict among the units of international society’.76 And so on.
For Realism, resigned to the permanence and inalterability of the condition of the
international, it is only through acceptance and comprehension of such repetition that
security and self-preservation may be achieved. That is the substance of Realism as
‘science’. In Morgenthau’s formulation: ‘The realist parts company with other schools
of thought before the all-important question of how the contemporary world is to be
transformed. The realist is persuaded that this transformation can be achieved only
through the workmanlike manipulation of the perennial forces that have shaped the past
as they will the future.’77 The question is indeed all important, but Realism’s answer is
no answer. In it instead resounds the mockery of the gods, in that the Realist sentiment
of disillusioned, grown-up responsibility78 simply negates itself: for it is precisely
                                                                                                                                              
balance-of-power theory can be traced back even further than Thucydides, to the very moment of
transition between myth and enlightenment.
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submission to, and festishisation of, the ‘perennial forces’ and the endless patterns of
repetition they enforce, that foreclose the possibility of any meaningful transformation.79
The pose of hard-headed practicality – looking the facts in the face – really bespeaks
only impotence and immemorial entanglement in unfreedom and hopelessness:
The principle of immanence, the explanation of every event as repetition, which
enlightenment upholds against mythical imagination, is that of myth itself. The
arid wisdom which acknowledges nothing new under the sun, because all the
pieces in the meaningless game have been played out, all the great thoughts have
been thought, all possible discoveries can be construed in advance, and human
beings are defined by self-preservation through adaptation—this barren wisdom
merely reproduces the fantastic doctrine it rejects: the sanction of fate which,
through retribution, incessantly reinstates what always was. Whatever might be
different is made the same. That is the verdict which critically sets the
boundaries to possible experience.80
Such is Realism: international anarchy as perennial entrapment and the balance of
power as the logic of fate.
Marx and Myth
For Realism, modernity is implicated in the mythic context of anarchy and the
balance of power as much as, perhaps more than, any other historical epoch. History is
superficially change but fundamentally more of the same, and the contemporary
globalised system of formally free and equal sovereign states finds its most compelling
theoretical expression in the extreme abstraction and timelessness of neo-Realism.
Though Marxist IR has insisted on the dynamic of history, in fact these Realist
perceptions are deeply related to the character of modernity as it is explicated in Marx’s
theory of capital: the critique set out in Capital and the Grundrisse is structured by
mythic themes at every level of the analysis.81 The following sub-sections elaborate this
important mythic dimension of Marx’s theory, moving progressively from the surface
                                                                                                                                              
be developed further later on, Adorno and Horkheimer perceive in this ‘bourgeois disillusionment … the
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of the text right into the innermost secrets of the system formed by capital, one in which
‘individuals are subsumed under social production; social production exists outside
them as their fate.’82 The section as a whole is intended to illuminate an important side
of Marx’s thinking that brings it into a constellation with Realism’s philosophy of
history as the continual negation of freedom.
Metaphor
Even at the apparently superficial layer of the metaphoricity of the texts, in
Volume I of Capital in particular (the only volume actually completed and seen through
the printing presses by him), Marx’s prose bristles with motifs drawn from the realm of
myth to reveal the hellish nature of the bourgeois world in which capital is sovereign.
Volume 1 is entitled ‘The Production Process of Capital’ and the theoretically decisive
transition comes at the end of Part II where, after a lengthy analysis of exchange, of the
development of the value form and money, and of the general formula of capital
(M–C–M'), Marx arrives at the central paradox of the surface forms of capitalist society:
‘The money-owner … must buy his commodities at their value, sell them at their value,
and yet at the end of the process withdraw more value from circulation than he threw
into it at the beginning.’83 How is this riddle of simultaneous equality and inequality to
be solved? The clew84 is the commodification and sale of labour power, but following
this clew leads not out of the labyrinth but into it, away from the sphere of exchange, ‘a
very Eden of the innate rights of man … the exclusive realm of Freedom, Equality,
Property and Bentham’,85 into a dark world of pain, misery and suffering, the inferno of
production. Marx announces this transition with what is surely a parodic, mock-heroic,
version of the mythical motif of the descent into the underworld, complete with
ominous warning over the portal: ‘Let us therefore, in company with the owner of
money and the owner of labour-power, leave this noisy sphere [of exchange], where
everything takes place on the surface and in full view of everyone, and follow them into
the hidden abode of production, on whose threshold there hangs the notice “No
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admittance except on business”.’86 Heaven and hell are linked. With the entry into the
dolorous abode of production, the character of Marx’s text changes, the dialectical
unfolding of logical forms being not so much supplemented as displaced by a vast mass
of historical evidence, drawn mainly from 19
th
-century Britain, on the frightful
exploitation of the workers by capital, ‘graphically depicting the corporeal depths of
capitalist immiseration.’87 But this is not a turning away from theory to history, from the
abstract to the concrete; rather, it is a revealing of the real content of the abstractions,
the real costs of production of the elegant, self-regulating mechanism idol-worshipped
by the bourgeois apologists of political economy.
In this world the workers, who constitute the great mass of society, undergo
continual, relentless, senseless punishment, trapped in a system of perpetual torment, of
physically exhausting labour that has no issue and no conclusion, an infinite task: ‘The
wearisome routine of endless drudgery in which the mechanical process is ever
repeated, is like the torture of Sisyphus; the burden of toil, like the rock, is ever falling
back upon the worn-out drudge.’88 The immense machinery of production that capital
calls into being, ‘an animated monster’,89 utterly remote from the dimensions of human
physique and capability,90 is in no sense under the worker’s control but dwarfs and
overwhelms him: ‘Cyclopean machines’ of ‘Cyclopean dimensions’ that produce on ‘a
Cyclopean scale’.91 The antagonistic relations of production constitutive of capital set
the worker and the machine in confrontation with each other, a battle in which the
human is no match for the animated monster: ‘the instrument of labour strikes down the
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worker.’92 Marx’s analysis reveals how the development of the productive powers of
capital is always at the same time the development of its destructive powers, which ruin
the worker ‘and drag his wife and child beneath the wheels of the juggernaut of
capital.’93 The helpless worker is the mere plaything of these maleficent forces and he
cannot escape the totality that progressively encloses him: ‘the law which always holds
the relative surplus population or industrial reserve army in equilibrium with the extent
and energy of accumulation rivets the worker more firmly to capital than the wedges of
Hephaestus held Prometheus to the rock.’94 Not only does capital continually damage
and deform its victims, physically and morally; Marx goes further, identifying the most
modern and rational society with the most brutally primitive and irrational, when he
writes of ‘the ceaseless human sacrifices required from the working class, in the
reckless squandering of labour-powers, and in the devastating effects of social
anarchy’.95 In the benighted lands where capital has established its rule, this grim
practice is carried out on an industrial scale: ‘Every large town may be looked upon a
place of human sacrifice, a shrine where thousands pass yearly through the fire as
offerings to the moloch of avarice.’96 The society as a whole sustains and reproduces
itself, on an ever grander scale, through consumption of the individuals that compose it.
Fetish, Vampire, Metamorphosis
Just as the seemingly reasonable workings of the Edenic sphere of exchange can
in fact only be explained by recourse to the hell of the abode of production, each
revealed as inhering in the other, so all of Marx’s categories in the critique of capital
should be thought of as simultaneously rational and irrational, modern and mythic. As
much is suggested by the famous section on ‘The Fetish-Character of the Commodity
and its Secret’.97 For the consciousness of healthy commonsense, blind to the societal
                                                
92
 ibid., p.559. If, as Adorno and Horkheimer suggest (and will be explored in Chapter 3), Odysseus’s
confrontation with Polyphemus, the tricking and blinding of the mythical monster, is emblematically a
decisive moment in the formation of the hard, self-denying identity necessary for the comparatively weak
human to evade the superior forces of nature, then in industrial capitalist society the Cyclops has his
revenge.
93
 ibid., p.799.
94
 ibid., p.799.
95
 ibid., p.618.
96
 ibid., p.812.
97
 ‘Influentially mistranslated in both English versions as “fetishism of commodities” and its secret, as if
to suggest that the fetishism in question were nothing more than a mode of apprehending commodities,
rather than the character of commodities themselves’ (Sutherland 2008, p.4). As Sutherland observes, the
satire of this section, undercutting enlightened reason, works in a number of directions. One is aimed at
the 18
th
-century anthropological ‘drama of astonishment and its disciplining’ (ibid., p.16). In Marx the
72
totality and the specific form of the social relations that produce it, the commodity is
both an ordinary, commonplace use value and also something in fact extraordinary, the
bearer of the mysterious and powerful property ‘value’ as a quality intrinsic to it, its
own proper self, its essence. Fetishism is intrinsic to the system of capital at all levels; 98
here, at this early stage of his analysis, Marx restricts himself to some caustic satire at
the expense of the self-satisfied modern bourgeois, condemning the enlightened reason
of modern society as no better than archaic nature-worship. Ancient societies ‘founded
either on the immaturity of man as an individual, when he has not yet torn himself loose
from the umbilical cord of his natural species-connection with other men, or on direct
relations of dominance and servitude’,99 were characterised by primitive forms of
religion, cults that enlightened reason would reject: ‘these real limitations are reflected
in the ancient worship of nature, and in other elements of tribal religions.’100 But what,
then, should one think of the modern capitalist world, with its idolatrous veneration of
‘the mystical character of the commodity’? Modernity is itself enveloped in the fetish-
worship it thought it had overcome: demythologisation is remythologisation. But the
fetish now is the social substance, value, rather than natural powers, second nature
rather than first. Social power takes on the ineluctable appearance of natural power. The
section on the fetish-character of the commodity appears, somewhat suddenly, at an
early stage of the analysis in Capital and marks ‘a moment of stylistic transition that is
                                                                                                                                              
course of this drama is short-circuited because it is we, as inhabitants of the world of capital, who take the
place of the savages as objects of astonishment: Marx’s analysis allows no ground of theoretical
objectivity on which we can securely stand at a distance from the satire because we, as necessarily
members of bourgeois society, are ourselves implicated in that which is being critiqued. In fact,
‘demystification of the commodity in Capital is aggressively satiric: we grow up beyond the Kantian
“self-imposed immaturity” of unthinking confidence, we leave a phantom home on the promise of a
material home, only to be lodged by analysis itself in a mysterium more nauseatingly intricate and
Byzantine than anything in the playground of phantoms we were so proud to grow out of’ (ibid.,
pp.18–19). There is thus also an implied rejoinder to Kant’s answer to the question, ‘What is
Enlightenment?’: ‘Marx’s description of the commodity in part one, section three of Capital is a negative
mirror image of the enlightened mündig person, as well as a contribution to the larger theoretical account
of his present impossibility’ (ibid., p.24). Additionally, Marx’s satire is surely aimed at Hegel. Where
Hegel’s dialectical analysis, as in the Phenomenology of Spirit, begins with the most familiar and obvious
thing in order to read out of it the metaphysics of the absolute, Marx’s dialectic, beginning with the
simple commodity, reveals a system not of rational but of irrational abstraction, a phantasmagoria, a
topsy-turvy world of ‘magic and necromancy’ (Marx 1990, p.169), of dancing tables and talking things, a
world still enthralled to hidden powers and age-old fetishism.
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abrupt and even dramatic.’101 It is as though Marx was willing, even anxious, to take the
risk of interrupting the continuity of the dialectical exposition in order to signal to the
reader that this critique of political economy will be no straight-forwardly scientific
work of conceptual elaboration, but that the very conceptuality of capital should always
be understood as being essentially fetishistic, its logic as irrational.102
Such is the import of two other of Marx’s recurring metaphors that have a deep
critical, thematic significance. The first is his much-observed fascination with the figure
of the vampire.103 Where wealth takes the form of value, the immense means of
production generated by society constitute an ever-expanding mass of what Marx calls
dead labour. This inert body must be continually revivified by being brought into
contact with living labour in the person of the worker, again the sacrificial victim.
Because, like everything else in capitalist society, their meaning and function derive
only from their value-character, the forces of production can have no intrinsic
connection with the fulfilment of human needs; rather, it is the reverse – the living
humans must continually satisfy the voracious appetite of the colossal and ramified
social apparatus of production. It is into this scene of the ghastly and compulsive
consumption of human labour power that Marx’s vampire makes his entrance: ‘Capital
is dead labour which, vampire-like, lives only by sucking living labour, and lives the
more, the more labour it sucks.’104 In the capitalist phantasmagoria the creatures of the
night are the lords of the daytime world,105 indeed they strive to turn night into day,
although such is capital’s ‘blind and measureless drive, its insatiable appetite for surplus
labour’106 that ‘the prolongation of the working day beyond the limits of the natural day,
into the night, only acts as a palliative. It only slightly quenches the vampire thirst for
the living blood of labour.’107 At the conclusion of the chapter on the working day Marx
returns to the theme of the dialectical reversal of the modern into the mythical, freedom
into slavery. On the labour market, worker and capitalist had stood face to face as
formally equal owners of commodities engaged in a process of exchange of equivalents.
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Both parties were free in the sense that no direct coercion or compulsion was involved:
they contracted of their own volition. ‘But when the transaction was concluded, it was
discovered that he [the worker] was no “free agent”, that the period of time for which he
is free to sell his labour-power is the period of time for which he is forced to sell it, that
in fact the vampire will not let go “while there remains a single muscle, sinew or drop
of blood to be exploited”.’108 Capital incessantly hungers for the worker’s labour, which,
transformed into abstract labour,109 is the life-blood of society, coursing through every
branch of production that composes the social body, keeping it alive.
At one of those characteristic moments in the Grundrisse where his thought
leaps from the detailed examination of a specific problem to speculative reflection on
the nature of capital, Marx brings together the figure of the vampire with a meditation
on the mystery of the peculiar social substance, value:
Capital posits the permanence of value … by incarnating itself in fleeting
commodities and taking on their form, but at the same time changing them just
as constantly; alternates between its eternal form in money and its passing form
in commodities; permanence is posited as the only thing it can be, a passing
passage – process – life. But capital obtains this ability only by constantly
sucking in living labour as its soul, vampire-like.110
Marx’s texts are notoriously resistant to a positivistic, fixed interpretation. The
plasticity and movement of the concepts cannot be captured and held fast by definition:
attempt to pin them down – stake them through the heart – and they shrivel up and die.
What in Marx’s concepts irritates the compulsively doctrinal or tidy-minded is their
fluidity, their shape-shifting quality. But in this Marx is simply obeying the Hegelian
injunction to be inside the material, to follow it rather than impose an abstract schema
on it externally.111 For, as he demonstrates again and again in his analyses, it is capital
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itself that is fluid, that can only be understood as a process rather than as a fixed ‘thing’.
Capital is present in all its moments but is not reducible to any of them; unity and
multiplicity, identity and difference, eternity and transience, are dialectically conjoined.
This is the context of the third of Marx’s recurrent and structural mythic metaphors:
metamorphosis. In the system of generalised exchanges, value, which constitutes the
moment of identity between two dissimilar objects and makes the exchanges possible,
increasingly takes on a life of its own, the use value becoming simply a bearer for this
social substance to manifest itself in. ‘Capital becomes commodity and money
alternately … but not this or the other commodity, rather a totality of commodities. It is
not indifferent to the substance, but to the particular form; appears in this respect as a
constant metamorphosis of this substance.’112 Analysis of the circulation of capital is
therefore analysis of ‘The Metamorphoses of Capital and their Circuit’,113 as value
constantly changes shape, appearing in different forms. The omnipresent nature of value
as the animating social force is such that all things in the capitalist world must be
understood through its movement. The individual element can only be comprehended in
relation to the whole, the single commodity understood as a microcosm of the total
social capital: ‘Just as the metamorphosis of the individual commodity is but one term
in the series of metamorphoses of the commodity world as a whole, of commodity
circulation, so the metamorphosis of the individual capital, its turnover, is a single term
in the circuit of the social capital.’114 Value – and Marx’s entire analysis in Capital is
nothing other than a tracing out of the societal movement of value that is implicit in the
single act of exchange – is the mana of the mythical world of capital, the invisible and
all-powerful force behind everything manifest, the essence that is the truth of all
appearances.115 It is the mysterious property, the spirit, that in its metamorphoses brings
to life seemingly dead, inanimate things and endows commodities with the social
power, to be feared and adored, that makes them objects of fetish-worship.
                                                                                                                                              
which take the form of an immense metacritique both of bourgeois political economy and of German
Idealist philosophy. Capital is systematic to the extent that the social process of which it is a critique
purports to be systematic; thus Adorno called it a ‘negative system’ (quoted in Jarvis 2004a, p.89).
Indeed, what Adorno, in philosophically more self-reflexive terms, said about his own thinking
concerning a materialist dialectic can also be said of Marx’s theorising of capital: ‘Negative dialectics is
thereby tied, at its starting-point, to the highest categories of identity-philosophy. To this extent it also
remains false, identity-logical, itself that which it is being thought against’ (Adorno 2001b, ‘On the
Dialectics of Identity’).
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System
What Marx’s mythic metaphoricity points towards is an encompassing structural
fact: capital posits itself as a context of entrapment, the productive activities of every
member of capitalist society serving continually to generate, on a scale that binds
together the whole ever more tightly, an objective system that has power over them
all.116 The enlightened, rational world is revealed as unconscious of itself and
uncomprehending of its blind and anarchic processes of reproduction, which are a
fortiori uncontrollable:
As much, then, as the whole of this movement appears as a social process, and as
much as the individual moments of this movement arise from the conscious will
and particular purposes of individuals, so much does the totality of the process
appear as an objective interrelation, which arises spontaneously from nature;
arising it is true, from the mutual influence of conscious individuals on one
another, but neither located in their consciousness, nor subsumed under them as
a whole. Their own collisions with one another produce an alien social power
standing above them, produce their mutual interaction as a process and power
alien to them.117
Just as with the mythic world controlled by the vengeful and inscrutable gods, or the
neo-Realist system of international anarchy, in the most modern society the ungraspable
whole continues to dominate the parts. Such subjection cannot be doubted in the case of
the workers, who relentlessly have surplus value pumped out of them. Marx repeatedly
emphasises the degree to which the worker is bound to, indeed absorbed into, the
objective force confronting him, such that he is compelled to sacrifice his subjectivity
and think of himself as and to become merely a thing, an element of the productive
apparatus. In such circumstances it is delusional to analyse the process of societal
reproduction rationalistically, in the manner of orthodox economics, as addressing the
question of how a given group of organised human beings produces and distributes its
means of consumption. In capitalist society, in which production irrationally becomes
an end in itself, the rationalistic assumption is turned upside-down, the producers being
objects of consumption for the omnivorous productive machine that society becomes:
‘It is at bottom false to say that living labour consumes capital; capital (objectified
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labour) consumes the living in the production process.’118 Simply another unit input to
be fed into the system, the ‘free’ worker has no freedom, but is held in thrall to an
overwhelming societal totality that confronts him as something manifest and
unquestionable, that which simply is, as inescapable as the natural context of myth once
seemed,119 and his subjectivity is inevitably stunted and damaged as he is forced, amid
the relentless competition of the labour market, to adapt himself to the requirements of
capital, looking always to the maintenance of his use value of being an object capable of
producing exchange value.
The anarchic system of capital, populated by formally free and equal units,
generates immense disparities of power. But it is not only the worker, the object of
exploitation, who is unfree in his freedom. The system objectively dominates also those,
the capitalist ruling class, who think of it as their own and who feel their being to be
confirmed by its workings – what one might think of, in IR terms, as the Great Powers
of the system. In the ‘Preface’ to the first edition of Volume I, Marx insists that to grasp
the truth of capitalist society it is necessary to rend the ‘individualistic veil’120 that is
woven by its surface appearances: ‘My standpoint, from which the development of the
economic formation of society is viewed as a process of natural history, can less than
any other make the individual responsible for relations whose creature he remains,
socially speaking, however much he may subjectively raise himself above them.’121
Repeatedly, through the three volumes, Marx stresses that the capitalist as much as the
worker remains a captive of the very system that instils in him his sense of power and
freedom, and that his subjectivity is therefore unreal.122 Even the mightiest cannot
escape the system; as with the worker, the capitalist’s being-for-himself is really a
being-for-capital. The glories of free competition, the magic of the market,123 which for
the bourgeois mind represent the height of liberty and personal autonomy, are shown, as
                                                
118
 Marx 1973, p.349 (emphasis in original).
119
 ‘The advance of capitalist production develops a working class which by education, tradition and habit
looks upon the requirements of that mode of production as self-evident natural laws’ (Marx 1990, p.899).
120
 As Adorno called the screen of narcissism that delusively shelters the individual from the power of the
universal that, if gazed upon directly, would destroy the sense of self (see the section of Negative
Dialectics of that name).
121
 Marx 1990, p.92.
122
 ‘As a capitalist he is only capital personified. His soul is the soul of capital’ (Marx 1990, p.342). for
variations on the same theme, see also ibid., pp.254, 739 and 1053–4; Marx 1992a, p.197; Marx 1991,
pp.397, 403, 496, 958, 963, 969 and 1019–20.
123
 The phrase reveals that the market does not arise as an expression of human freedom but is
heteronomous, a part of what Adorno called the ‘spell’ that keeps humans ensnared.
78
with so many of the other categories of modernity that are turned upside-down in
Marx’s theory, to be continued entrapment, individualisation, through diabolical
cunning, to be the very medium of the negation of the individual: ‘This kind of
individual freedom is therefore at the same time the most complete suspension of all
individual freedom, and the most complete subjugation of individuality under social
conditions which assume the form of objective powers.’124
Equilibrium
The objective system-character of capital, like the condition of international
anarchy in Realist thinking, compels the actors involved into certain patterns of
behaviour, quite independently of their subjective intentionality. Executors of the inner
laws of capital, the capitalists simply identify themselves with the coercive force that
they in any case cannot avoid, except on pain of destruction qua capitalists. Their
freedom is identification with necessity. Just as, for Realism, it is impossible for each
state, which must be continually mindful of its own security, to calculate the obscure
intentions of all others amidst international anarchy, with the result that ‘wars occur
because there is nothing to prevent them’,125 so crises of capital are inevitably generated
because in a condition of generalised competition each capitalist must look to his own
survival, pursue his own interest, which, as the contradictions involved in accumulation
play themselves out, drives the system as a whole into breakdown: ‘In every stock-
jobbing swindle everyone knows that some time or other the crash must come, but
everyone hopes that it may fall on the head of his neighbour, after he himself has caught
the shower of gold and placed it in secure hands. Après moi le deluge! is the watchword
of every capitalist and every capitalist nation.’126 The disaster is the outcome of the
multitude of uncoordinated individual actions but it cannot be understood as the product
of the conscious will of the participants. Rather, like political powers in the anarchic
realm of neo-Realist theory, they act under blind compulsion: ‘looking at these things as
a whole, it is evident that this does not depend on the will, either good or bad, of the
individual capitalist. Under free competition, the immanent laws of capitalist production
confront the individual capitalist as a coercive force external to him.’127 Although there
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are enormous disparities of power among the market participants, some having greater
capabilities for survival than others, none is ever in control. The crash, the general
conflagration, is the means by which a degree of balance – equilibrium, in the favoured
conception of orthodox economics from Adam Smith’s ‘hidden hand’ onwards – is
returned to the anarchic societal process of capitalist production. As with the balance of
power internationally, capitalist society as a whole reproduces and maintains itself at
the expense of the parts, which are consumed in periodic orgies of creative destruction.
Equilibrium, the point of stillness and identity, comes about only through continual
instability and destructive conflict. Of this grim and relentless process of the sacrifice of
individuals to the collective, Marx observes: ‘the proportionality of the particular
branches of production presents itself as a process of passing constantly out of and into
disproportionality, since the interconnection of production as a whole here forces itself
on the agents of production as a blind law, and not as a law which, being grasped and
therefore mastered by their combined reason, brings the productive process under their
common control.’128
Cyclicality
The periodic and uncontrolled movement into and out of proportionality is a part
of the repetition and recurrence intrinsic to capital in all its moments. The worker is
condemned by the nature of the capitalist societal division of labour to the punishment
of Sisyphus, endless repetition of the same task. But the labour process is only one
element within the overall movement of value, a moment of repetition within a totality
of repetition,129 as Marx notes when, at the beginning of Part Seven of Volume I, having
completed his journey through the hell of production, he turns to ‘The Process of
Accumulation of Capital’. The commodities that come out of the sphere of production
contain, by virtue of the inequality involved in the labour contract, more value than was
stored up in their original component parts. If capital is to function as capital and profit
is to be made, this surplus value must be realised, and so the commodities must be
returned to circulation: ‘They must be sold, their value must be realized in money, this
money must be transformed once again into capital, and so on, again and again. This
cycle, in which the same phases are continually gone through in succession, forms the
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circulation of capital.’130 The movement of value describes a whole series of ever-
repeated cycles and circuits of varying durations, from the microcosm of the
reproduction of an individual capital investment to the macrocosm of the historical
trajectory of capitalist society as a whole. It is like a gigantic machine, wheels within
wheels: the circuit of money capital; the circuit of productive capital; the circuit of
commodity capital; the turnover period of capital (tied, in its measurement, to the
timeless natural cyclicality of the agricultural year);131 the trade cycle; the business
cycle; cycles of boom and bust, prosperity and crisis, all the way up to the long,
alternating waves of capitalist expansion and stagnation, punctuated by crisis, that Marx
speculates on in a footnote added to the French edition of Volume I.132 It is, in fact, not
just the worker who is a modern-day Sisyphus: the motion of capitalist society as a
whole is one of endless recurrence, the senseless and compulsive tracing out of a
circular pattern that is necessarily issueless and from which there is never any breakout
to something qualitatively different. ‘The return of capital to its point of departure is
always the characteristic movement of capital in its overall circuit.’133 Capital’s very
infinitude, its boundless quality, enforces the treadmill effect of continual repetition by
virtue of the fact that, the means having finally usurped the ends, there is no limit to
accumulation, no endpoint – never ‘enough!’ – because there is no intelligible and
definite purpose to the whole process outside its own survival: it is objectless and
wholly immanent.134 Viewed as a totality, capital ceaselessly drags itself along the same
aimless path with wearisome and pointless inevitability. At a certain moment in Volume
III, having followed through the process by which disproportionalities and
contradictions develop to produce a crisis, which is then destructively resolved – the
balance restored – in order to open the way for another round of accumulation to be
followed inevitably by further crisis, Marx breaks off from his scientific analysis, just
briefly, to utter almost a cry of despair at the insane repetition-compulsion of this social
form: ‘And so we go round the whole circle once again … the same cycle of errors is
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pursued once more.’135 Strictly speaking, the movement of capital is spiriform rather
than simply circular because the accumulation that takes place through the repetition
produces a linear, directional momentum.136 But this directionality is itself directionless
and meaningless, accumulation for accumulation’s sake, as senseless as the historical
process itself viewed as the mere succession of one generation by another, each forming
a link in the chain that keeps humans tethered to their past, the unfreedom of archaic
myth – the analogy Marx finds when discussing the process of increasing value through
accumulation: ‘It is the same old story: Abraham begat Isaac, Isaac begat Jacob and so
on.’137
Timelessness
The movement and dynamism of capital, the ceaseless passage of value through
the moments of its reproduction and expansion, are inseparable from circularity and the
recurrence of the eversame. Exchange society has inscribed within it a compulsion
towards timelessness and stasis. Adorno comments: ‘to exchange commodities is to
cancel one act by another; it is, thus, an essentially timeless activity although it takes
place in time—not unlike a mathematical operation, which is also, in its essential
nature, out of time.’138 Exchange implies equality, the sum of all the factors always
amounting to zero, a continual balancing of accounts. The universalisation of this
process is the negation of the historical because, as Adorno goes on, ‘to balance
accounts is to leave nothing unaccounted for; but the historical is essentially what
cannot be accounted for.’139 The withering of historical consciousness that the spread of
exchange relations induces ‘is the forerunner of a static society, in which the bourgeois
principle of universal exchange and balanced accounts will triumph, and in which
bourgeois rationality will reign supreme. Everything historical will be excluded from
such a society.’140 The totalisation of the exchange principle, so that every element in
the society is immediately encountered as for-another, makes it progressively more
difficult to experience that which is not commensurable, that which cannot be forced
into the strait-jacket of exchange and identity. As the network of exchange spreads by
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virtue of capital’s inexorable expansion of value relations, its subsumption of the non-
capitalist world to itself, both horizontally (the conquest of pre-capitalist social spaces)
and vertically (the penetration of the commodity form ever deeper into the life of
society) the annihilation of the experience of time takes place in a further way. Long
before ‘globalisation’ and the transformations in the organisation of production
associated with it, Adorno observed that with the further development of capital,
‘industrial production will also cease to be essentially temporal: It will proceed more
and more in identical and potentially simultaneous cycles.’141 This tendency is in fact
foreshadowed variously in Marx’s own analysis of capital. For example, he notes that,
because the value content of machinery is only preserved through its use in the
production process, ‘the greater the scale on which fixed capital develops … the more
does the continuity of the production process or the constant flow of reproduction
become an externally compelling condition for the mode of production founded on
capital.’142 And as the scale and seamlessness of production develop, so ‘likewise [do]
the continuity and the constant growth of consumption’.143 The dynamic of capital is
therefore towards an absolutely continuous, interlocking and interrelated production
process, employing to the full the colossal technological apparatus of which humans are
mere appendages.144 As a result of this tendency, ‘there will no longer be any need for
the rudiments of craftsmanship or for a long apprenticeship—the paradigms of
qualitative accumulated experience’.145 Complete continuity equals instantaneity; the
absolutely dynamic is the absolutely static. The forced collapsing of the diachronic into
the synchronic manifests itself also in the circulation sphere. Circulation is ‘the passing
of capital through the various conceptually determined moments of its necessary
metamorphosis – its life process’.146 But it is also a barrier to capital’s own growth
because it posits no new value, being merely the process by which the value stored up
in the commodity during production is realised. ‘Circulation time thus appears as time
during which the ability of capital to reproduce itself, and hence to reproduce surplus
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value, is suspended’;147 from this perspective, it is ‘a limiting, negative principle’.148
Capital’s insatiable appetite for surplus value cannot tolerate such a limitation, which it
strives to overcome: ‘The necessary tendency of capital is therefore circulation without
circulation time.’149
If exchange involves equivalence and therefore stasis, the non-equivalence
within the equivalence, the principle of movement within the equality of exchange, is
the surplus value extracted during production, which is ultimately transformed into
profit. It is the production and appropriation of surplus value that give the movement of
capital a spiral form rather than a simple circular one. The measure of the vigour of this
directional movement – the index of the momentum of accumulation in bourgeois
society – is the rate of profit. However, the theoretical investigations of the classical
economists, especially Smith and Ricardo, had seemed unavoidably to suggest a, to
them, horrifying conclusion: that the outcome of capitalist society’s accumulation
process is a falling back into stasis because the workings of the same laws that establish
accumulation and the rate of profit also force down that profit rate tendentially to zero.
Accumulation inclines to revert to simple reproduction. Almost from the very
beginning, bourgeois society is beset by a gnawing conviction of its own historical
limitation, the insufficiency and illusory quality of its dynamic principle and its
temporality. For, if the rate of profit were reduced to a nugatory value, ‘the animating
fire of production would be totally extinguished. It would die out. It is the rate of profit
that is the driving force in capitalist production, and nothing is produced save what can
be produced at a profit.’150 In Volume III of Capital Marx refutes Smith’s and Ricardo’s
formulations of the theory that articulates this law, demonstrating instead that it is the
very advance of capital, its necessity of constantly forcing up productivity, that works to
undermine the basis of its own dynamism: accumulation produces a progressive change
in the organic composition of capital, dead labour supplanting living (and becoming,
ultimately, a colossal burden that living labour can hardly sustain151), with the effect that
the surplus-value producing element – the life-blood of capital – forms an ever smaller
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part of the total capital investment. The dynamic of capital is therefore towards
continual expansion of production, a growing absolute mass of profit, but at the expense
of a falling rate of profit. As it expands, it slows down.152 The law of the tendential fall
of the rate of profit – said by Marx to be ‘in every respect the most important law of
modern political economy, and the most essential for understanding the most difficult
relations … the most important law from the historical standpoint’153 – is rooted deep in
the workings of the system of capital, at a level that defies straightforward empirical
observation; only theory reveals such inner truths, the laws of essence. For the classical
economists, the law, with the historical fate it implied, was experienced as something
terrible and final, situated ominously at the edge of the horizon of history and
consciousness, a ‘bourgeois “Twilight of the Gods”—the Day of Judgement’.154 The
mythic world of capital is itself subject to a doom.
Static and Dynamic
The theory of capital is one of the modern world as a gigantic system of
entrapment that everywhere negates freedom. The point of Marx’s analysis is that
enlightened bourgeois society has never escaped from myth; its disenchanted rationality
is delusional. Marx’s theorisation of capital, though, had a dynamic intention. The
purpose was to historicise the social form of the modern world, and thereby to refute the
reified thinking endemic to bourgeois political economy, which tended to regard the
categories of capitalist society as timeless and natural, simply given. Throughout
Capital, Marx demonstrates, to the contrary, that those categories can only be properly
comprehended and their systematic interrelation grasped when they are understood not
as immediate but as mediated, the products of a specific historical configuration of
social relations. Adorno observed that this aspect of Marx’s theory derived from his
critique of fetishism, which he pursued into all the categories of bourgeois economics:
‘His basic theme was a Hegelian one …: What appears to be should be conceived as
something that has come to be—or in Hegel’s terminology, as something “mediated”.
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What has come to be, and hence, everything that would come under the abstract concept
of the static, is thus stripped of its pretensions to “being in itself”.’155 To break bourgeois
stasis would be to return historical dynamism to society: if the forms of the
contemporary world could be demonstrated to be not eternal and general but limited and
become, then the future would be opened to the possibility of a different social
existence. This is the side of Marx that has been most influential on the tradition of
Marxism and has inspired most Marxist thought in IR. And, without doubt, IR Marxism
does not completely misrepresent Marx in its emphasis on inner-historical dynamics.
Virtually all of Marx’s early works, still under the influence of the French Revolution,
are centred on the urgent prospect of transformative revolution – modernisation – in
Germany;156 and the Communist Manifesto sets out in classical fashion a historical
conception that would remain basic to Marx’s thought: that bourgeois society had
wrought immense transformations, creating the material conditions for freedom, but had
at the same time, as it were, taken out a mortgage on the future that it could not redeem
because of its own limited and contradictory nature. Capital is vertiginously dynamic
but nevertheless betrays the movement it appears everywhere to affirm because its
productivity and transformative potential are restricted by its continued entanglement in
antagonistic social relations. Only the victorious struggle of the proletariat and the
creation of a classless society can bring humanity home to the promised land of freedom
that capitalist society leads towards but can never itself enter. The Marxian idea is
therefore that the static element of the bourgeois world is indeed a fetter, but one that
will be broken by the dynamism of what is essential to society: onward progress, driven
by the dialectic of the forces and relations of production and class struggle, will in time
blast through the hardened, reified shell. The historical promise that capital deceptively
embodies would be fulfilled through the latter’s sublation in revolution: dynamics
unleashed.157
Marx’s critique of fetishism and of the unmediated, one-sided categories of
bourgeois political economy was, as Adorno noted, a Hegelian theme, and it has long
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been realised that the architectonic structure of Capital as a whole was modelled upon
Hegel’s conception of the dialectic, especially as expounded in the Science of Logic.158
Yet, for all its setting in motion of rigid and isolated categories, drawing them together
in the elaboration of the totality, Hegel’s dialectic by no means dissolves everything
into the movement of historical dynamics. Adorno again:
The other, less popular aspect of dialectic is its static side. The self-movement of
the concept, the conception of history as a syllogism, as it is to be found in
Hegel’s philosophy, is no developmental doctrine. … The law that, according to
the Hegelian dialectic, governs the restlessly destructive unfolding of the ever-
new consists in the fact that at every moment the ever-new is also the old lying
close at hand. The new does not add itself to the old but remains the old in
distress. … Thus, throughout all its antithetical mediations, history remains one
vast analytic proposition. That is the historical essence of the metaphysical
doctrine of the identity of subject and object in the Absolute. The system of
history, the elevation of the temporal to the totality of meaning, abolishes time
and reduces it to an abstract negation.159
Hegel’s dynamisation of static categories is only possible because it is held together, at
the apex, by the principle of stasis and self-sameness: the absolute identity of subject
and object. History is the activity of Spirit through the process of its self-estrangement,
but the principle of identity, which compels the movement, remains in essence the same
at the end as it was at the beginning: the whole historical development is simply the
elaboration and flowering of what was in fact always already there, from the in-itself to
the for-itself. As conceived by Hegel, the dynamic of history is articulated and driven
by an overarching principle of identity and stasis,160 and the image he finds for his
philosophical conception is the mythic one of the circle.161 In a way, this side of Hegel is
also preserved, in critical form, in the Marxian analysis of political economy: the class
antagonism of bourgeois society is the fullest development of the age-old social division
between power and obedience; and in the totalisation of value, identity has achieved
existence as for-itself, the conceptuality of capital constituting a universal system of
entrapment, an objective structure that is the product of the unconscious activity of
humans and which consumes them. What Capital demonstrates on every page is that all
the Mündigkeit of Enlightenment and modernity has not liberated humanity from myth,
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The dark, archaic and irrational origins still shape the most modern. Seen from this
perspective, what Marx says in Capital is exactly what Realism says: that, in the terms
of the ‘Preface’ to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, history is still
prehistory.162 Capital presents itself as second nature, just as, politically, humans remain
trapped within the Realist state of nature. For both Marx and Realism, the present
remains chained to the past because the only change that would really be change has not
happened: history has not yet begun. To this day the static reigns supreme.
In a sense, then, there are two Marxes: a dynamic one and a static one. For a
long time the former held sway, under the banner of the world-historical role assigned
by Marx to the dynamic force of Labour. But that the revolution never happened and the
working class never overthrew bourgeois society, calls into question the primacy
awarded to the dynamic Marx.163 What history has revealed is that between these two
elements there is a failure of dialectic in Marx: the static and the dynamic exist in an
insufficiently mediated tension in his thought as a whole. To a considerable extent, they
directly contradict each other.164 Hegel had the better dialectical insight, although it is
affirmed as something positive in his thinking – that the inner principle of the system,
identity, is both dynamic and static, so that the dynamic continually reproduces the
static and the static gives rise to the dynamic. Each exists within the other.165 In IR, this
would accord with Realism’s perception that all the dynamism of history does not
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overcome the static condition of the international; in fact, it would be better to
understand the principle of historical movement as continually reproducing
international stasis and timelessness. There is thus something fundamentally amiss with
the dynamic principle in that it has never led out of Realism’s context of myth to a
humanity that, at a global level, is self-aware and in conscious control of its own
existence – one that is actually free. In the same way, all the immense dynamism and
productivity of capital only reproduces mythic entrapment: modernity has not liberated
itself from prehistory. It was argued above that IR Marxism, in its emphasis on change,
has been unable to grasp the real depth of Realism. Perhaps, instead, by exploring the
static side of Marx, what lies behind the theorisation of capital as mythic, it would be
possible to crack open the meaning of Realism and to explain its ahistorical and
timeless conception of the international.
***
Conclusion: The purpose of this chapter was to break down the opposition that has
been established in IR theory between a Marxism that emphasises historical movement
and change and a Realism that remains fixated on stasis and repetition. It has shown that
the Realist discourse on the condition of international existence can be understood as
one of mythic oppression and compulsion, political freedom remaining to this day
trapped within a wider context of unfreedom. And it has also shown that there is another
side to Marx, different from that normally encountered in IR: the theory of capital is
suffused at every level with motifs drawn from myth, such that it may be said to be
fundamental to Marx’s conception of the world-historical meaning of capital that
society recreates entrapment in myth. Looked at in this way, it becomes evident that
Realism and Marxian theory are much more congruent in their understandings of
modernity and their philosophies of history than has ever been allowed by Marxism in
IR. This is not to imply that they are identical. Marx’s thinking is, of course, critique
(the world is mythic – and therefore it ought to be changed) whereas Realism is really a
form of bourgeois resignation (the world is mythic – and cannot be changed). But it
does suggest that explication of this side of Marx may lead to a deeper understanding of
the meaning of Realism. By exploring why Marx thought of capital as mythic, what it
means that modernity has not escaped myth, it might be possible then to grasp why
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Realism thinks the international in the way it does, what is the cause of the timelessness
and the repetition and recurrence. It is to this that the thesis now turns.
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Chapter 3
----
Ideality and Myth
Introduction: This chapter explains what is meant by thinking of capital and
modernity as mythic. Developing this idea means, for the moment, stepping back from
immediate reference to IR, but with the intention of deepening the overall argument so
as subsequently to return to and explicate issues that are central to the discipline. The
principle theme of this chapter is the problem of abstraction or ideality, what in the
Hegelian tradition to which Marx and Adorno belong was referred to as the Concept.
The chapter falls into two halves, one focusing on Marx, the other on Adorno. It opens
with a brief section setting out the centrality of the progress of abstraction to Marx’s
thinking about history. There follow two sections looking more closely at this
materialist aspect of Marx: first, his critique of ideality in Hegel’s philosophy, as found
in some of the early writings; and second, the centrality of abstraction to the basic
categories of capital. The central section, on which the chapter pivots, suggests that the
failure of Marxism as practice prompted Adorno in the mid-20
th
 century to push the
materialist critique of ideality much further than Marx had done. The second half of the
chapter looks at Dialectic of Enlightenment, drawing out the major themes of its first
two chapters, to explain how Adorno developed a philosophical anthropology of
conceptuality and thereby theorised the entanglement of modernity in myth.
***
The Rule of Abstraction
If it is the case that the mythic thematics of Marx’s critique of capital should be
understood as having substantive critical content, then the question of their deeper
significance arises: why does the seemingly most advanced, certainly the most
productive, social form in world history simultaneously have the character of a
regression to myth?1 What does it mean to say that capital is mythic? Answering this
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question requires addressing Marx’s critique of abstraction. At a certain point in the
chapter on money in the Grundrisse Marx pauses from his criticism of the absurdity of
the idea of replacing money with labour time-chits in order to reflect on the inner
character of the great social transformation that took place initially in early-modern
Europe and thereafter all over the world, from social relations principally of direct
authority and servitude to ones everywhere mediated by exchange. In considering the
former, pre-capitalist, sort of society, he observes, ‘it is clear from the outset that the
individuals in such a society, although their relations appear to be more personal, enter
into connection with one another only as individuals imprisoned within a certain
definition’,2 lord and vassal, landowner and serf, and so forth. Here the individual is
both defined and restricted by a fixed structure of social relations which are
heterogeneous to him, and in which he has a specific, unchanging, place. These pre-
capitalist social relations may well have been experienced as substantial because they
were immediate and evident, and to those involved they doubtless seemed God-given,
inalterable and eternal, akin to a metaphysical structure. But from the perspective of
developed exchange society that immediacy is revealed as the immediacy of power and
the relations of domination as, to use the favoured term of the 18
th
-century
Enlightenment in its struggle against the remnants of feudalism, ‘arbitrary’. By contrast,
in the money relation, in the developed system of exchange (and this semblance
seduces the democrats), the ties of personal dependence, of distinctions of blood,
education, etc. are in fact exploded, ripped up (at least, personal ties all appear as
personal relations); and individuals seem independent (this is an independence
which is at bottom merely an illusion, and it is more correctly called
indifference), free to collide with one another and to engage in exchange within
this freedom.3
In capitalist society the individual appears to be freed, to have the fetters of direct
relations of power removed (although the violence involved in this process of liberation
is more than suggested by Marx’s language) so that he is at liberty to determine himself
and to pursue his own interest in the unregulated, anarchical sphere of civil society. This
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is the Eden of liberal rights and freedoms. To Enlightenment eyes the long, dark night
of arbitrary and restrictive feudal power is at last dispelled to reveal the clear, bright
dawn of natural, self-evident social relations, in which the individual stands forth in his
true-born freedom.
But, Marx immediately goes on, such enlightened thinking does not understand
itself. These social relations can appear as freedom only by ignoring ‘the conditions of
existence within which these individuals enter into contact (and these conditions, in
turn, are independent of the individuals and, although created by society, appear as if
they were natural conditions, not controllable by individuals).’4 Critical theory,
breaking through the semblance character of individual liberty and sovereignty, reveals
the condition of the apparent freedom of each to be the objective dependence of all on
the whole they together form, a societal totality unified ever more tightly by the
uncontrollably proliferating exchange relation. Where once the individual was defined
by his direct relationship to another, capital constitutes an ‘objective restriction of the
individual by relations independent of him and sufficient unto themselves.’5 Personal,
limited restriction, becomes impersonal, generalised restriction. It is here that Marx
identifies the continuity within the immense, world-historical transformation from
feudal to capitalist society, the identity within the seemingly all-transforming rupture:
These external relations are very far from being an abolition of ‘relations of
dependence’; they are rather the dissolution of these relations into a general
form; they are merely the elaboration and emergence of the general foundation
of the relations of personal dependence. Here also individuals come into
connection with one another only in determined ways. These objective
dependency relations also appear, in antithesis to those of personal dependence
(the objective dependency relation is nothing more than social relations which
have become independent and now enter into opposition to the seemingly
independent individuals; i.e. the reciprocal relations of production separated
from and autonomous of individuals) in such a way that individuals are now
ruled by abstractions, whereas earlier they depended on one another. The
abstraction, or idea, however, is nothing more than the theoretical expression of
those material relations which are their lord and master.6
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The historical transition from particularity and limitedness to universality is conceived
here as a dialectical development. Rather than a simple split occurring between one
social formation and another,7 there is an inner, conceptual, continuity within the
undoubted and manifest difference. The universal mediation of the exchange society
does not simply cancel or supplant the restrictions of feudalism – it is, rather, their
unfolded truth, the realisation of the Idea of domination. The abstract individual of
modern society is, to be sure in a very different manner, just as defined and limited8 as
the restricted individual of feudal society, perhaps more so. Not only, therefore, do the
universal ‘objective dependency relations’ of capital contain a specific class relation
within them,9 albeit in a highly mediated form, but the seemingly direct and personal
relations of feudalism (and pre-capitalist societies generally) already embody
abstraction and objectivity, though in a partial, not yet fully developed way.10 Pre-
capitalist social forms, as shapes of Spirit, are constituted by human alienation and
objectification but only in capitalist society is the ‘general foundation’ revealed. Capital
is the revelation of this inner principle of society and the progress of abstraction is this
inner content of the historical transformation: the discontinuity is created through the
continuity. This short, dense passage from the Grundrisse both signals the centrality of
questions of abstraction – ideality, form – for understanding Marx’s critique of capital
and also points further, containing embryonically several perceptions that Adorno and
Horkheimer would go on to elaborate in the mode of the philosophy of history in
Dialectic of Enlightenment: human development as the conjoined advance of
domination and abstraction and history as the progressive movement of society towards
the universality of the ideal.
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The problem of abstraction is thus central to Marx’s critical social theory and his
philosophy of history, and to those of Adorno after him.11 The following two sections
examine the scope of Marx’s critique of ideality in greater detail: first, in the early
writings, which concentrate on the puncturing of what he takes to be inflated
abstractions in Hegel and others, ideal forms that serve to oppress real people; and
second, in the mature Marx’s theorisation of capital, which he shows to be a system
constituted by objective, real abstraction that has achieved existence for itself.12
The Ideal and the Real
Marx’s materialism was formed out of an intermittently renewed but lifelong
struggle with Hegel, the intellectual battle that lies behind the more localised theoretical
and political skirmishes with the Young Hegelians, Proudhon, the utopian socialists and
the anarchists, Feuerbach, the bourgeois political economists, and so on.13 His thinking
takes place in the shadow of Hegel’s Spirit, its development representing the effort to go
beyond Hegel without, in the attempt, falling behind him.14 Central to Marx’s continual
argument with Hegel was his disputing of the status of the ideal in his predecessor’s
thought. From the beginning, the critique of hypostatised idealities and the search for
their real conditions of possibility form much of the substance of the young Marx’s
polemics. Consciousness of comparative German backwardness – of being trapped
anachronistically in a superannuated quasi-feudal world, able to observe the political
and economic development of France and England but not to be part of the forward
movement of history – doubtless motivated the rejection of Hegelian Absolute
Idealism.15 The attack on philosophy was born out of the urgent desire for social change,
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to release Germany from the dead weight of its history and bring it into modernity. So,
according to his own testimony, in the 1859 Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of
Political Economy,16 Marx began his serious theoretical studies with a paragraph-by-
paragraph critical commentary on Hegel’s theorisation of politics, law and the state in
the Philosophy of Right – the fragmentary text that has survived under the name
‘Critique of Hegel’s Doctrine of the Sate’. Again and again, with relentless enthusiasm,
Marx here criticizes and picks holes in Hegel’s purported reconciliations of the general
and the particular in the political sphere, the merely theoretical harmonisation of the
ideality of the state with the various empirical moments that constitute it (family, civil
society, monarchy, bureaucracy, and so on): where Hegel proclaims achieved totality,
Marx everywhere sees unresolved antagonism and contradiction.
The argument against Hegel is played out through the continual contrast
between the state as perfected Hegelian form and the reality of the activities of actual
individuals reproducing their existence within their families and civil society. For the
philosopher of absolute idealism, the latter are the manifestations in empirical existence
of the Idea, its own self-sundering as subject, realising itself through discovering itself
in its opposite, the ideal in the real. Marx repeatedly denounces this conceptualisation of
the real as ‘mysticism’ and as a reversal of the true situation: ‘The family and civil
society are the preconditions of the state; they are the true agents; but in speculative
philosophy it is the reverse. When the idea is subjectivized the real subjects … are all
transformed into unreal, objective moments of the Idea.’17 In  the young Marx’s reading
of Hegel, the ideality of the state, the self-consciousness of the political community,
does not grasp or encompass the actuality of the activities of real individuals: the
sensuous and the abstract are in unresolved contradiction, the former being unable to
find expression and self-awareness through the latter. The real, living, embodied
individuals do not recognise themselves, find themselves reflected, in the ideal sphere
of the state because the mediations that Hegel establishes between civil society and the
state consistently fail to produce an identity. To be sure, the critique of Hegel at this
stage of Marx’s theoretical development is not that, idealistically, he seeks to achieve
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identity, but that he is unsuccessful in doing so: ‘Marx himself wants the identity of the
particular and the universal, and what he reproaches Hegel with is having affirmed this
identity without being able to establish it.’18 This is the tenor of, for example, Marx’s
analysis of Hegel’s discussion of monarchy. So far from representing an authentic
universality, monarchy is only a bad form of particularity, an untrue universal that
restricts rather than properly expresses what is subsumed beneath it. As such, Hegel’s
theory of the state only serves to trap Germany in the past. The limitation of the
constitutional form of monarchy is to be contrasted with democracy as the genuine
expression of the will of the demos. Where, under monarchy, the people are confined by
a constitution alien to their real being, ‘in democracy the constitution itself appears only
as one determining characteristic of the people, and indeed as its self-determination. In
monarchy we have the people of the constitution, in democracy the constitution of the
people.’19 Democracy would represent the achieved truth of the concept of the political,
the unity of form and content: ‘Every other political formation is a definite, determinate,
particular form of the state. In democracy the formal principle is identical with the
substantive principle. For this reason it is the first true unity of the particular and the
universal.’20 As Marx reads Hegel’s theorisation, the individual cannot be really free
because it is trapped by a false, badly particularistic universality. Only through the
transformation of this universal can the individual realise itself, although Marx’s
ambition here of an identity of the universal and the particular still sits firmly within an
idealist horizon.21
The originating fallacy of Hegel’s false totalisations, Marx argues, is his
fetishisation of the concept, the inversion by which that which is derived is elevated as
that which is originary. In the more or less contemporaneous Economic and
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Philosophical Manuscripts Marx takes Hegel to task for  the hypostatisation of self-
consciousness, its establishment as the instantiating principle: ‘For Hegel, human
nature, man is equivalent to self-consciousness. All estrangement of human nature is
therefore nothing but estrangement of self-consciousness’.22 Estrangement, the  subject’s
experience of itself in the object, is abstract and contentless when it is equated with the
movement of self-consciousness and human practical activity is reduced to an empty
‘willing’. It is precisely man’s human nature, his physical, corporeal powers and
capacities, that are alienated in a privative way in the glorification of self-
consciousness, the Hegelian manoeuvre, characteristic of philosophy as a whole,23 that,
so Marx argues, reverses the real situation: ‘Man is equated with self. But the self is
only abstractly conceived man, man produced by abstraction.’24 As Marx reads him,
Hegel subordinates the natural, sensuous capacities of humans to their abstract self-
consciousness. Giving the ideal priority over the material in this way again reverses the
real situation: ‘Self-consciousness is rather a quality of human nature, of the human eye,
etc.; human nature is not a quality of self-consciousness’.25 The absolutisation of the
ideality of self-consciousness as the truth of the self cancels, renders abstract, its real
material substance. Just so, in the critique of Hegel’s political and legal philosophy,
Marx accuses Hegel of subjectivising the state in a mystical way. The state is posited as
the subject and the real individuals who constitute the political community are reduced
to mere predicates of this subject: ‘Because Hegel starts not with an actual existent …
but with predicates of universal determination, and because a vehicle of these
determinations must exist, the mystical Idea becomes that vehicle.’26 The result of
Hegel’s positing of the state as originary being is that he is rendered unable to grasp the
reality of civil society and individual life; the individual can then only be understood in
an abstract and merely formal way, split between being a member of civil society and
being a member of the state. So, for Marx, Hegel’s political philosophy remains a
thinking of the concept but not a thinking of reality, an elaboration of abstract ‘logico-
metaphysical determinations’:27
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Hegel’s true interest is not the philosophy of right but logic. The task of
philosophy is not to understand how thought can be embodied in political
determinations but to dissolve the existing political determinations into abstract
ideas. The concern of philosophy is not the logic of the subject-matter but the
subject-matter of logic. Logic does not provide a proof of the state but the state
provides a proof of logic.28
Because ideality does not express the actual life of individuals, the hypostatisation of
self-consciousness, the ontologising of the idea and the thinking of the political as the
self-unfolding of the concept remain trapped within unfreedom: the fate of the various
powers of the state ‘is predestined by the “nature of the concept”, it lies sealed in the
holy archives of the Santa Casa (of the Logic)’.29 The paradoxical results of the
absolutisation of self-consciousness and of the state at the expense of the material
elements are that ideality, form, repeatedly reverts to brute nature, such that ‘at every
point Hegel’s political spiritualism can be seen to degenerate into the crassest
materialism’,30 and that reason, willing, the rationality of the concept and of self-
consciousness, resolve themselves into caprice and arbitrariness.31 Idealism has thus
never succeeded in liberating itself from subjection to the natural condition it thought it
had raised itself above. But the failure of Hegel’s political philosophy, Marx argues, is
not the result of subjective folly, an eccentric and misplaced obsession with the
Absolute Idea. Rather, the Hegelian conception reaches deep into the reality of the
modern state form; his error lies in mistaking the untruth of society for its truth: ‘Hegel
should not be blamed for describing the essence of the modern state as it is, but for
identifying what is with the essence of the state. That the rational is real is contradicted
by the irrational reality which at every point shows itself to be the opposite of what it
asserts, and to assert the opposite of what it is.’32
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This last critical observation complicates the trajectory of Marx’s argument. The
ideal sphere of the state may be an irrational reality, but it is, nonetheless, real. Marx’s
‘racy polemics’33 of the 1840s, penned in expectation of the impending revolution that
was to set things to rights, struggle towards an articulation of this contradiction. On the
one hand, the self-moving abstractions of the philosophers are to be denounced, in the
name of reality, as mystificatory, obscuring real practical activity: ‘History does
nothing, it “possesses no immense wealth,” it “wages no battles.” It is man, real living
man, that does all that, that possesses and fights; “history” is not a person apart, using
man as a means for its own particular aims; history is nothing but the activity of man
pursuing his aims.’34 And if society and its laws of movement are ever finally to be
understood so that it may be decisively changed, then it too may not be hypostatised.
So, Proudhon is lambasted for personifying society, for turning it into ‘a person-
society’,35 an ideal thing that appears to have an existence independent of the activities
of the individuals who compose it. This side of Marx’s intellectual development in these
years is characterised by a drive to liquefy the static and the abstract in the dynamic and
‘real’, and thereby perhaps to compel the onward march of history: ‘There is a continual
movement of growth in productive forces, of destruction of social relations, of
formation in ideas; the only immutable thing is the abstraction of movement—mors
immortalis.’36 However, the paean to historical dynamism also, in the same moment,
concedes its opposite. Adorno comments on this famous passage:
The last remark is meant ironically in this case; it portrays the abstract general
concept of the static as the corpse of the dynamic social process. But it also
points beyond its immediate object: Although Marx’s nominalist convictions do
not allow him to hypostatize abstractions, his reference to mors immortalis
shows him to be dimly aware that an abstraction may also denote a social
reality.37
The intention of Marx’s nominalism was the puncturing of abstractions that have
become idols or fetishes, and that keep humans in chains, but he remained a good
enough student of Hegel to understand that the abstractions have objective existence.
The aim of great swathes of Marx’s theorising is to strip the mystical veil from these
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real idealities and to expose them as the products of social processes rather than
metaphysical entities. Doing so may demystify the abstractions but it does not dispel
them; for they are not subjective thought errors but objective realities, produced by
human social activity. Marx was thus, as it were, ironically a conceptual realist:38 where
for Hegel the objective Concept is the truth of being, for Marx it is a dead, oppressive
weight, a fetter on freedom that keeps humans subjected to heteronomy, to brute nature
and to the nightmare of the history of social oppression and unfreedom. The critical
theory of society and history, as it developed during the 1840s, is intended to wrench
open this contradiction, uncovering the material presuppositions of the progress of
Spirit, the reality of violence and domination that is transfigured in any metaphysics of
history. So, the dialectic of the forces and relations of production can be seen as the
immemorial struggle to conquer nature, to compel it to human purposes, and the
doctrine of class conflict is the societal setting, the battleground, on which this age-old
war takes place. The theory outlined programmatically in the Preface to A Contribution
to the Critique of Political Economy of successive revolutions in the relations of
production brought about by the inexorable progress of the forces of production is a
materialist reinscription of Hegel’s conception of history as a developing series of
shapes of Spirit formed through the progressive identification of the object with the
subject.39 In that text Marx also points to the turn to the study of political economy as
the decisive step in the effort to uncover the substance of the surface phenomena of
‘legal relations’ and ‘political forms’.40 His mature theory analyses the process of the
reproduction of society that takes place outside the rational sphere of the state, in the
civil society that in the critical commentary on the Hegelian doctrine of the state he
called ‘the dark ground of nature from which the light of the state is born’.41 In this
theory, materialist reworking of the Hegelian objective Concept and critique of the
mythic power of societal abstraction are taken to vertiginous heights – constituting what
Adorno called ‘a phenomenology of the anti-Spirit’.42 The following section explores
just a few of the basic categories of Marx’s theory of capital to show how abstraction,
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embodied in money, constitutes capital. In this system of abstraction come alive, Marx’s
critique of ideality is brought to a climax because the mythic character of capitalist
society examined in Chapter 2 is shown to be the product of the abstraction that is
intrinsic to the exchange relationship.
Critique of the Economic
Marx’s works on political economy are not a positive economics. They do not
simply seek to explain how the economy works (and, by implication, how it could do so
better, with less friction, in a socialistic way), taking its basic presuppositions as given.43
From the arguments directed against the petty-bourgeois fantasy of generalised
commodity exchange without money onwards, Marx’s analyses relentlessly
demonstrate both the logical necessity of the categories that constitute the bourgeois
economy44 and that the system thereby expounded is utterly beyond conscious human
control. Capital can never be made reasonable; the economic is thoroughly irrational.
Viewed in this way, Marx’s economic texts represent a radicalisation of the tradition of
transcendental enquiry begun in German philosophy by Kant. Michel Henry notes that
‘from Kant to Marx, the transcendental question shifts; it is no longer an interrogation
concerning the essential possibility of a science, in this case of political economy, but
one that concerns first of all the reality which comes to be the object of this science, the
“economy,” now understood in relation to praxis and to the fundamental modes of its
actual realisation’.45 In Marx, the economy itself is placed in question, such that
economics is revealed not merely as having a history, a course of development, but as
something that has itself become, something whose apparent naturalness is in fact
historical. Economics is de-ontologised and the critique of political economy is really
part of the philosophy of history.46 Marx asks how it is that such a thing as an economy
that dominates every aspect of society down to the smallest details, as is the case in
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capitalist society, could come to be: ‘What makes this sort of economy possible? What
is it that has allowed something like exchange to be produced in history?’47
Transcendental enquiry is thus taken beyond itself, in that the aim is not to unveil an
even more abstract and super-transcendental structure or principle,48 but to break open
the prison of the transcendental itself by demonstrating its own conditions of possibility
in the actions of humans, actions that both constitute and take place within social
labour. The abstract system of categories is to be brought down to earth: the
transcendental is revealed as something that humans themselves create against
themselves.
Marx’s dialectical exposition of the possibility of capitalist society famously
takes the simple object, just as it presents itself, as the point of departure, from which
everything else will be elaborated: ‘The wealth of societies in which the capitalist mode
of production prevails appears as “an immense collection of commodities”.’49 But what
is a commodity? The analysis that Marx undertakes in the opening sections of Volume 1
of Capital reveals that the essence of the commodity is abstraction. Each of the first two
sections addresses the commodity’s existence as a simultaneously concrete and abstract
thing, establishing the unity of and contradiction between these two aspects: first, use
value and exchange value, then concrete and abstract labour. The commodity must
necessarily be the product of someone’s actual labour (tailoring and weaving are Marx’s
examples) and it must have a use value in order to find a buyer, but it is created to be
exchanged and, as Marx demonstrates, exchange has abstraction as its substance. In the
act of exchange two qualitatively different objects are equated, held to be identical –
indeed, if they are not different, there is no exchange. To the extent that the objects
differ, they cannot be the same; it follows, therefore, that ‘the exchange relation of
commodities is characterised precisely by its abstraction from their use values’.50 The
qualitative, material dimension of objects is wholly set aside. Rather, for the exchange
to occur, the dissimilar objects must be held to be ‘equal to a third thing’,51 and in their
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character as exchange-values, ‘reducible to this third thing’.52 The only thing that the
use values have in common is being the products of human labour, although prima facie
this is specific, qualitatively distinct labour (the tailoring that has produced the coat and
the weaving that has produced the linen), the concrete labour of actual persons (the
tailor and the weaver). Marx’s argument is that, as occurred with the use value character
of the commodities, in exchange the specificity of the labour that produced them is also
extinguished: ‘With the disappearance of the useful character of the products of labour,
the useful character of the kinds of labour embodied in them also disappears; this in turn
entails the disappearance of the different concrete forms of labour. They … are all
together reduced to the same kind of labour, human labour in the abstract.’53 The
reduction in the exchange process of the multiplicity of concrete labours to the common
substance of abstract labour enables them to be quantified according to standardised
time, the time socially necessary for the production of a specific amount of a specific
thing. This socially necessary abstract labour is the substance of value and the form of
wealth in capitalist society. The simultaneous unity of and contradiction between the
concrete and the abstract in the commodity is mirrored in the contradiction between the
independent, mutually indifferent commodity producers and the unified social whole of
which they each form a part, a system bound together by the network of exchanges.
Because such a society is simultaneously a whole and infinitely fragmented, the
reductions and abstractions that take place in the ever-widening exchange process
escape the conscious control or understanding of any of the participants. Exchange
establishes itself as societal objectivity: ‘The various proportions in which different
kinds of labour are reduced to simple labour as their unit of measurement are
established by a social process that goes on behind the backs of the producers; these
proportions therefore appear to the producers to have been handed down by tradition.’54
The development of the value form that Marx undertakes in section 3 of Chapter
1 similarly traces out a process of progressive abstraction. The simplest, isolated form
of exchange is revealed as containing within itself ‘the germ of the money form.’55 In
truly dialectical fashion, each form development is shown to arise as a result of the
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inadequacies and contradictions of the preceding form, the movement being motivated
in a wholly immanent, logical, way, while we, in the manner of Hegelian
phenomenological observers, simply look on. It is surely correct, against a long-
standing tradition of interpretation deriving from Engels, that these opening sections of
Capital do not concern a putative, one-class society of ‘simple commodity production’
– the entire analysis from the beginning in fact presupposes developed capitalist society
– and that the method of Capital is not straightforwardly logical-historical.56
Nevertheless, as Marx’s own remarks in this section demonstrate, the logical cannot be
wholly separated from the historical. The simple form of value, we are thus told,
‘appears in practice only in the early stages, when the products of labour are converted
into commodities by accidental, occasional exchanges.’57 By contrast, ‘the expanded
form of value comes into actual existence for the first time when a particular product of
labour, such as cattle, is no longer exceptionally, but habitually, exchanged for various
other commodities.’58 And Marx’s delight at having surpassed Aristotle in the scientific
determination of value is premised on the fact that the form of value itself develops
historically – Aristotle’s perception was restricted by the fact that he lived in a society
based on slave labour, one in which, because of the structure of the social relations, all
labour was not recognised as equivalent, so the value form, itself inherently infinite,
could only have a comparatively restricted social instantiation.59 The pursuit of clarity
about the logical form of the systematic dialectic of the capitalist mode of production
contained in Capital does not mean that that dialectic can be severed from the historical
one.60 Indeed, Marx’s remarks about Aristotle, and his famous statement in the
methodological ‘Introduction’ to the Grundrisse that history is to be understood from
the perspective afforded by bourgeois society – ‘human anatomy contains a key to the
anatomy of the ape’61 –, suggest rather that the systematic dialectic of capital summates
within itself the historical dialectic. Certainly, the logical developmental process that is
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set out in the analysis of the value form is strikingly homologous in its inner,
conceptual, nature to the historical development from pre-capitalist to capitalist
societies whose logic was specified by Marx in the Grundrisse passage examined
above. In both, the movement is one of totalisation, from singularity, limitation and
submersion in the materiality of the particular, to generality and universality, abstraction
which has raised itself above material specificity. If the progress of abstraction is the
inner movement of history, the triumph of the value form in capitalist society represents
the fullest extent of this development of abstract generality, the objectified ideal raised
out of the material and dominating it.
The simple form of value, the primitive, accidental exchange, takes places
directly between two objects that are equated with each other; this is still a relation
between intrinsically separate and different items, among which an identity is only
fortuitously established. Value here has no congealed objective existence against the
material: it glimmers for a moment in the instant of the exchange and then is gone. The
expanded form of value widens the network of exchanges and identifications – more
objects are brought into relations of equivalence with one another – but remains, in
Hegelian terms, a bad infinity, lacking systematic unity and conceptual coherence and
stability, ‘a motley mosaic of disparate and unconnected expressions of value [in which]
the relative form of value of each commodity is an endless series of expressions of
value which are all different from the relative form of value of every other
commodity.’62 The general form of value provides the missing unity in that all
commodities are now identified with each other through their relation to a single
equivalent form, but it remains enmeshed in the limited and the personal to the degree
that the commodity that stands in the position of equivalent is simply one use value and
form of concrete labour (linen and weaving, in Marx’s example) among others. The
form has not yet properly lifted itself above the material. It is the transition from the
general form to the money form (a transition that in purely logical terms appears slight,
in that both forms have the same structure, but is in fact absolutely decisive) that
completes the movement of abstraction, being the moment in which the proper,
adequate form of value as identity-in-otherness crystallises: all commodities are now
identical with and exchangeable for one another because they are all identifiable with
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and exchangeable for a third one, money. The emancipated conceptual existence of
value attains its adequate objective form in, classically, gold, a material that is, as it
were, abstraction and neutrality embodied, being both extremely durable and
completely homogenous, self-identical and fungible, every part of it the same as every
other part.63 The money form is demonstrated by Marx to be the form in which the value
abstraction obtains a stable, objectified existence as a real abstraction. This is what the
inner logic of the exchange abstraction drives towards. Money is infinite, in the
Hegelian sense, in that it finds itself reflected in everything it confronts – it is the single
truth of all the multitudinous commodities. Correlatively, the society in which the
money form itself attains its own adequate existence, becomes universal, is the society
that is ruled by abstraction.
In its infinitude, the money form signals a world of achieved subjective
immanence. Where the object has become a commodity, its real substance, its being-in-
itself, is its value content, its quotient of socially mediated subjective labour. It is in the
nature of the commodity to be both singular and directly, but contradictorily, universal.
In this way, the commodity form is truly ‘the identity of identity and non-identity. The
commodity is equal in essence to money and at the same time different from it.’64 The
material aspects of the commodity are something secondary and incidental, merely ‘the
material bearers [Träger] of … exchange value’,65 the husk of a subjective content, and,
as the value abstraction truly comes alive, the owners of commodities, who perform the
exchanges, are reduced to an automatic, functional role by the exchange system in
which they cannot help but become enmeshed: ‘the characters who appear on the
economic stage are merely personifications of economic relations; it is as the bearers of
these economic relations that they come into contact with each other.’66 In societies in
which personal relations of authority have been dissolved and that are instead unified by
the exchange relation, ideality really does posit materiality in Hegelian style: nothing is
produced other than for the sake of its exchange value, concrete individual labour only
counts to the extent that it is also validated as abstract social labour, and everybody is
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compelled to find a role within the social production apparatus in order to be functional
to the single overall purpose of generating value. Further, because it is the case that in
capitalist society no production on any meaningful scale can occur other than for the
purpose of creating value, capital itself, the self-moving abstraction, absorbing all
factors of production, in a real sense becomes the productive force:
Labour itself is productive only if absorbed into capital, where capital forms the
basis of production. … The productivity of labour becomes the productive force
of capital just as the general exchange value of commodities fixes itself in
money. Labour, such as it exists for itself in the worker in opposition to capital,
that is, labour in its immediate being, separated from capital, is not productive.67
Totalised, the abstraction-in-motion produces reality, its opposite, out of itself.
However, as this passage also indicates, capital only properly becomes the all-
enveloping social substance-and-subject through the exchange between itself and
labour. The circulation sphere cannot explain how an increment in value can arise. That
riddle can only be solved by recourse to the hellish abode of production, in which the
peculiar capacity of the commodity labour power of producing more value than it
contains is harnessed and, by a dialectical reversal, the laws of private property turn into
their opposite, laws of appropriation.68 Generalised commodity production, the money
form spread across society, has generalised domination at its core, in that domination no
longer contents itself with appropriating some of the product after it has been produced
but grasps hold of the production process itself so that everything that is produced is its,
the worker being paid simply the costs of his reproduction. The total subjectivisation of
the world in the form of the value character of the commodity is also its total alienation
in the objective, abstract, transcendental system that stands over against and dominates
all of society, that, in fact comes to embody society as the all-embracing functional
context. The world becomes an economy when the germ of the simple accidental form
of the value abstraction has completed its inexorable development first into the
triumphant money form and then ultimately into capital, subsuming all objectivity to
itself. It is this monstrous abstract totality, the worship of which is satirised in the
section on the fetish character of the commodity, that is continually denounced by Marx
in Capital, in all the different registers of his mythic thematics.
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Progress and Regression
The meaning of Marx’s thinking of capital as mythic is that abstraction, even
though it is the product of their own activity, oppresses humans as an objectified force.
Their conquest of the world in reducing it to commodities is their own subjection:
through the abstract being of capital humanity dominates itself. So, for all Marx’s
nominalist attack on him, the critique of political economy in fact demonstrates that
Hegel was in an important sense right: capitalist society really does have as its
metaphysical essence a system of self-moving, totalising ideality. However,
philosophically, Marx never resolved the contradiction between the pre-1848
denunciation of ‘mystified’ idealities and the post-1848 theorisation of capital as
abstraction-in-motion.69 Instead, he trusted in the practical revolutionary activity of the
proletariat to put an end to humanity’s entrapment in this abstract system that it has
itself created and to set the inverted world the right way up, on its feet. But, in the
decades after Marx death, history proved the illusory nature of that faith, as ‘the
revolution went the way of the return of the Messiah’:70 the First World War revealing
the brittle, fractured reality of the internationalism of the workers movement; Stalinism
consolidating itself where revolution did occur; and, most damagingly for the traditional
Marxist theory of the historical trajectory of class struggle, the German working classes
siding in huge numbers with Hitler rather than creating a free society.71 After such
catastrophe, the implication of modernity in myth, progress in regression, had to be
recognised as deeper and more intractable than Marx, in his confidence that the future
was on the side of freedom, had ever permitted himself to believe. The drastic negation
of the Marxist understanding of the dynamic of history as being ineluctably towards the
overthrow of class society necessarily affected the substance of the theory. In a lecture
course from the mid-1960s, Adorno remarked that ‘to reflect on why it did not happen
and why it could not happen – this theoretical question is a matter of no small
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significance for a philosophy that claims to be relevant today. It belongs ... to a
dialectical anthropology which is assuredly no small part of the problem of philosophy
in our time.’72 Adorno’s thinking about why the transformation of the world failed set
aside all the Marxist narratives about the tactics and strategies of revolutionary
movements and the betrayals or mistakes of leaders, indeed the whole rhetoric of the
struggle between capital and labour, as illusory. Still blinkered by the assumption of the
immanence and developmental linearity of the historical process, with organised Labour
as its ultimate subject, such orthodox Marxist thinking failed to grasp the full meaning
of capital and the problem of abstraction. Instead, Adorno took up the critique of
ideality initiated in Marx’s writings and pushed it substantially further. If capital is a
system of abstraction-in-motion and if Labour does not lead out of it, then it would be
necessary to rethink identity to understand why the human capacity for conceptuality,
the means of separation from nature, produces entrapment and self-destructive conflict,
not freedom. If modernity regresses so disastrously to myth, then enlightenment must
never have broken with myth in the first place.
This is the principle theme of the Philosophical Fragments73 collected under the
title Dialectic of Enlightenment.74 Written in the historical moment of its catastrophe,
the work summates a whole tradition of German thought: the ghosts of Kant, Hegel,
Marx, Nietzsche, Freud, Weber and Benjamin can all be readily discerned in it. Here, in
the first two chapters in particular, Adorno and Horkheimer seek to theorise the
formation of identity, to understand how the ideal could come into being. These
chapters are dialectical anthropology as philosophy of history, the speculative
construction of the origins of conceptuality and the continued entanglement of history in
prehistory.75 They seek to demonstrate that rational thought, conceptuality, is constituted
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only through the principle of myth and so cannot escape it. Because the concept is thus
itself mythical, the historical transition from myth to enlightenment (located in the pre-
Socratic moment) and the formation of the unified self (read out of the Homeric
narrative of Odysseus’s wanderings during the return to Ithaca: Odysseus as Robinson,
‘the prototype of the bourgeois individual’76) are revealed to be not steps forward in a
linear, evolutionary movement but moments of qualitative disjuncture in an
encompassing dialectic of human development that never beaks free from prehistory.77
This dialectic of enlightenment is the articulation of the static and the dynamic: the
progress of identity as power and domination, mastery and exploitation of nature for the
purpose of survival, remains always tethered to its mythical origins. The drive for
control over disparate nature is what Adorno called ‘the permanent reductio ad
hominem’,78 the relentless movement of identification by which the subject both creates
its own unitary self and masters the object by identifying it with that abstract self, and
because identity’s origin is in domination, enlightenment does not simply cancel myth,
relegating it to prehistory and establishing objective truth in place of credulous
superstition, but is rather the development of the inner principle of myth. The
implication of Adorno and Horkheimer’s argument is that myth itself in fact already
contains the possibility of enlightenment and, in a sense, releases it out of itself. So, the
more the power of the concept develops, the more its origins in myth are revealed.
Hence the famous twin theses, set out programmatically in the Preface: ‘Myth is already
enlightenment, and enlightenment reverts to myth.’79 The following sub-sections seek to
develop some of the principle thematic elements of these first chapters of Dialectic of
Enlightenment to show how Adorno and Horkheimer substantiate this claim about the
entanglement of history and prehistory, the concept and myth. The central idea is that
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the subject’s escape from nature does not result in freedom because it is achieved only
through the mimesis of what it seeks to escape: the concept comes into being through
the internalisation of the abstract universal experienced in nature. As a result, ideality,
what should be the means of freedom from subjection to nature, always in fact remains
caught within the natural condition it longs to escape. The purpose of this section,
therefore, is both to show how Adorno and Horkheimer develop the Marxian critique of
abstraction and to set out some of the theoretical grounds for Adorno’s critique of the
concept, which will be taken up further in Chapter 4 in relation to the question of
political form.
Ur-history of the Concept
Fear80
The development of the concept, the capacity to solidify the world as an object
world and make it knowable, separated humans from nature, definitively producing the
subject/object schism and creating the possibility of civilisation. In one of the ‘Notes
and Sketches’ appended to Dialectic of Enlightenment, entitled ‘Man and Beast’,
Adorno and Horkheimer consider the animal condition as it appears to the reflective
capacity of humans:
The world of animals is without concepts. There is no word to hold fast the
identical in the flux of phenomena, the same genus in the succession of
specimens, the same thing in changing situations. … There is nothing in the flux
that could be defined as lasting, and yet everything remains one and the same,
because there is no fixed knowledge of the past and no clear prospect into the
future. The animal responds to its name and has no self, is enclosed in itself, yet
exposed, one compulsion is followed by another, no idea extends beyond it. …
Even the strongest animal is infinitely feeble.81
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The fate of the conceptless animal is to live submerged in the monotonous, formless
flux of the eversame because it is not able to determine itself and the world, to create
any stable, fixed identity that would allow phenomena to be experienced as anything
other than fleeting, more or less chance stimulants encountered in its environment. This
incapacity to raise itself out of its natural condition, to throw off the oppressive weight
of brute materiality, in order to shape and control its surroundings and be free makes
every animal, ‘even the strongest’, pathetically vulnerable, constantly at the mercy of
the accidents and contingencies of nature: it is simultaneously trapped within itself, its
own limitations, and open and exposed. This vulnerability in the face of the might of
nature is what, on Adorno and Horkheimer’s account, drives the human animal, ‘so
much more ill-equipped than other creatures’,82 to the development of conceptuality:
thought is born of fear and weakness. The prehistoric human experiences nature both as
full of meaning and significance and as opaque and resistant, ego-alien and continually
threatening – a context that is mysterious and marvellous as well as amorphous and
terrifying. In this condition of wild nature, individual existence counts for little. The
totality, both the species and nature as a whole, maintains itself at the expense of the
individual being. The primitive perception of the power of the encompassing generality
of nature as the truth of the individual manifestation (the tree as a location of mana)
already foreshadows and is of the same structure as the much later metaphysical duality
of essence and appearance and the modern, rational distinction between object and
concept.83 The overwhelming power of ‘the complex concatenation of nature in contrast
to its individual link’84 elicits the primal scream of fear that becomes the name and the
earliest explanatory principle of enlightenment, ‘mana, the moving spirit, is not a
projection but the echo of the real preponderance of nature in the weak psyches of
primitive people.’85 Myth, and even pre-mythic modes of thought and behaviour, magic,
animism and archaic mimesis, are in this way already part of the movement of
enlightenment and knowledge, and of the formation of the unified self that provides
strength and protection in place of animal defencelessness and exposure, power in place
of feebleness. They are attempts, albeit still directly reflecting in their content the
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preponderant power of nature, to explain the world as a system of force and effect and
to develop techniques and rituals designed to enable control of, or influence over,
natural processes. The pattern of enlightenment, and all that Adorno develops about the
inner structure of the concept, stretches as far back as the first attempts by humans to
free themselves from the burden of nature. And it follows that, if thought springs from
primal dread and the ingrained experience of weakness and vulnerability, laboriously
detaching itself from immersion in material nature, there can be no return to origins, no
recapturing of a pure, pre-lapsarian condition prior to the fall into subjectivity: ‘Before
the subject constitutes itself, undifferentiatedness was the terror of the blind nexus of
nature, was myth. … After all, undifferentiatedness is not unity, for the latter requires,
even according to Platonic dialectic, diverse entities of which it is the unity.’86
Equivalence
The eternal natural order is the essence of the mythic explanation of the world –
stasis and timelessness, immemorial repetition, and the impossibility for the mere
natural being of escape or redemption. Every individual thing comes into existence and
passes away, has its own history, but the order as a whole survives unchanged,
ahistorical, and indifferent to every element within it. The mythic vision expresses the
domination of the particular by the universal: everyone and everything is born guilty,
and the judgment of fate is inevitable and unavoidable. In a world devoid of
transcendence or any horizon of freedom, nothing new or incommensurable may ever
come into being. ‘The world controlled by mana, and even the worlds of Indian and
Greek myth, are issueless and eternally the same.’87 Myth thus bespeaks the absence of
hope. Adorno and Horkheimer designate the ordering schema of this context of
enclosure as the principle of equivalence: dualism and exchange everywhere prevail,
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action equals reaction (‘all birth is paid for with death, all fortune with misfortune’88)
and every symbol of myth repeats the ‘inescapable cycle of nature’.89 The universal, the
One that is always reinstated through the principle of equivalence, is a sort of nothing,
an empty, timeless, self-identical point of abstraction or indifference which grinds
everything down into the nullity of abstract equality, rendering the dissimilar the same.
Equilibrium and self-sameness are the timeless logic of the universal, and equivalence
has inequality at its heart, the injustice that the everlasting generality does to the
transient particular that passes away. The individual is subsumed and crushed by the
universal as an enveloping context of enclosure, rather than finding freedom through it.
In propitiation of the mythical powers before which it is vulnerable, enlightenment
internalises the principle of equivalence from the beginnings of the attempt to influence
nature – ‘The shaman wards off a danger with its likeness. Equivalence is his
instrument’90 – right down to the modern world in which the principle has spread across
every aspect of existence – ‘Bourgeois society is ruled by equivalence.’91 With the
advance of positive knowledge of and control over nature, the substantive contents first
of animism and magic, and then of mythic thought, are left behind as irrational, but the
maintenance of equivalence nevertheless runs like a thread through this progress of
reason, binding the modern to the archaic. Adorno and Horkheimer descry the same
inner structure of equivalence and stasis, of entrapment within endlessly repeating
nature, hypostatised in an ever more hardened, abstracted and generalised form in the
succession of explanations of being in Western ontology, from the profusion of mythic
demons and gods, the pantheon of Olympian deities, pre-Socratic hylozoism, the
Platonic forms and Aristotelian metaphysics, down to the laws of modern mathematics
and physics and Heideggerian Being: ‘The categories by which Western philosophy
defined its timeless order of nature marked out the positions which had once been
occupied by Ocnus and Persephone, Ariadne and Nereus.’92 The dynamic of the
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historical process of societal development and the progress of self-preserving reason in
the form of scientific knowledge and technological capacity do not lead out of the
immanence of the closed sphere of natural being; rather, the wider the chasm that
separates humans from nature and the deeper the division between subject and object,
the greater the power of the principle of equivalence and the more thoroughly it is
driven into human rationality. In the universality of their reason, humans reiterate the
archaic experience of the eversame:
The step from chaos to civilization, in which natural conditions exert their power
no longer directly but through the consciousness of human beings, changed
nothing in the principle of equivalence. Indeed, human beings atoned for this
very step by worshipping that to which previously, like all other creatures, they
had been merely subjected. Earlier, fetishes had been subject to the law of
equivalence. Now equivalence itself becomes a fetish. The blindfold over the
eyes of Justitia means not only that justice brooks no interference but that it does
not originate in freedom.93
Law
Fetishisation of equivalence as worship of the power of the universal is, in
Adorno and Horkheimer’s account, integral to the subject’s escape from helpless
vulnerability to natural forces and its elevation to mastery. They read the narrative of
Odysseus’s wanderings as an allegory of the development of subjectivity out of the
encounter with the blind eversameness of nature.94 The voyage back to Ithaca has an
aspect of conquest about it, of the wild being charted, open sea and strange lands being
brought within the sphere of the known, as Odysseus confronts hostile powers and
monsters and, by virtue of his self-preserving reason, survives each one: ‘The primeval
world is secularized as the space he measures out. … The adventurer bestows names on
each of these places, and the names give rise to a rational overview of space. The
shipwrecked, tremulous navigator anticipates the work of the compass. His
powerlessness, leaving no part of the sea unknown, aims to undermine the ruling
powers.’95 In this sense, the Odyssey is a story of demythologisation, as through
Odysseus’s success in striking out beyond the security of the domestic sphere and
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returning to tell the tale, the ancient mythical beings that had ‘originally sprung in the
face of primal dread’96 are pushed back to the very margins of the known world,
rationally ordered space inexorably encroaching on them. But how could the powerless
human undermine the ruling powers of this mythical world? In his wanderings,
Odysseus confronts archaic beings whose substance is the force of law:
The mythical monsters under whose power he falls represent, as it were, petrified
contracts and legal claims dating from primeval times. … The fact that it would
be impossible to choose any route other than that between Scylla and Charybdis
may be interpreted rationalistically as the mythical representation of the
preponderant power of sea currents over the little ships of ancient times. But
translated into the objectifying language of myth, it means that the natural
relationship between strength and powerlessness has already taken on the
character of a legal relationship. Scylla and Charybdis have a claim on whatever
comes between their teeth, just as Circe has a right to metamorphose those who
are not immune, or Polyphemus a right to the bodies of his guests.97
The forces of nature take on the character of law and are irresistible as such. They pay
no heed to the particularity of what comes within their power, instead confronting
Odysseus and all others as an abstract self-sameness. They thus present Odysseus with
an apparently insoluble dilemma. He can never engage the mythical monsters and
sorceresses in direct physical struggle because, their power being the power of nature,
they are too strong to be overcome by the human’s inferior strength. But nor can he
simply find another route past Scylla and Charybdis or the Sirens, for, as embodiments
of abstract legality and necessity, the claims these ancient powers insist upon must be
satisfied. Ineluctable as fate, they can neither be avoided nor defied.
What Odysseus discovers in his moments of extremity in these encounters is
how at the same time to fulfil the statute by submitting to it, paying off the debt that he
owes merely by existing, and escape its penalty – to satisfy the principle of equivalence
and evade it. The method of self-preservation that he discovers is cunning, ‘defiance
made rational’.98 Thus, in his encounter with the Sirens, Odysseus does not attempt to
take a different course and nor does he hubristically imagine himself free to listen
without incurring the penalty; rather, ‘he cowers [and] the ship takes its preordained,
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fateful course’.99 But, through the ruse of having himself bound to the mast and
blocking his men’s ears with wax, Odysseus both complies with the mythical contract
and escapes it through a loophole. Equivalence is reinstated, guilt atoned for, and self-
preservation achieved. The law-like demands of the primeval powers have a harsh,
abstract force, one that is indifferent to the particularity of what they confront. But they
only embody, or represent legality – they have not absorbed into it their being, reflected
it into themselves. They are legality in-itself but not for-itself. Adorno and Horkheimer
note that the epic says contemptuously of the Cyclopes that they are not political beings,
for they live solitary and isolated and ‘have no assemblies for the making of laws, nor
any settled customs’,100 and that ‘when Homer calls the Cyclops a “lawless-minded
monster” he does not mean simply that the Cyclops does not respect the laws of
morality but that his thinking itself is lawless, unsystematic, rhapsodic.’101 Threatened
by this mythic lawfulness, the strategy of the rational self’s cunning is one of adaptation
and immanence: to take into itself the strength of the hostile force that opposes it in
order to overthrow what threatens. Odysseus applies to himself the abstracting,
dominating power, indifferent to content, of the archaic legal force making its claim on
him, repressing his own dread and distancing himself from the immediacy of what
confronts him in order to be able to manipulate it. In this way, his thinking becomes
systematic, lawful and rational, rejecting rhapsodic wandering. This enables the
legalistic literalism that finds and exploits the loophole in the Sirens’ fateful contractual
claim, and in Polyphemus’s cave Odysseus, using the ruse of the name, is in the same
manner able to break the mythical unity of signifier and signified, to become aware of
and exploit the difference between word and thing – ‘Odysseus’ and ‘Udeis’, hero and
nobody – to secure his survival. This breach opened between word and object, concept
and world, wins Odysseus his life, but it is a desperate exigency of self-preservation
achieved through the internalisation of the abstract power that threatens. The human
mastery that is unleashed thereby does not free itself from myth but is rather the
extension of mythic, natural power: ‘From the formalism of mythical names and
statutes, which, indifferent like nature, seek to rule over human beings and history,
emerges nominalism, the prototype of bourgeois thinking.’102
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Renunciation
Hero and nobody – Odysseus’s successful self-assertion, his fabled capacity to
survive thanks to his cunning, is at the same time self-renunciation. He wins his life by
denying himself. To be able to exert self-control at all times, to act in a rational,
calculating manner, the better to serve self-preservation, he must repress the instinctual
reactions of the nature within him. Adorno and Horkheimer note of a metaphor in Book
XX of the Odyssey, describing Odysseus’s struggle to contain his own rage at the
licentiousness that he discovers on returning to Ithaca:
The effect is equated with an animal which the human being is subduing … The
subject, still split and forced to do violence to nature both within himself and
outside, “punishes” his heart, compelling it to be patient and denying it direct
satisfaction in the present for the sake of a more distant future. Beating one’s
breast later became a gesture of triumph: What the victor really expresses is that
the victory is over his own nature. The achievement is accomplished by self-
preserving reason.103
The stability of the self, which ensures that it can hold itself together rather than being
panic-stricken and bewildered by fear, is achieved through a splitting of the subject, an
internalised abstract power being established to dominate and control the material,
natural being. To attain such conceptual coherence, the channelling of all behaviour
through the calculating medium of self-consciousness, the self cuts away, excludes from
itself, its own illogical, non-conceptual materiality, repressing the irrational instinctual
drives that threaten relapse into the flux of nature. That affinity with nature cannot be
entirely extinguished – the human is, inalienably, a natural creature – but it is
increasingly denied and held at a distance, outside the purified circle of the abstract
rational identity. Unity and order thus come into being through internal division and
repression. Because renunciation is instantiated as the principle of the self’s formation,
defeat being admitted in advance and the superior destructive force of nature
acknowledged by the mind that has evaded it, the self’s survival through cunning is
continually played out within the ambit described by myth. It can except itself, through
a loophole, but it cannot escape to be free. So, with self-relinquishment as its principle,
the struggle against nature continually compels realism: ‘All bourgeois enlightenment is
agreed on the demand for sobriety, respect for facts, a correct appraisal of relative
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strength. Wishful thinking is banned. The reason, however, is that all power in class
society is beset by the gnawing consciousness of its powerlessness in face of physical
nature and its social successor, the many.’104 Resignation as wisdom places a ban upon
utopia. Fulfilment is perpetually deferred because self-forgetfulness, ‘the urge to attain
entire, universal, undivided happiness’105 entails weakness in the fight for survival and
therefore can only be regarded as delusion or foolishness, in any case as self-defeating.
The present is continually sacrificed to the future, happiness perpetually put off for the
sake of self-preservation. As a result, freedom cannot escape from necessity and
disillusionment is integral to the mature, developed self: Odysseus ‘can never have the
whole, he must always be able to wait, to be patient, to renounce; he may not eat the
lotus or the cattle of Hyperion, and when he steers through the narrows he must include
in his calculation the loss of the companions snatched from the ship by Scylla. He
wriggles through—that is his survival.’106 The escape from the natural context is bought
only at the expense of perpetual adaptation to what continually threatens doom and
involves compulsive self-relinquishment and denial of the substantiality of the self in
the effort to secure survival. It is therefore no escape. Odysseus may have evaded the
natural powers and won his survival through reflecting their legality into himself,
objectifying himself, but the result of this internalisation of the universal as rationality is
the incorporation of myth into civilisation. In the sovereignty of his reason, he becomes
the image of the dominating natural force that he was once subject to: ‘it is implacable
nature that [Odysseus] now commands, which triumphs on his return home as the
implacable judge, avenging the heritage of the very powers he has escaped.’107
Sacrifice
Renunciation is a form of self-sacrifice and the practice of sacrifice is a central
element in Adorno and Horkheimer’s account of the formation of identity and the
mastering of the world by means of abstraction. The ancient gods are destroyed through
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the very sacrificial acts by which they are worshipped. These rituals represent
submission to the power of nature and the veneration of the principle of equivalence: an
exchange is made with the deity, an offering in return for divine beneficence, and the
social whole is reconnected with the natural essence whose power it is reliant upon. But
sacrifice also contains elements of rationality and cunning that are in contradiction with
its function of reaffirming the collectivity’s oneness with nature. As a form, sacrifice
points in two directions. Through the symbolic communion with the deity, it irrationally
reinforces the strength of the social body and the authority of the societal power holders
and the religious functionaries (sorcerers, medicine men, and so forth) who perform the
sacrificial act, but at the same time the god that is sacrificed to is also brought within the
power of human reason: ‘All sacrificial acts, deliberately planned by humans, deceive
the god for whom they are performed: by imposing on him the primacy of human
purposes they dissolve away his power, and the fraud against him passes seamlessly
into that perpetrated by unbelieving priests against believing congregations.’108 As
Adorno and Horkheimer read it, this double aspect of sacrifice, its simultaneous
rationality and irrationality, contains the possibility of self-assertion through adaptation.
The moment of fraud in the sacrificial ceremony opens the way for substitution, which
enters the sacrificial scheme as a moment of cunning: the contract is fulfilled, the
exchange takes place, and equivalence is formally maintained, but now something
worth less has been given for something worth more.109 Inequality has been introduced
into the equality. According to Adorno and Horkheimer, ‘the substitution which takes
place within sacrifice marks a step toward discursive logic’,110 the supersession of the
specific qualities of the sacrificial object by the generality of the specimen, so that, in
the end, through this unfolding logic of substitution, ‘representation gives way to
universal fungibility’,111 the elimination of the qualitative altogether. Abstraction and
demythologisation grow out of sacrificial substitution and, in this way, sacrifice from
the beginning contains the principle of its own dissolution as a historical practice.
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However, ‘if the principle of sacrifice was proved transient by its irrationality, at the
same time it survives through its rationality’.112 This is because ‘exchange represents the
secularization of sacrifice’,113 not its transcendence. The inequality that is developed in
sacrifice, within the observance of the principle of equivalence, is transferred to ‘the
magic schema of rational exchange’114 between the propertied and the propertyless.
Again, modernity repeats myth. Archaic society was structured by the power of the
ancient rulers, the awesome might of the god to whom the sacrifice must be made, and
the weakness of the mass of believers who are bound together through the
representative restoration of direct communication with nature that the sacrifice
represents. This is mirrored in modernity by the dominance of the property owners, the
destructive power of the societal totality and the vulnerable mass of the propertyless
who, through the mystical medium of money, must continually exchange their life force
(the capacity for labour) with this enveloping power in order to stay alive.115
The reason for this continuity is that the rational self overthrew archaic sacrifice
by means of sacrifice. It is ‘only the moment of fraud in sacrifice [that] is raised to self-
consciousness through Odysseus’:116 the sacrificial structure itself is not overthrown.
And if the moment of rationality in sacrifice is constitutively tied to its irrationality,
then the heightening of the former does not lead out of the sacrificial context. So the
escape does not result in freedom, as Odysseus’s self-preservation by means of denying
himself through the ruse of the name in Polyphemus’s cave symbolically attests:
‘Bargaining one’s way out of sacrifice by means of self-preserving rationality is a form
of exchange no less than was sacrifice itself. The identical, enduring self which springs
from the conquest of sacrifice is itself the product of a hard, petrified sacrificial ritual in
which the human being, by opposing its consciousness to its natural context, celebrates
itself.’117 The self wins its survival by sacrificing itself to itself: it venerates its abstract,
controlling consciousness as its own internal god to which it progressively sacrifices its
natural being. Hence the famous assertion that ‘the history of civilisation is the history
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of the introversion of sacrifice—in other words, the history of renunciation.’118 Just as
Marx’s critical theory was constantly struggling against Hegel, so this argument turns
inside-out Hegel’s philosophy of history: ‘Adorno’s project is unthinkable except as a
critical transformation of Hegel’s doctrine of the ruse of reason’119 by which Hegel
sought to explain the movement of history as the self-development of Spirit. ‘Divested
of its theodicean veneer … Hegel’s theory of the cunning of history became Adorno’s
fundamental insight into the dialectic of enlightenment: the unity of the self is the work
of sacrificial cunning.’120 Society has never left behind myth and the domination of the
universal over the particular because in the very movement by which it sought to escape
blind nature it bound itself to it: ‘If we define the universal as the inequality of what
renders everything equal, then we can claim that cunning always remains the instrument
of a universal that it never endangers.’121
Identity
Just as the repression of inner nature is an act of self-sacrifice, so escape from
nature as adaptation to nature means that the mimetic capacity of humans is turned
against itself: ‘The reason that represses mimesis is not merely its opposite. It is itself
mimesis: of death.’122 Abstraction is the subject’s achievement in making itself like that
which threatens, in order to survive it. The formation of self-identity through the self’s
domination of itself and the resulting emergence of the cunning of self-preserving
reason are a mimesis of the emptiness of the universal in nature, that which survives
while all else perishes in the endless cycles of growth and decay. ‘Only when made in
such an image does man attain the identity of the self which cannot be lost in
identification with the other but takes possession of itself once and for all as an
impenetrable mask.’123 The enduring self-identity that resists the power of myth is the
product of mythic power, because ‘only thought that does violence to itself is hard
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enough to shatter myths’,124 to break itself free from nature. The impulse of
enlightenment, against the enforced acknowledgement of the superior might of nature
that is evident in mythic thought, is the desire to quell fear through the conquest of
nature as what is threatening and different, and demythologisation takes the form of the
continual identification of the world, through the concept, with the hardened self, the
abstract point of unity: to know the object is to make it like the self-as-subject, breaking
its power of enchantment and bringing it to heel, making it available for use.
Abstraction is the means through which the self determines itself and by which things
are subsumed under concepts, natural processes under rules and laws. Through the
distancing that abstraction enables, the flux of nature, from which the conceptless
animal could not escape, is solidified and made coherent, capable of being grasped,
manipulated and turned into use values.125 With the definitive formation of the
‘impenetrable mask’ of self-consciousness through which it controls internal and
external nature, the subject establishes itself as the locus of truth.126 Conceptuality
becomes the essence of all things as that which is solid and lasting, and the timelessness
of metaphysics and ontology inherit from myth.
However, the structure of identity contains a contradiction. On the one hand
both the subject’s desire to conquer the world, taking it into itself or finding itself
                                                
124
 ibid., p.2
125
 Against much of the Marxist tradition, which has validated a good, concrete and material, use value as
against a bad, abstract and immaterial, exchange value, the two moments should be seen as dialectical:
historically, the more the object has become a use value, disenchanted and made functional, completely
subsumed to purposes of human utility, the more it has also become an exchange value, the material
bearer of social labour. Marx’s analysis suggests that the commodity is at the same time both something
‘homely’ and ‘natural’ (Marx 1990, p.138), apparently familiar and self-evident to the subject, and
something unheimlich, uncanny and metaphysical, subject-alien and mystical. Both aspects are
constitutive of its fetish-character. As Adorno and Horkheimer observe: ‘False clarity is only another
name for myth. Myth was always obscure and luminous at once’ (Adorno and Horkheimer 2002, p.xvii).
The ambition of materialism, therefore, would not be to reduce the object to a straightforward and
commonsensical use value, eliminating mystificatory exchange value, but to bring about a world ‘in
which things are freed from the drudgery of being useful’, an experience of the object beyond both use
value and exchange value (Benjamin 1999, p.9). This motif from Benjamin’s 1935 Exposé for the
Arcades Project was specifically approved twice by Adorno in his otherwise notoriously critical letter to
Benjamin (Adorno and Benjamin 1999, pp.104 and 113) and note also Adorno’s remark in the same letter
that ‘the mere concept of use-value by no means suffices of itself as far as a critique of the commodity
character is concerned, but only takes us back to a stage prior to the division of labour’ (ibid., p.108). On
Adorno’s critique of use value, see Kaufmann 2001 and Vatter 2008.
126
 As Adorno put it in more epistemological terms in Negative Dialectics: ‘The abstraction … whose
reification in the history of nominalism since the Aristotelean critique of Plato has been ascribed to the
subject as its error, is itself the principle whereby the subject becomes the subject in the first place, its
own essence. That is why the recourse to that which it is not itself seems external, violent. What convicts
the subject of its own caprice, its prius of its own posteriority, always sounds like transcendental dogma
to it’ (Adorno 2001b, ‘“Transcendental Appearance”’).
124
reflected in everything, and its capacity for identity are inherently limitless and
universal. ‘Humans believe themselves free of fear when there is no longer anything
unknown. … Nothing is allowed to remain outside, since the mere idea of the “outside”
is the real source of fear.’127 The historical advance of identity and of knowledge and
mastery of the world, are the progress of the internalisation of the outside, of what was
once experienced as subject-alien. But because the infinite self is modelled on the
abstract universal in nature, which itself violently ruled over the particular,
identification is always also misidentification, involving a continual injustice to the
object, the severing from the thing of its specificity and singularity in order to make it
known. The form of the subject’s universality, imitated from blind nature, inevitably
represses the object. It is the inequality that renders the unequal equal: ‘Abstraction, the
instrument of enlightenment, stands in the same relationship to its objects as fate, whose
concept it eradicates: as liquidation.’128 Bringing the outside inside, identifying it, can
therefore only be achieved through the banishment of that living element of things that
cannot be subsumed or made identical because it resists conceptualisation – an element
that comes to be regarded as chaotic and irrational, and that endangers self-preservation
through the threat of the dissolution of identity that it poses. What this contradiction in
identity reveals is that all the subject’s power over the object is still just weakness: it
remains enthralled to nature and transfixed by mythic fear, even in its escape. It is not
reconciled with nature but dominates it, just as nature once dominated it.129
Identification is thus the elimination of what is in-itself rather than for-us, what is
outside the magic circle of identity and thus causes fear. In the drive for security,
humans make both external nature and themselves into inherently neutral, thing-like
objects, equating ‘the living with the non-living, as myth had equated the non-living
with the living.’130 If myth still expressed the age-old consciousness of the substantiality
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of nature, the movement of enlightenment against myth is the continual ‘extirpation of
animism’,131 both the denial that the object represents anything other than lifeless,
neutral matter onto which humans project a self-generated meaning – ‘value’ – and the
repression by the subject of its own capacity to experience itself and the object as other
than fixed and reified. In pursuit of security, the perpetual maxim of enlightenment is:
‘All gods and qualities must be destroyed’.132
Domination
The development of identity is inseparable from societal domination: ‘The
distance of subject from object, the presupposition of abstraction, is founded on the
distance from things which the ruler attains by means of the ruled.’133 Where Odysseus
quelled his inner nature and assured his survival by elevating the abstract self to a
position of mastery, in like manner the societal body is made more integrated and
powerful, better capable of ensuring its self-preservation, through the instantiation and
objectification of domination, what reveals itself eventually in Marx’s analysis of 19
th
-
century capital as depersonalised class rule. Like the self, society’s principle of unity is
also its principle of division: it is bound together through the antagonism that threatens
to pull it apart.134 ‘Power confers increased cohesion and strength on the social whole in
which it is established’,135 and through the division of labour the particular interest of
societal authority becomes general, so that ‘power confronts the individual as the
universal, as the reason which informs reality.’136 The progress of that reason,
demythologisation, is inseparable from the progress of substitutability, the social power
objectified and made permanent in the division between rulers and ruled:
“Just as substitutability is the measure of domination, and that person is most
powerful who can have others substitute for him or her in the majority of tasks,
so substitution is at once the vehicle of progress and regression.” In this passage
Adorno and Horkheimer begin to reconceive the commonplace that domination
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is the power to have others do one’s own work; they reformulate this idea as part
of the history of sacrifice in which an object of lesser value is cunningly
substituted for another of greater value.137
The history of abstraction set out in Dialectic of Enlightenment contains virtually a
tripartite schema of such substitution. At the primitive stage of animism and magic, in
which the differentiation of the social organism is not far advanced, the shaman
attempts to influence nature through making himself like it: ‘The magician imitates
demons; to frighten or placate them he makes intimidating or appeasing gestures.’138
The sorcerers and tribal elders represent power but not yet in an abstracted, objectified
form. At this primitive stage no sharp split between self and world, sign and signified
has occurred, so that materiality still has a compelling authority and allure to it: ‘Magic
implies specific representation. What is done to the spear, the hair, the name of the
enemy, is also to befall his person.’139 But the sacred essence is already associated with
a privileged status within the group and, in time, as the societal practice of sacrifice
supersedes magic, authority and subordination diverge and hierarchy rigidifies. With the
increase of power and social division comes a distancing from the object: ‘if the
nomadic savage, despite his subjection, could still participate in the magic which
defined the limits of that world, and could disguise himself as his quarry to stalk it, in
later periods the intercourse with spirits and the subjection were assigned to different
classes of humanity: power to one side, obedience to the other.’140 The substitution that
inheres as a possibility in sacrifice, bringing the god within the reach of the humans
who worship, has as its corollary the substitutional wound incised into the social body,
the division between those who command and those who obey. The wielders of social
power assume the authority of the gods who are overthrown through the sacrificial
ritual.  However, if the practice of abstraction that makes possible discursive logic can
already be discerned in the substitution that occurs in sacrifice, nevertheless the
sacrificial ritual as a whole remains poised between the ancient world of magic and the
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disenchanted world of reason. The form has not yet lifted itself clear of the content,
become for-itself rather than only in-itself. ‘The sanctity of the hic et nunc [in the
sacrifice], the uniqueness of the chosen victim which coincides with its representative
status, distinguishes it radically, makes it non-exchangeable even in the exchange.’141
The transition from myth to enlightenment, from sacrifice to exchange, leaves this
behind. Where the shaman had identified himself with what was feared, in the rational
exchange process, based upon value, the object is made identical to the subject.
Ultimately, in the thoroughly disenchanted world, in which man is the measure of all
things, everything becomes exchangeable for everything else and money, the bearer of
the precious social substance, is exalted as ‘the god among commodities’,142 to be
worshipped. But, as Marx perceived, universal mediation is not the dissolution of
domination but the exposure of its ‘general foundation’. Capital is the complete
subjectification of the world, the total reduction to identity that, in Adorno and
Horkheimer’s argument, is the telos of enlightenment. It is the social form in which the
outside has been entirely brought inside, nothing is any longer ‘in-itself’ and everything
is ‘for-us’, so that ‘in their transformation the essence of things is revealed as always the
same, a substrate of domination’,143 value. The commodity form is the necessary
endpoint of the logic of the concept, developed out of myth, and the class relation of
capital, which subjects humans themselves to commodification, is the outcome of the
evolutionary process of societal domination: ‘all the oppression that man has ever
inflicted on man culminates in the modern age in the cold inhumanity of free wage
labor.’144 The historical process of the universalisation of abstraction and domination set
in motion in prehistory reaches its fulfilment in modernity, which is structured by the
twin systems of value and the neutral, impersonal state form, totalised systems of
objective abstraction that encompass and dominate the real, material human beings who
both produce these forms of ideality and cannot control them.
Dialectic of Enlightenment is a dense text, and Adorno and Horkheimer’s mode
of exposition – what at first seems like simply a series of breathtaking assertions –
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makes few concessions to ready intelligibility. The exposition here of key elements of
the argument concerning the prehistory of conceptuality was designed to show how they
take up the Marxian themes of the critique of idealism surveyed in the first part of this
chapter and deepen them: abstract universals dominating the ‘real’ particular, the
reversion of the ideal to mere nature, and the historical process of the human conquest
of the material world by way of objectified ideality. What their account of the origins of
identity shows is that rationality does not succeed in leaving myth behind because it is
itself mythic, having the principle of domination at its core. Abstraction and the self
attain objective being against the subject as a material, natural thing, through sacrifice
and renunciation; and identity, as capital, may be able to subsume the world completely,
but it only thereby creates a second mythology. So, through reason, as universality,
humans are both free and unfree: abstraction and the concept separate them from nature
but because they are modelled on natural domination, internalised, that separation does
not produce liberation. In their sovereignty, as conquerors of the world, they remain
trapped. In constructing the ur-history of the concept, these first two chapters of
Dialectic of Enlightenment can be understood as a critique of form, and, having
established some of the essential themes, the thesis now turns to the question, central to
the critique of Realism in IR, of political form.
***
Conclusion: This chapter has focused on elaborating some of the theory central to the
thesis. Taking up the question of the mythic character of capital, it has shown that a
critique of abstraction as ideality that dominates and represses the material was central
to Marx’s thought, both in his early writings and in Capital. His mature theory is one of
abstraction achieving independence from and power over materiality in the money-form
and then coming alive, abstraction-in-motion, as capital. It is this ‘rule of abstraction’
that gives rise to the mythic thematics of the theory of capital. The chapter then turned
to Adorno’s thinking about the origins of conceptuality in Dialectic of Enlightenment.
The leading idea is that abstraction, the concept, is the mimesis of the dominating
universality of nature, internalised for purposes of self-preservation. This is a sacrificial
process in which humans progressively deny their own natural being for the sake of
identity, mastery of themselves and of the world. What Adorno shows is that the
separation from nature and myth achieved thereby still remains trapped and unfree
129
because the escape is achieved only through the internalisation of the principle of myth,
domination. Thus, identity, the inner substance of capital, is mythic from the beginning.
It is now necessary to consider the implications of this argument for an understanding of
the political.
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Chapter 4
----
Sovereignty and the Exception
Introduction: This chapter addresses the issue central to the critique of Realism: the
problem of political form. Again, it is constructed in two halves. The first is concerned
with the inside/outside structure of political being. This is developed through an account
of Carl Schmitt’s thinking about sovereignty and how Schmitt’s themes are taken up
and developed by Giorgio Agamben. The argument, in brief, is that in thinking about
political form and the exception, Schmitt and Agamben are driven towards the
terminology of epistemology: subject and object, identity and non-identity. These
political theories are then read through Adorno’s epistemological thinking about the
contradictory structure of the concept, identity and non-identity, to show that these
apparently disparate theoretical enquiries are in fact identical in form: at this deep level,
political theory and epistemology coincide. The conclusion is that the political should
be thought of as a modality of ideation, a central structure of the creation of human self-
identity through abstracting itself from nature, and that its delimited form results from
the problematic structure of the concept, already touched on in Chapter 3. From this
position, the second half then develops the idea of the political and myth. It begins with
a brief overview of what Agamben establishes as the ‘Schmitt–Benjamin Debate’ and
then goes on to show how Adorno took up and elaborated critical themes from this
debate in Dialectic of Enlightenment. This brings the thematics of ‘the exception’ and
the ‘state of exception’ into the ambit of Adorno’s thinking about ideality and myth.
The intention is to explain in a new way for IR the central Realist problems of the
delimited nature of the political and the international as a state of nature.
***
As the subtitle of his great work indicates, Marx’s study of political economy is
placed in the the Kantian-Idealist tradition of Critique, reflection on the context of
mediation. Where German Idealism, pursuing the epistemological problematic, had
rediscovered the subject at the origin of objectivity, so Marx cracked open the basic
categories established by classical political economy, the hardened objectivity of
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bourgeois society, revealing their subjective substance. In starting with the seemingly
self-evident commodity, and unfolding its metaphysical subtleties, Marx asks the
fundamental question of how exchange is possible at all. The commodity is the
‘elementary form’1 of bourgeois society; beginning with it means not presupposing any
categories as simply given and immediate, a theoretical failing for which Marx
repeatedly castigates the bourgeois economists,2 but developing them immanently out of
the commodity form, showing them to be mediated and historical. The elaborated
analysis of this societal cell-form reveals how their material circumstances – nature –
are changed by humans into a reified object world in which the object’s true being, its
essence, is its value character. If it is to align itself with Marx’s theorising, a critique of
the political should also think through and not presuppose any categories in attempting
to understand the meaning of humanity’s status as !"#$%$&"' ()"' – the political
existence that, so Realism’s saturnine wisdom suggests, is, in its totality as fragmented
international system, as much of a block on freedom as the world-spanning, ever more
integrated, system of capital. Experience of relative German backwardness, failed
revolution and the necessary limitations of bourgeois society (its ideology promising
more than its reality could allow) provoked the Marxian critique in the mid-19
th
 century.
Decades later, and long after the eclipse of Idealism, it was doubtless the experience of
national defeat, failed revolution and the chronic instability of the Weimar Republic,
which the liberalism inherited from the 19
th
 century seemed unable to resolve, that
prompted the analyses of the political of Walter Benjamin and Carl Schmitt. Although
these point in drastically different directions, one characteristic they nevertheless both
share with Marx’s theorising is a refusal to assume the givenness of the established
categories of their subject, to take the political, as seemingly proper to human beings,
for granted and then to concern themselves with second-order considerations relating to
the organisation of decision-making, modes of conflict resolution, hierarchies of
authority and so forth. Writing in a society that felt itself to be disintegrating, they ask
the more profound question of how it is that the political space is constituted at all, what
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it is that makes the political possible. It is this interest in the extreme question, the
question of constitution, that Giorgio Agamben has subsequently taken up in his
theorising about the political, developed as it is out of Benjamin and Schmitt. The first
part of this chapter examines Schmitt’s theory of sovereignty and Agamben’s
exploration of its implications, and seeks to open out their meaning by bringing them
into relation with Adorno’s abstract-philosophical critique of the concept.3
Schmitt and the Exception
In Homo Sacer, the first work in his ongoing investigations into the political,
Agamben takes as his starting point Schmitt’s discussion of sovereignty in the first
chapter of the latter’s 1923 volume, Political Theology, which opens with the famous
dictum: ‘Sovereign is he who decides on the exception’.4 Part of the difficulty of
situating Schmitt’s thought and reconstructing its continuity is that his oeuvre ‘consists
overwhelmingly of interventionist texts’,5 slim volumes of polemical import that stage a
contribution to a specific intellectual controversy but also reach out theoretically
beyond these historical confines. Political Theology is, in this sense, characteristic.
Against the prevailing authority of legal positivism, which sought to conceptualise and
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expound a seamless order of legal norms regulating society, a system in which the state
was reduced to the technical-formal role of a guarantor that ‘should remain in the
background as ultima ratio’,6 Schmitt in this text insists that the legal system can never
be a self-sustaining totality enclosed on itself because the legal form as such is not self-
sufficient: ‘Every legal thought brings a legal idea, which in its purity can never become
reality, into another aggregate condition and adds an element that cannot be derived
either from the content of the legal idea or from the content of a general positive legal
norm that is to be applied.’7 Central to Schmitt’s argument is the perception that the
form, the legal norm, relies upon, indeed has its existence in, an element outside its own
immanent sphere, something that is not wholly reducible to it.8 The positivists, however,
in their drive to produce a coherent deductive system of law on the model of
mathematics or the natural sciences, simply closed their eyes to the ineliminable
question of power implied in the problem of the relation of norm to fact because
‘everything that contradicts the system is excluded as impure’.9 As a result, they
dismissed the exception as something extra-juridical and irrational. This wilful
blindness left them unable to produce a convincing explication of the concept of
sovereignty, or to account for the relation between legality and power.10 It is this that
motivates Schmitt’s interest in the exception. Through the crisis point of the
confrontation with the exception, the true source of authority in the legal order, beyond
the organised structure of norms, is revealed because it is in that instant of decision that
sovereignty and fact come face to face and the force of law is applied directly to the
material of life in a way necessarily unmediated by the objective norm of the juridical
rule. In the moment of the exception the authority of the sovereign is revealed.
The exception is thus, in an emphatic sense, as Schmitt notes at the very outset
of his discussion, ‘a borderline concept … one pertaining to the outermost sphere’.11
Theory that takes for granted the coherence of the political-legal space as a given fact
has great difficulty in coming to terms with, even acknowledging, the exception and
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therefore, so Schmitt argues, struggles to grasp the concept of sovereignty, being
reduced to mouthing the empty formalism that sovereignty is the highest, underived
power: ‘A jurisprudence concerned with ordinary day-to-day questions has practically
no interest in the concept of sovereignty. Only the recognizable is its normal concern;
everything else is a “disturbance”. Such a jurisprudence confronts the extreme case
disconcertedly.’12 In contrast to the regularity of the day-to-day, the exception is a
liminal concept, the point or moment that both makes possible and defines the
separation of inside and outside, and as such it is the exception that gives substance to
sovereignty, for it is at the meeting point of sovereign power and the exception that the
regularised societal space in which the legal norm can be applicable finds it justification
and legitimacy. Only at the extreme, beyond the familiar routine of the quotidian, in the
crisis of the confrontation with the unknown, is the inner truth of the juridico-political
sphere revealed. In the effort to grasp the significance of the exception and the decision,
Schmitt’s discussion is elaborated in terms of identity and non-identity, logical
generality and the irreducibly singular:
The exception is that which cannot be subsumed; it defies general codification,
but it simultaneously reveals a specifically juristic element—the decision in
absolute purity. The exception appears in its absolute form when a situation in
which legal prescriptions can be valid must first be brought about. Every general
norm demands a normal, everyday frame of life to which it can be factually
applied and which is subjected to its regulations. The norm requires a
homogeneous medium. This effective normal situation is not a mere “superficial
presupposition” that a jurist can ignore; that situation belongs precisely to its
immanent validity. There exists no norm that is applicable to chaos. For a legal
order to make sense, a normal situation must exist, and he is sovereign who
definitely decides whether this normal situation actually exists.13
In Schmitt’s argument, the exception arises at the origin of the ordered, ‘homogeneous’
political-legal space. Only through and against ‘that which cannot be subsumed’ can the
‘normal, everyday frame of life’, the domain of juridical norms and regulations, be
created. The element of the exception, branded as chaotic and irrational, defying
assimilation, not submitting to mastery, must be successfully excluded for the coherent,
objectified, self-identical inner space to have validity. That which can be made
homogeneous can be included; that which cannot be reduced to identity must be
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excluded. This is the necessary and essential task of the sovereign: no juridico-political
order can exist without this separation being made. The exception, on Schmitt’s
account, thus has a peculiar double function. It is a limit concept in that it marks the
borderline of the ordered space of sovereignty, the point beyond which the inclusive
capacity of sovereign power does not – in fact, cannot – reach; but it is also the element
that gives life to sovereignty, which asserts and proves its power ultimately through the
encounter with the exception. The sovereign must exclude the exception but also relies
upon it for its own meaning, its own ordering logic. Sovereignty’s sense is dependent on
the element that it cannot incorporate into itself. So Schmitt writes: ‘The exception is
more interesting than the rule. The rule proves nothing; the exception proves
everything: It confirms not only the rule but also its existence, which derives only from
the exception. In the exception the power of real life breaks through the crust of a
mechanism that has become torpid by repetition.’14 The authority of sovereignty is
therefore contradictorily bound to the exception: it cannot exist without it, but its
existence has validity only in excluding it.
Agamben and the State of Exception
It is this complex topology of sovereignty and the exception suggested in
Political Theology that Giorgio Agamben explores in the first section of Homo Sacer
and in the subsequent volume State of Exception.15 Where Schmitt, despite his stress on
the connection of the legal to the non-legal, nevertheless attempts to frame a
comparatively straightforward duality of order and exception, with sovereign power
periodically drawing the divide, Agamben reveals that the problem of the exception is
more intricate than Schmitt allows. He notes that Schmitt’s discussion implies that in
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the conceptualisation of political space there is no clean separation of the political
inside from the non-political outside.16 The political existence of humans cannot be
reduced to a straightforward binary of ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ because the sovereign, who
stands at the apex of and guarantees the order of the inside space, has his most emphatic
existence in deciding on the exception, which the legal norms do not reach. Through the
moment of the exception, the sovereign can be seen to be both at the centre of the legal-
political space and at its extremity, simultaneously inside and outside, a point that
Schmitt perceives – ‘although he stands outside the normally valid legal system, he
nevertheless belongs to it, for it is he who must decide whether the constitution needs to
be suspended in its entirety’17 – but that Agamben explores. This double position is what
Agamben names ‘the paradox of sovereignty’, the fact that ‘the sovereign, having the
legal power to suspend the validity of the law, legally places himself outside the law’ so
that it may be said that ‘the law is outside itself.’18 In being called upon and seemingly
able to act in the space beyond the reach of the legal norm, but only so as to redraw the
dividing line, the sovereign shows himself, as it were behind ‘the everyday frame of
life’, to be always still within the non-political world, Schmitt’s ‘chaos’. If Schmitt’s
aim is to articulate the relation between the state of exception and juridical order,
Agamben observes that ‘it is a paradoxical articulation, for what must be inscribed
within the law is something that is essentially exterior to it, that is, nothing less than the
suspension of the juridical order itself.’19 There is and can be no clear, neat or
unproblematic division of inside from outside because in creating the ordered interior
space sovereignty necessarily remains always involved with the exterior, the relation
that is expressed in the state of exception, and in the decision on the exception the
sovereign, the origin of the juridical order as a whole, reveals himself as at the same
time external to that order. Through this paradoxical position of the sovereign, inside
and outside are necessarily bound together. Order and chaos imply each other.
For Schmitt, the decisive importance of the state of exception is that through it is
unambiguously stated the distinction between derived, posited law and the sovereign,
underived authority, nomos – the untrammelled source from which law issues. ‘What
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Schmitt wishes to establish above all is the superiority of the sovereign nomos as the
constitutive event of law with respect to every positivistic conception of law as simple
position and convention (Gesetz).’20 Confronted by the exception, which is situated on
the far side of all the established positive legal norms, the sovereign nomos, through an
act of seemingly pure will, the direct application of power to fact, makes a decision. To
the extent that Political Theology seeks to demonstrate the necessary superiority of the
decision to the mere norm – ‘the decision on the exception is a decision in the true sense
of the word’,21 remarks Schmitt, with admiration –, the nomos is the essence of
sovereignty. It cannot be reduced to law because it is the founding power. In the much
later work The Nomos of the Earth, Schmitt devotes a short section of the introductory
first part to setting out his understanding of the meaning of nomos. Again polemicising
against the reduction of nomos to convention, norm or rule, he insists on its status as an
originary, foundational, underived power:
Nomos comes from nemein — a [Greek] word that means both “to divide” and
“to pasture.” Thus, nomos is the immediate form in which the political and social
order of a people becomes visible — the initial measure and division of pasture-
land, i.e., the land-appropriation as well as the concrete order contained in it and
following from it. … Nomos is the measure by which the land in a particular
order is divided and situated; it is also the form of political, social, and religious
order determined by this process.22
Nomos is thus associated by Schmitt at its root with possession and property, with the
way in which humans take hold of the world and make it their own for purposes of self-
preservation, producing a stable and objectified social order, and also with the
interlocked development both of abstraction and universality – measure – and of
division and delimitation.23 The power of nomos lies at the centre of sovereignty, the
quality that summates the status of humans as autonomous, rational, self-governing
political beings; it springs from the control and settlement of territory, its division and
delimitation, and the specific and localised ‘concrete order’ of societal life that is
established thereby. In Political Theology Schmitt relates but does not comment upon,
perhaps does not see, the peculiar contradiction, congruent with the complex topology
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of the exception, produced in this way. He notes that, for practical purposes, the issue of
sovereignty within any particular social order ultimately resolves into the question,
‘who is supposed to have unlimited power?’,24 a question made urgent when that order
experiences the disintegrative proximity of the exception, and goes on, ‘what
characterizes an exception is principally unlimited authority’.25 Universality,
unlimitedness, is here defined and becomes evident precisely through its necessary
relation to the limit, the exception: it is the capacity to decide on the exception and draw
the border, the line of delimitation and exclusion, that is the defining mark of the
‘unlimited authority’ of sovereignty. Only through the exclusion of the exception can
the sovereign be universal; the form of its universality is dependent upon an element
that it cannot and must not know. Thus, sovereign nomos is universal not despite but
because of its limitation, its boundedness.
Agamben explores the implications of the contradiction objectively implied by
Schmitt’s account of the exception in his own analysis of the state of exception as a
periodically repeated and reinscribed instance of origin, the movement through which
the sovereign subject takes hold of the indeterminate flux of nature and objectifies it in
a stable order. The exception, he suggests, is not simply severed from the juridical order
as something wholly different but is held in a relation with that order: it is, after all,
only an exception by virtue of its non-assimilation, which presupposes relationality.
Through the exception, sovereignty does not just try to confine or contain that which is
excessive or transgressive, as others have maintained (Agamben cites Deleuze and
Guattari and Blanchot); rather, it is the mode through which its would-be absolute
power is constituted:
Here what is outside is included not simply by means of an interdiction or an
internment but rather by means of the suspension of the juridical order’s
validity—by letting the juridical order, that is, withdraw from the exception and
abandon it. The exception does not subtract itself from the rule; rather the rule,
suspending itself, gives rise to the exception and, maintaining itself in relation to
the exception, first constitutes itself as a rule. The particular “force” of law
consists in this capacity to maintain itself in relation to an exteriority.26
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That which does not lose itself in the flux but maintains its own inner coherence in the
face of everything that confronts it as disturbing and alien is self-identical, infinite in
the Hegelian sense. Although he does not use the term, what is delineated in Agamben’s
explication of the state of exception is something like the originary movement of
abstraction by which the subject withdraws itself from the ‘chaotic’ materiality of
nature, creating the ordered, ideal, regularised inner space, governed by laws. Agamben
describes the dynamic of the state of exception as ‘the capture of life in law’,27 the
‘inclusive exclusion’28 by which legality absorbs what it can of the non-legal. Through
abstraction the sovereign subject creates its own infinitude, its fixed, objectified self-
identity that ensures its effective self-preservation by enabling it everywhere to mediate
exteriority, making it its own. The inner space is the means through which the outer
world is mastered.29 Once this inner space, solidifying the world as a determinate object
world, coheres as a permanent and stable structure, it comes to be assumed as what is
most proper to human beings, its universal validity presupposed in all cognition: no
objective experience is possible other than through it because there is no longer any
unmediated access to immediacy. This is the meaning, in developing the implications of
the instantiation of sovereignty through the state of exception, of Agamben’s numerous
analogies to the self-presuppositional structure of language30 – the relation of the
linguistic to the non-linguistic and of the abstract organisational structure of language to
concrete instances of language use, langue and parole – and also to the relation of
potentiality to actuality, the withheld capacity to do and the actual doing. The universal
forms and structures of abstraction that make possible human life as something separate
from mere nature, as free and self-determining as opposed to the instinctual
compulsions of animal existence, come into being through the modality of the state of
exception.
For Schmitt, the exception demonstrates the status of sovereign power as
something superior, and not reducible, to mere law as statute – as the absolute force,
nomos, of the political domain. Agamben, by contrast, in drawing out the implications
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of Schmitt’s account, develops a theory of the state of exception as something more, not
just the crisis point in which the actuality of sovereignty is revealed but the liminal zone
through which the human political space comes into being in the first place. Sovereign
nomos does not just prove itself in the state of exception: it is created through it. In
Agamben’s account, this is thus the mode of origin of law: ‘What is at issue in the
sovereign exception is not so much the control or neutralization of an excess as the
creation and definition of the very space in which the juridico-political order can have
validity.’31 Political Theology’s interest in the exception lies in how it functions in
reaffirming the vitality of sovereign power; to that extent, Schmitt, despite taking it to
its boundary-concept, continues to presuppose the priority of political order, from
within which the exception, however necessary its existence, must always appear as
something egregious. His view of the exception remains one from within the inner
space of sovereignty. Agamben deposes this hierarchical perspective in order to reveal
the state of exception as a mode of relationality through which the conceptual generality
of law comes into being.32 In setting aside the Schmittian interest in reinscribing the
boundary and instead seeking to explore the point of indifference between the legal and
the non-legal, Agamben draws discussion of sovereignty away from the assumption
ultimately shared by both Schmitt and his legal-positivist enemies, that the political is
inherently justified: when that prejudice is removed, the state of exception is revealed as
‘the originary structure in which law refers to life and includes it in itself by suspending
it.’33 This mode of relation by which law takes hold of life through the exception is what
Agamben names ‘the ban’.34 The logic of his investigation of the paradox of sovereignty
is that ‘the originary relation of law to life is not application but Abandonment. The
matchless potentiality of the nomos, its originary “force of law,” is that it holds life in
its ban by abandoning it.’35 As ‘the originary juridico-political relation’36 only by means
of which can the political order come into existence, the ban gives expression to the
paradox of sovereignty. For the ban names the contradictory structure of the state of
exception, in which the distinction between inside and outside is both drawn and
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effaced: ‘He who has been banned is not, in fact, simply set outside the law and made
indifferent to it but rather abandoned by it, that is, exposed and threatened on the
threshold in which life and law, outside and inside, become indistinguishable. It is
literally not possible to say whether the one who has been banned is outside or inside
the juridical order.’37 To bring into question this relation of the ban is to try to think
beyond sovereignty and the political.
Adorno and the Non-Identical
Agamben’s identification of the ban as the modality of the inclusive exclusion
by which sovereign nomos, the fount of law, takes hold of and regularises the wildness
of life indicates that the problem of the political is one of its form: not simply the
organisation of the internal legal-political space (nowadays, the difficulties of
representation and accountability in complex industrial or post-industrial consumer
societies, and cognate debates) but the anterior question of the very mode of
constitution of the ordered social sphere per se. If the political comes into existence
only through the contradictory structure of the ban, and the paradox of sovereignty
produced thereby, then no rationalisation of the inner space can solve the intrinsic
irrationality of its foundational principle. In taking it to its outer limit, its border, where
the indeterminate zone of the state of exception is located, Agamben’s analysis moves
thinking on the political away from questions of rights, competencies, powers,
procedures of conflict resolution, and the like, which in their restriction to the immanent
sphere of political organisation and contestation necessarily have a fetishistic quality.
Instead, the question of the political is drawn into the ambit of the problem of
conceptual generality, the way in which the subject, as the principle of order, relates to
the object, the world – how it constitutes itself as a subject and the world as an object.
Divested, at the borderline, of the untroubled assumption of the validity of its own
domain, political thought opens out into questions that are normally thought of as
falling within the technical field of epistemology (that is, examination of the nature of
the concept, the instrument of abstract generality, and the justification of claims to
knowledge), while, conversely, epistemology is revealed as having an intrinsically
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social, political content.38 In this light, the continual legal-political metaphoricity of
Adorno’s seemingly abstruse, intra-philosophical, critique of the concept – the
‘sovereign subject, which dictates laws to nature’39, ‘the sovereignty of the Spirit’40, the
‘formal juridicality of thinking’41 ‘the lawful synthesis through categories’42 performed
by the subject within the ‘jurisdiction’43 of thought, and so forth –, a thematics that is
encountered throughout his work, should be understood in an emphatic sense, if the real
significance of the critique is to be grasped: thinking, conceptuality, and sovereign
power, the force of law, are one and the same. It is a central thesis of Adorno’s reading
of the history of epistemology, philosophy’s meditation on the validity and legitimacy
of its own thought, that the necessary, objective structures and laws of thinking
discerned in that tradition express the compulsory logic of antagonistic society in its
mode of reproduction. Understood in this way, philosophical critique and interpretation
become simultaneously a deciphering of the innermost truth about society, the truth that
is necessarily sublimated into the rarefied conceptual discourse of philosophy.
Accordingly, epistemology can be read as a form of political theory: ‘Critique of society
is critique of knowledge, and vice versa’.44 The purpose, then, of this section on Adorno
is to explain in more general philosophical terms why sovereignty and the political have
the structure of the exception and to link back to and amplify some of the themes
developed in Chapter 3.
Agamben’s investigation reveals the question of sovereignty, the constitution of
the political, as being that of the relation of law to life, how law captures life within
itself. In the section of Negative Dialectics entitled ‘The Juridical Sphere’, Adorno
writes:
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Law is the Ur-phenomenon of irrational rationality. In it the formal principle of
equivalence becomes the norm, everyone is measured by the same standard.
Such equality, in which differences perish, gives a secret impetus to inequality;
persisting mythos in the midst of an only apparently demythologized humanity.
The norms of the law cut short what is not covered, every experience of the
specific which is not preformed, for the sake of the seamless systematic, and
then raises instrumental rationality to a second reality. … The entire juridical
realm is one of definitions. Its systematic commands, that nothing shall pass into
it, which could escape from its closed circle. … This enclosure, ideological in
itself, exerts real violence through the sanctions of law as the socially controlling
authority, particularly in the administered world.45
This passage on law draws together a number of the themes of Adorno’s wider critique
of the concept:46 the domination of the general over the particular, of identity over non-
identity (the former fixing, reifying as far as possible, through the rigidifying force of
definition), the inequality that dwells within formal equality, the compulsion of
equivalence towards system and self-enclosure, and the link between identity, law and
violence. The mischief that Adorno descries at work in law lies not in the fact that it is
so frequently employed as an instrument for the exertion of social power and injustice,
but in the being of the abstract legal norm itself: ‘Even according to its very form,
before class-content and class-justice, it expresses domination, the yawning difference
of individual interests from the whole, in which they are abstractly conglomerated.’47 It
is not that the force of abstract generality is used one-sidedly and deplorably for
instrumental purposes of domination, but that domination and instrumentality exist
within, structure, the form of abstraction. The legal form, like the form of the concept, is
not something neutral, usable as is for good or ill, but has a power claim inscribed
within it. Herein lies the problem of the concept that Adorno continually presses upon.
For, as the medium of identity and order, the concept is, in the first place, inseparable
from thought: there simply is no thinking other than through concepts because only
through their universality is the determination of the particular possible. As Adorno
remarks in admitting the truth of Kant’s claim that the mind is structured so that it is
incapable of thinking in the absence of the universality of reason, ‘without concepts,
without abstraction, that is, without the mechanisms that [Kant] ascribes to universality,
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thinking is in fact not possible … we really would be faced with “blind intuition” …
with non-conceptualized givens, from which concepts were absent and on which no
light could be thrown.’48 The concept is the means of enlightenment because through it
the subject is freed from blind submersion in nature. The tendentially universalising
mediation of the concept enables the human creature to break the immediate power of
natural forces over it, to abstract itself. As such, the concept is inseparable from the
subject’s assertion of itself, as the emergent principle of order, against nature –
Agamben’s ‘life’ –, solidifying the flux into a coherent object world. However, because
its very form expresses domination, the concept simultaneously obscures that which it
illumines. It is, as it were, slid in front of the actual object of which it is a concept. ‘The
immanent claim of the concept is its order creating invariance as opposed to the change
in what it analyzes. … The concept in itself, before all content, hypostasizes its own
form against the content. Thereby, however also the identity principle: that what is
solely postulated in thought-practice would be a matter-at-hand in itself, something
solid, something proper. Identifying thought concretizes by means of the logical identity
of the concept.’49 Because the object is only determined through the generality of the
concept, the latter becomes the measure of knowledge, the truth of the object as what is
ordered and stable as against the ephemerality of the merely ontic, the transient
individual thing: it is what survives, while the object passes away. The concept both
makes the specific thing determinable and  substitutes itself for the thing thought: as
Marx perceived in relation to value, the means of mediation becomes the real in-itself of
the object.50
The immanent motivation of the concept is to perfect its own universality, to
leave nothing unknown and unmediated to the subject. The purest and most extreme
model, at least since Plato, of this ideality is number. In the ‘Introduction’ to his
metacritique of epistemology,51 a text in which he came as close as he ever did to a
programmatic statement of the principal thematics of his philosophical thought, Adorno
observes of number: ‘The difficulty of defining the concept of number arises from the
fact that its peculiar essence is the mechanism of concept construction, which must then
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help in defining number. Concepts themselves involve subsumption and thus contain
numerical ratio. Numbers are an arrangement for making the non-identical, dubbed ‘the
Many’, commensurable with the subject, the model of unity. They bring the manifold of
experience to its abstraction.’52 Number is the most powerful and efficient means by
which the disparate and multifarious Many are arrayed in the serried order of identity,
being organised and articulated to one another through the unifying point of the One;
just so, the abstraction mechanism of the concept unifies and determines the multiple
particulars subsumed under it. The conceptual One, as the point of origination, makes
possible thought as method, coherent and lawful orderliness, a logos that is not
rhapsodic, does not lose itself powerlessly in the object, but remains with itself, secure
and self-possessed in all that it encounters. By faithfully following the laws of thought,
the thinking subject can be sure that it will not go astray, falling into the errors of
exaggeration and contradiction, but will stay always safe amongst the known. Thought
as method means that, in principle, the same minimum number of logical categories can
be used to grasp everything, making otherwise disparate multiplicity easily available
and usable: ‘spirit confiscates what is unlike itself and makes it the same, its property.
Spirit inventories it. Nothing may slip through the net. The principle guarantees
completeness. The accountability of the stock becomes axiomatic.’53 The inexorable
momentum of methodical thinking towards surveyability and orderliness gives it the
character of systematics, an inner logical organisation of hierarchy and subordination in
which, ideally, all parts are co-ordinated with one another to form a totality, Schmitt’s
homogenous medium. Such systematics, brought to a culmination only in modernity,
are inherent to the subject’s conceptual mastery from the very beginning. ‘The structure
of immanence as absolutely self-contained and all-inclusive is necessarily always
already system, irrespective of whether it has been expressly deduced from the unity of
consciousness or not.’54 On Adorno’s account, the drive for system in thought is
inherent in philosophy from the moment of its birth in the transition from mythological
to rational thinking, ‘the first two system builders in the grand manner’55 being Plato
and Aristotle, and the architectonic philosophical structures of Kant and Hegel are the
modern successors to the grand tradition. What is expressed in the historical
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development of that tradition is the abstract subject’s will towards universal mediation,
making itself, its logos, the organising principle of the world: to conquer the unknown
by means of the identifying power of the concept and to overcome all forms of merely
immediate, heteronomous power, thereby making itself free.56
But the sovereign subject’s self-created universality is achieved only at a price.
Modelled upon mythic domination, the abstraction mechanism of the concept elevates
the universal at the expense of the particular. As number expresses most perfectly,
abstraction ‘always comes into being through the elimination of qualities, through the
reduction of qualitative distinctions to quantitative forms.’57 Conceptual order and the
determinacy of the object are made possible only through the disqualification of the
world: in becoming for-us, the world is stripped of its in-itself. For law to grasp life –
for nature to be made conceptual – there must, therefore, be a moment of loss, in which
the unruly and disruptive qualitative element of the object, the specificity that resists
abstraction, is excluded for the sake of order and stability. That which, in Schmitt’s
terms, cannot be subsumed, cannot be made homogenous, must be rejected and cast
outside for the inner space to achieve the logical identity and universality that is its
telos. This is the locus of the central term of Adorno’s thought, around which all else
revolves, the consciously aporetic marker ‘the non-identical’, a conceptual designation
of that which resists conceptuality. The non-identical can only be gestured towards in
this deliberately inadequate way because it is precisely the element that is not directly
accessible through the conceptually discursive dimension of language. It arises through
the delimiting form of the concept. When the object is subjected to identity, ‘the
concept is always simultaneously its negative; it cuts short what it is itself and yet
cannot immediately be named, and replaces it with identity.’58 The power claim inherent
in the form of the concept, as the instrument of the mastery of sovereign subjectivity,
ensures that what in the object cannot conform to identity is repressed or cut away: ‘it is
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eliminated from thought, exiled from the latter’s home domain.’59 The form of
conceptual generality is such that it cannot tolerate or abide with the specificity of the
particular but must cut it short for the sake of its own immanent order.60 In being
determined through the concept, the object is at the same time reduced for the sake of
the identity claim, so that what is known is increasingly only a damaged or mutilated
simulacrum. The identifying capacity of the concept determines the thing as something
specific, but at the same time denies the specificity of the thing, its qualitative
difference. The concept is thus simultaneously the medium of knowledge and the
medium of alienation from the world: it is both what enables the subject to know the
object, to bring it to determinacy, and what blocks the object off from the subject,
preventing the latter from really knowing the former.61 In this sense, the concept has the
form, as Agamben claims of the political, of an inclusive exclusion: it is at once the
mode of the subject’s universality and inherently limited and particularistic.
The contradictory structure of the concept is the flaw that, in Adorno’s reading,
continually brings idealist epistemologies to ruin: their subjection to ‘Anaxaminder’s
curse’,62 under which they all labour and from which none of them can escape.63
Because the ordering power of the concept is the means by which the subject, by doing
violence to its own instinctual nature, learns to control both itself and the fearsome
forces of nature, to attain stability and security in its self-preservation, it is almost
compelled, for the sake of the maintenance of identity, to transfigure it into the ground
of being itself, as what is secure and constant. ‘After the unspeakable effort which it
must have cost the human species, in order to establish the primacy of identity even
against itself, it rejoices and basks in its victory, by turning this latter into a
determination of the vanquished thing: what this last experienced, it must present as its
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in-itself.’64 Hence, what Adorno denounced as an originary fallacy of pr ima
philosophia, that what is stable and permanent is true, what is ephemeral and transient
untrue.65 Once the ordering capacity of the concept is presumed as the staging-ground of
truth, then everything else must be derived from it. Pre-Socratic philosophy, the
transition from mythic to rational thought, expresses a decisive moment in this
formation of identity: the irrevocable break between thought and being, method and
matter, and the elevation of the eternal above that which changes. And, so Adorno
argues, the trajectory of all philosophy since then, from Plato onwards, has been to try
to mediate that break through the primacy of the concept: so to control the object in the
subject that ultimately the subject is conceived of as producing the object out of itself.
But such attempts are doomed to failure – ‘the advancing ratio, however, has as an
advancing mediation ever more ingeniously hidden that break without ever coming to
master it’66 – because the split that produces the mediation cannot then be seamlessly
repaired by that same mediation. Philosophies of the primacy of the concept are
condemned by their own principle: ‘Their inclusiveness is the break’.67 The narrative of
this failure is what Adorno finds written in the history of epistemology: a series of ever
more sophisticated attempts to generate the object from the subject, to conclude a final
identity of subject and object. But, despite the enormous efforts they make to deduce the
world from subjective immanence, such systematic conceptual constructions always and
again, at their borderline, run up against an element that defies subsumption, that, in
Schmitt’s term, cannot be made homogenous because it resists total articulation through
the concept.68 Through the consistency of their own systematics, epistemologies are
inexorably led up to what cannot be incorporated into the system, the exceptional
element of the non-identical.
Thought that assumes the primacy of the concept inevitably finds itself caught in
a bind. As Adorno puts it in his lectures on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, on the one
hand, ‘every theory of knowledge must, if it is to be a theory, that is, a coherent body of
ideas, resolve the problems of identity and non-identity, subject and object, in such a
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way as to shift the entire emphasis … into the subject and draw knowledge purely from
the analysis of the subject’,69 but because the object in the end cannot be wholly reduced
to the subject they struggle in vain to produce a definitive, closed system. Non-identity
perpetually undermines the longed-for security of stability, coherence and order.70
Through its structure as an inclusive exclusion, the sovereignty of the concept, as with
Agamben’s analysis of political sovereignty, is continually dependent for its meaning
on an element it can never actually know, that it must exclude, since, as they themselves
demonstrate, the systematics of epistemology crumble without the support of a moment
of sheer materiality, something that is not identical with thought.71 The concept thus
produces a dualistic structure: like the exception in Schmitt and Agamben, the non-
identical is ‘exiled’ from the inner space of the concept and remains held in a relation of
antagonism to the concept. It is necessary for the construction of the system, hence must
be included, but fatally threatens its systematic character, hence must be excluded. What
is banished outside as inessential ends up being rediscovered at the centre because the
conceptual system cannot exist without it. This agonised, self-defeating structure, by
which thought can only constitute itself by shutting itself off from the world, the very
thing it would know, gives the lie to the sovereign subject’s claim to mastery, its self-
glorification as possessing, in Schmitt’s words, ‘unlimited authority’. It is suggestive in
this context that the most insistent term in Adorno’s writings for naming this condition
of the subject’s self-entrapment through self-glorification is der Bann, the ban.72
Through the concept, the subject frees itself from nature and at the same time casts a
spell over itself and nature, so remaining trapped: ‘The subject – itself only a limited
moment – was locked for all eternity in itself, as punishment for its deification. It gazes
into the darkened heavens, in which the star of the idea or that of being would arise, as
through the embrasures of a tower.’73 The sovereign subject’s power is also its own
imprisonment. If the ban is the originary juridico-political relation, through which law
takes hold of life, it is also the originary epistemological relation, through which the
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subject takes hold of the object. In both cases the subject’s sovereignty, its achievement
of a stable, ordered juridicality, is attained only through an inclusive exclusion, a
delimitation, within its own borders, that cuts it off from the world that it dominates.
Sovereignty and Idealism
Bringing Adorno together with Schmitt and Agamben, it may be said that the
problem of the political is, at root, the same as the problem of the concept: in fact, the
political is – has the objective form of – a concept. In Marxian terms, it is a real
abstraction.74 This implies that the unreason of political reason, the problem of its form,
is the same as the irrationality of the rational concept. In Adorno’s work the critique of
idealism and of the primacy of identity is articulated through the critique of the concept,
as the medium of ideality, and such critique may be extended also to the political, as a
keystone of what might be termed the civilisational structure of identity. Thus, when
regarded from the perspective afforded by the Adornian critique of the concept, it
becomes evident that, for all its rejection of the immanence of positivism and despite its
interest in the exception, Schmitt’s thinking on sovereignty in Political Theology
remains very much within the ambit of the charmed circle drawn by idealism – under
the spell. For Schmitt is emphatic that, while the juridico-political sphere cannot attain
closure, and so must always encounter the exception, it is the true task of the sovereign,
at the point of crisis in which the systematic order of society is threatened with
dissolution, to make a decision, and thereby once again to separate the inside from the
outside. If the state of exception is the moment at which law takes hold of life, or, in
epistemological terms, the moment at which the subject takes hold of the object, it is at
that moment that sovereign nomos demonstrates its power by cutting short the object,
literally deciding – cutting, severing –,75 for the sake of re-establishing conceptual order:
‘He decides whether there is an extreme emergency as well as what must be done to
eliminate it.’76 For Schmitt, the exception serves to reaffirm order and the authority of
the sovereign subject. The decision is, must be, unmediated by the legal norm; it is a
moment of sheer, immediate power, in which the force of law shows itself, where law
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no longer exists, as ‘in the true sense absolute’,77 in being applied directly to the object,
grasping it and dividing it at the same time.
As the crisis that serves to reveal the sovereign’s unlimited power, the state of
exception in Schmitt takes on a metaphysical significance: not only does it serve to
prove the priority of sovereign power over the legal norm, but it reveals the former’s
intrinsic creative, formative capacity. Sovereign nomos is primary because without it,
without the power of the concept, there is no human world, only, in Schmitt’s words,
‘anarchy and chaos’.78 The importance, for Schmitt, of the power named in the term
sovereignty is that it in fact constitutes an objective, ordered world in which it is
possible for civilised human life to take place: ‘There exists no norm that is applicable
to chaos. For a legal order to make sense, a normal situation must exist, and he is
sovereign who definitely decides whether this normal situation actually exists.’79 In
Schmitt’s thinking, only through sovereignty does rational sense exist in the world,
which is otherwise simply chaotic. This is a quintessentially idealist trope. In Negative
Dialectics Adorno notes that, ‘the dawning consciousness of freedom nourishes itself on
the memory of the archaic impulse, not yet directed by a solidified ego. The more the
ego curbs this, the more questionable pre-temporal freedom becomes to it as something
chaotic.’80 As, for the sake of order and control, meaning is increasingly located within
the rationality of the subject, so the object is progressively denuded of its qualitative
determinacy, its own substantiality. The model for this in modern philosophy is Kant’s
conception of the activity of cognition as ‘an investment of subjectivity in non-
qualitative multiplicity’,81 the object reduced to ‘something chaotically abstract’82 that
has to be constituted by the form-giving power of the subject, and which as a result is
only a mere hollowed-out shell, its in-itself being unknowable. The reduction of the pre-
categorial world to chaos is, in Adorno’s reading, a historical achievement of the
growing power of the sovereign subject as it masters the world: ‘sheer chaos, from
which reflective spirit disqualifies the world for the sake of its own total power, is just
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as much spirit’s product as the cosmos which it establishes to revere.’83 The greater the
identifying power of the subject, the more what is not proper to it appears as irrational
and chaotic, a threat to the security of its order. In Dialectic of Enlightenment, Adorno
and Horkheimer succinctly encapsulate the result of this developmental process: ‘The
world becomes chaos and synthesis salvation.’84
In the Schmittian account of the exception, the synthesising power of the
sovereign is revealed as something transcendent and self-constituting, a sort of floating
absolute subjectivity that can dispose over the world, in a way not dissimilar to the
productive capacity of Kant’s synthetic unity of apperception or Hegel’s Spirit.85 The
superiority of sovereign nomos to posited legal norms, which is made manifest through
the decision on the exception, is so important to Schmitt because thereby all the
potentially destructive and centrifugal pluralism characteristic of politics in developed
capitalist society is set aside and the essential unity of the ordering, creative capacity of
sovereignty is demonstrated: in extremis, all discussion is terminated and only one
person can decide on the exception. It is the great merit, in Schmitt’s eyes, of Bodin’s
theory of sovereignty, ‘what is truly impressive’86 about it, that in the age of the
breakdown of feudalism and the rise of the absolutist state he succeeded conceptually,
through an emphasis on the importance of the exception, in reducing the question of
sovereignty to that of unity, the One: ‘by considering sovereignty to be indivisible, he
finally settled the question of power in the state.’87 Only through an ultimate principle of
unity, the focal point at which sovereignty is located, can homogeneity and coherence
be guaranteed in the inner space of the political, the Many reduced to the One. The
systematic order of law and power within society must be attached to a unified
sovereign authority or it is liable to collapse or become unworkable through the conflict
of organised social forces. That supreme site of sovereign power proves itself and is, as
it were, reinvigorated, rejustified, in the state of exception. The exception and the
category of the decision are thus understood and conceptualised in Political Theology
entirely from the perspective of their importance for the assertion of the order-giving
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authority and unifying power of the sovereign, and the reaffirmation of the validity of
the inner, political space. The point of Schmitt’s theory of sovereignty is to justify,
idealistically, the power of the concept.
Inextricable from sovereignty is the idea of freedom: an individual or a political
community may be said to be sovereign to the extent that it has emancipated itself from
heteronomy, the compulsions of external authority (natural or social); yet, so Agamben
and Adorno suggest, sovereignty is achieved only through the paradoxical,
inside/outside structure of the state of exception and the non-identical. Sovereignty also
suggests autonomy: for an individual, the capacity to control one’s behaviour oneself;
for a political community, to be self-governing, deciding on a collective mode of
existence unhindered by outside power; yet, so Realism suggests, at the level of the
whole no state, no matter how powerful, is ever really autonomous and free because all
are caught up in the fateful condition of the international, ensnared by the irresistible
requirements imposed by anarchy and its objective logic of the balance of power, which
it is beyond anyone’s capability to control. The sovereignty of each individual ‘unit’, to
use the Waltzian term, produces only the international state of nature. The first part of
this chapter concentrated on developing an account of sovereignty that could explain
Realism’s conception of political form as inherently delimited and particularistic. It
demonstrated sovereignty to be a mode of ideality, aligning Schmitt’s and Agamben’s
thinking on the political with Adorno’s on the concept to show the problematic structure
of sovereignty as a mode of relation between subject and world, concept and object. The
second part takes this further, exploring what lies behind Realism’s perception that the
rationality of political sovereignty remains always ensnared in an enveloping condition
of irrationality. This is done first through a summary overview of what Agamben
frames as the ‘debate’ between Schmitt and Walter Benjamin over sovereignty, law and
the state of exception, and then a reading of how Adorno takes up the thematics of this
debate in his construction of the philosophy of history. In doing so, it returns to motifs
from Dialectic of Enlightenment already broached in Chapter 3 and uses them to throw
light on the Realist idea of the international state of nature.
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The Schmitt–Benjamin Debate
This was conducted only obliquely. The ‘exoteric dossier’88 consists of just a
small handful of citations or allusions.89 The ‘esoteric dossier’90 is, however, on
Agamben’s account, more substantial, constituting a ‘gigantomachy’91 over fundamental
questions of political theory. In this latter sense, the Schmitt–Benjamin debate, as
Agamben reads it, starts with Benjamin’s 1921 essay ‘Critique of Violence’, continues
through Schmitt’s response in Political Theology and Benjamin’s counter in The Origin
of German Tragic Drama, and culminates in the Eighth Thesis of Benjamin’s
celebrated theses ‘On the Concept of History’. What is at stake in the debate as a whole
is the status of sovereignty and of the juridico-political sphere as modalities of human
existence: where Schmitt seeks to inscribe the exception within the ambit of
sovereignty, as the element through which supreme authority imposes and justifies itself
as the originary principle of the legal order, Benjamin attempts to bring the connection
between sovereignty and law to nought and to shape a figure of sovereignty that is freed
from law and is thereby released from the logic of the exception. If Schmitt’s account of
sovereignty is idealist in its exaltation of the constitutive capacity of the sovereign as
the principle of human order and rationality in a chaotic, fallen world, Benjamin’s
challenge can be recognised as a subversion of idealism, a type of materialism despite
its sometimes theological mode of expression.92 Benjamin’s approach to the question of
sovereignty in these texts thus accords with what Adorno discerned as being
fundamental to his intellectual sensibility: ‘From the very start his thought protested
against the false claim that man and the human mind are self-constitutive and that an
absolute originates in them. … His target is not an allegedly over-inflated subjectivism
but rather the notion of a subjective dimension itself.’93 If sovereignty may be regarded
as the hallmark of human autonomy and self-determination as against natural existence,
in the debate with Schmitt, Benjamin’s ‘Medusan glance’94 petrifies this achievement of
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the subject into mere nature, opening a space for a human existence that would be
beyond the self-delusion and self-entrapment of sovereign autonomy: ‘He reduces this
autonomy to a moment of transition in a dialectical process … and the reconciliation of
men with the creation has as its condition the dissolution of all self-posited human
existence.’95
‘Critique of Violence’96
The question Benjamin poses in this notoriously elusive text97 is: what would be
legitimate force? The central idea of the essay is that the objectified authority of law
cannot be justified because law’s origins lie in a form of violence that has domination,
conquest and self-preservation as its aim. The order and regularity of the legal sphere
claim their authority from superior capacity for force, stretching back to primeval
combat and victory: after war, the ‘necessary sanctioning … of every victory …
consists precisely in recognizing the new conditions as a new “law,” quite regardless of
whether they need de facto any guarantee of their continuation.’98 The contradiction
between the particularist origin of law in the violence of conquest and the immanent
universality of its form is expressed in the fact that, having established its domination,
the force that becomes law must deny its historical origin, presenting itself as something
static and eversame in its generality, as nature. Legality, Benjamin argues, has the
ineluctable appearance of ‘an order imposed by fate’,99 and law-preserving violence is
cloaked in the character of a threat, the continual possibility of doom that minatory fate
holds within its power.100 Further, such is the problematic nature of law that neither
natural nor positive law can be used to legitimate means and ends because, so Benjamin
argues, legal thought fundamentally misconstrues this relation: ‘it is never reason that
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decides on the justification of means and the justness of ends: fate-imposed violence
decides on the former, and God on the latter.’101 This is explained by Benjamin (to be
sure, somewhat elliptically) in terms of the relationship of universal and particular: the
generality of law, its power over the particular, does grievous violence to the specific
object that is subsumed beneath it. Law’s origin in conquest and force means that it
cannot express the fullness of the particular, cannot do justice to it, but must always cut
it short, forcibly curtailing it to its own abstract norms. Law and justice are therefore in
irreconcilable opposition:
An insight that is uncommon only because of the stubborn prevailing habit of
conceiving those just ends as ends of a possible law—that is, not only as
generally valid (which follows analytically from the nature of justice) but also as
capable of generalization, which as could be shown, contradicts the nature of
justice. For ends that in one situation are just, universally acceptable, and valid
are so in no other situation, no matter how similar the situations may be in other
respects.102
If the fateful violence of legality is irreconcilable with just ends, this throws a
decisive light, in Benjamin’s text, on the origins of law: myth. The violence of mythic
gods, a non-mediate violence that is ‘primarily a manifestation of their will …
establishes a law far more than it punishes the infringement of a law’.103 Benjamin
instances Niobe, who is punished not because her boastfulness contravenes the law but
because it challenges the power of the gods, of fate, and so she must suffer retribution.
This ‘immediate violence in mythic manifestations proves closely related, indeed
identical, to lawmaking violence’.104 The violence that establishes the ordered political
space of legal regulation is of the same type as natural, mythic violence,105 and so the
juridico-political sphere is hopelessly entangled in the closed, violent world of myth,
guilt and retribution. Human law is immanent to the natural order and reproduces it. So,
law-making violence, in the moment of its instantiation ‘specifically establishes as law
not an end unalloyed by violence but one necessarily and intimately bound to it, under
the title of power. Lawmaking is powermaking, assumption of power’.106 Sovereignty,
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as the principle of human autonomy and law-making, is thus necessarily implicated in
‘the gravely problematic nature’107 of law, its origin in myth. Whatever else may be said
of the endlessly vexed question of Benjamin’s figure of an authentic sovereignty in this
text, ‘divine violence’,108 it is certain that it is intended to have broken not with force but
with myth, to be a form of universality that expresses rather than dominates the
particular: ‘Mythic violence is bloody power over mere life for its own sake; divine
violence is pure power over all life for the sake of the living.’109
Response and Counter Response
Agamben reads Political Theology as, thematically, a riposte to ‘Critique of
Violence’.110 Where, ‘as a critic of force, Benjamin as it were revokes the unity of the
subject to mythic turmoil in order to comprehend such unity as itself being only a
natural condition’111 and seeks to uncouple force from myth to make possible a different
conception of sovereignty, in Political Theology Schmitt attempts to re-establish an
inseverable link between sovereignty and law and to cut off the possibility, raised by
Benjamin, of a force or authority separate from legal order. This, Agamben suggests, is
the polemical function of the state of exception in Political Theology: ‘The state of
exception is the space in which [Schmitt] tries to capture Benjamin’s idea of a pure
violence and to inscribe anomie within the very body of the nomos. According to
Schmitt, there cannot be a pure violence—that is, a violence absolutely outside the
law—because in the state of exception it is included in the law through its very
exclusion.’112 In the state of exception the sovereign operates, a fortiori, beyond the
limits of the legal order; in this space sovereign power is therefore anomic in that its
action cannot be governed by posited statute law but is rather immediate and direct.
Thus Schmitt seeks to claim anomic, pure violence for law; indeed, to attach it
necessarily to law. Agamben also suggests that the metaphysical significance attributed
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by Schmitt to the sovereign decision is a response to Benjamin’s text. For if Benjamin
proposes a ‘pure’ violence that lies outside the dualism of constituting power and
constituted power, the category of the decision reconnects anomic violence to law:
Schmitt counters Benjamin ‘with the figure of a power that neither makes nor preserves
law, but suspends it. Similarly, it is in response to Benjamin’s idea of an ultimate
undecidability of all legal problems that Schmitt affirms sovereignty as the place of the
extreme decision.’113 Against Benjamin, the decision is elevated as a moment of
surpassing significance.
Benjamin’s famous citation of Schmitt in the book on the German baroque
Trauerspiel114 is then, in Agamben’s reading, a counter to this reformulation of the
theory of sovereignty. Schmitt considered 17
th
-century thinkers to be exemplary in their
appreciation of the interconnection of sovereignty and the exception115 and Benjamin in
his study of baroque drama also gives central importance to questions of sovereignty
and the exception, but to quite different effect. Where for Schmitt’s political theology
the transcendence of the sovereign in relation to legal order and of God in relation to
creation stand in analogy, Benjamin shows that while the sovereign is the focus of the
German baroque Trauerspiel, what characterises its conception is the loss of a
perspective of transcendence: ‘The level of the state of creation, the terrain on which the
Trauerspiel is enacted, also unmistakably exercises a determining influence on the
sovereign. However highly he is enthroned over subject and state, his status is confined
to the world of creation; he is the lord of creatures, but he remains a creature.’116 It is the
task of the sovereign to exclude117 the state of exception, but in the absence of possible
transcendence this produces not the absolute authority of the decision, but a near
perpetual crisis of indecision: ‘The prince, who is responsible for making the decision to
proclaim the state of emergency, reveals, at the first opportunity, that he is almost
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incapable of making a decision’,118 and so becomes split, veering between the character
poles of tyrant and martyr. The state of exception, which for Schmitt reveals the majesty
of sovereignty, in Benjamin’s reading exposes only the crisis of subjectivity, as the
sovereign subject is cut off from anything beyond itself and, in its immanence, is
reduced to helpless arbitrariness. Bereft of transcendence and confined to the state of
creation, the guilt-context of mythic nature, the glorification of the sovereign is
experienced by the baroque as at the same time a sort of historical disaster, ‘in which
the sphere of creatures and the juridical order are caught up in a single catastrophe’.119
The Eighth Thesis
The final text in Agamben’s dossier is Benjamin’s last rewriting of Schmitt, in
the theses ‘On the Concept of History’ from 1940.120 The opening of the Eighth Thesis
reads: ‘The tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the “state of emergency” in which
we live is not the exception but the rule. We must attain to a conception of history that
accords with this insight. Then we will clearly see that it is our task to bring about a real
state of emergency, and this will improve our position in the struggle against fascism.’121
Characteristic of the Theses as a whole is an emphatic rejection of historicism and of
any conception of history as linear progress, a complacent belief that, so Benjamin
argues, seduced the social-democratic left, rendering it incapable of understanding the
rise of fascism and helpless against it. If the political space, once considered the scene
of the pursuit of the good life, does not trace a historical path of movement towards
rational perfection but rather descends into the vortex of violence unleashed by fascism,
then the meaning of history as a whole must be rethought. What the Hitlerian state of
emergency122 reveals is what in any case ‘the tradition of the oppressed teaches’, that
history has never escaped from being a state of emergency. The state of exception may
be the modality through which the rationality of the political sphere comes into being,
but it is also what condemns it to irrationality, domination and oppression. In this way,
all the movement of history in fact takes place within stasis. From the perspective
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afforded by the latest, extreme state of emergency, history is to be understood as still
prehistory. So long as it is tied to the dynamic of the state of exception, no actual
change, no real bettering of human existence is possible; only once history is recognised
as a continual state of emergency, the subject’s glorification of its sovereignty as its
self-destruction, will it become possible to begin to think what might be really different,
‘a real state of emergency’:123 ‘The current amazement that the things we are
experiencing are “still” possible in the twentieth century is not philosophical. This
amazement is not the beginning of knowledge—unless it is the knowledge that the view
of history which gives rise to it is untenable.’124
Adorno and the Exception
Where for Schmitt it is through the state of exception that the human absolute of
sovereignty is affirmed, for Benjamin it leads to fascism. Where Schmitt seeks to
articulate sense and order to the sovereign subject, Benjamin sees the latter as itself
mythic: only through its downfall could freedom, a true sovereignty, come about. For
Benjamin, sovereignty, as myth, remains always caught within the fallen sphere of mere
nature. The principle thematics of this debate find their continuation in Adorno’s
thought. The importance of Benjamin for the development of Adorno’s thinking was
considerable:125 the latter’s move away from Neo-Kantianism, rejection of Heideggerian
ontology and assimilation of Marxian materialism during the 1920s were all, in various
ways and to varying degrees, mediated through the prism of Benjamin’s thought and
writings, and nowhere was this more significant for Adorno than in the construction of
the philosophy of history.126 Benjamin’s deposing of the sovereign subject was the
medium of Adorno’s rethinking of the Hegelian teleology of the absolute subject and of
the meaning of the critique of political economy, as well as of the decisive criticism of
socialist convictions that the movement of history was on the side of the proletariat. The
philosophy of history elaborated in Dialectic of Enlightenment stands at the confluence
of several very powerful currents of thought, and not the least of these is the motif of
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the identity of the archaic and the modern that was thematic in Benjamin’s thinking. His
‘Medusan glance’, the ability to divest historical materials of their subjective
intentionality and to read them as ur-historical, second nature, served as a model for
Adorno’s thought on the history of constitutive subjectivity and idealism. Where
Benjamin revoked the unity of the subject to mythic turmoil, Adorno interprets
idealism, subjectivity, identity and the concept, as themselves mythic, so that the break
between myth and rationality marks both reflective difference and speculative identity.
Robert Hullot-Kentor notes that Adorno’s first ideas for the thematics of the
‘Excursus’ on Odysseus were developed around the figure not of the wandering Ithacan
but of Oedipus. However, he ‘ultimately focused this study on Odysseus rather than
Oedipus because, while both are classical figures of heroic intellect, Homer stands on
the border of Western civilization between history and prehistory in a way that
Sophocles does not.’127 On this historical borderline, the point where the darkness of the
ancient mythical world and the luminous clarity of the ordered, rational one touch, the
desperate struggles of Odysseus, the proto-bourgeois and the first sovereign subject, are
played out.128 Odysseus’s subjectivity is formed at the extreme and as the epic
demonstrates, the hero’s self-identity, the division between inside and outside, is created
by way of the continual encounter with non-identity. The multiplicity of the scattered
and diffuse is essential to the formation of the One of identity:
the knowledge which makes up his identity and enables him to survive has its
substance in the experience of diversity, distraction, disintegration; the knowing
survivor is also the man who exposes himself most daringly to the threat of
death, thus gaining the hardness and the strength to live. … Odysseus … throws
himself away, so to speak, in order to win himself; he achieves his estrangement
                                                
127
 Hullot-Kentor 2006, p.36.
128
 Adorno and Horkheimer suggest that the thematic of the coming into being of conceptual unity that
they read in the Odyssey ‘is already true in a profound sense of the Iliad. The anger of the mythical son of
a goddess against the rational warrior king and organizer; the hero’s undisciplined inactivity; finally, the
enlistment of the victorious, doomed hero in a cause which is national, Hellenic, and no longer tribal, an
allegiance mediated by mythic loyalty to his dead comrade—all these reflect the entwinement of history
and prehistory’ (Adorno and Horkheimer 2002, pp.37–8). If the two epics, one of adventure, the other of
war, are connected in this way, then Agamben’s assertion that the relation of the sovereign ban ‘is more
original than the Schmittian opposition between friend and enemy, fellow citizen and foreigner’
(Agamben 1998, p.110) must be rejected. Rather, they should be seen as co-temporal and co-extensive
moments of one unfolding historical process. This would provide a way of linking the inside/outside
theory of the political Schmitt develops in Political Theology with the friend–enemy distinction he
elaborates in The Concept of the Political.
162
from nature by abandoning himself to nature, trying his strength against it in all
his adventures.129
Through repeatedly throwing himself away, casting himself into the crucible of
circulation, upon the sea, Odysseus’s self-identity crystallises. The archaic forces that
he encounters are the material on which his self-preserving will is tested and gains
form, as he tries to overcome the oppressive power of that which simply is and always
has been, and which must be accepted because it cannot be escaped. If it is indeed the
case that, in their ineluctability, the mythical monsters and demons that oppose him
‘represent, as it were, petrified contracts and legal claims dating from primeval times’,130
then what is preserved in them is the origin of law in the hopeless, closed structure of
the endless cyclicality of nature, the domination of blind nature over all the individual
things it subsumes. The primeval powers embody the immemorial entanglement of fate,
law and guilt. They are ‘constituted by repetition’,131 and, as such, like the punishment
myths of Tantalus, Sisyphus and the Danaids, are ‘figures of compulsion’132 who live
under a curse. ‘Mythical inevitability is defined by the equivalence between the curse,
the abominable act which expiates it, and the guilt arising from that act, which
reproduces the curse. All law in history up to now bears the trace of this pattern.’133 Law
as the perpetual inheritance of guilt continually reinscribes mythic timelessness. The
conflict that takes place at the edge of the world is thus one between this dark, archaic,
irrational legality, experienced by prehistoric society as enveloping, and the emergent
ordering power of Odysseus’s rationality. Through his own reason, Odysseus struggles
to free himself from archaic unreason, to liberate himself from the senseless
compulsions of nature. Only by doing so can he be sovereign and self-determining. But
the only way out he finds, in his extremity, is really no way. ‘In myth each moment of
the cycle pays off the preceding moment and thereby helps to establish the continuity of
guilt as law. Against this Odysseus fights. The self represents rational universality
against the inevitability of fate. But as it finds the universal and the inevitable already
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inextricably entwined, its rationality necessarily takes a restrictive form, that of an
exception.’134
The struggle against myth can only take the form of an exception because the
principle of Odysseus’s success is the same as that of the mythic world that
encompasses him: domination and force. As he tests his strength against the ancient
powers of nature that threaten his existence, confronting the ‘old demons’ at the ‘distant
margins’135 of the world, Odysseus is ever and again compelled to acknowledge his own
weakness: nature is too strong to be conquered directly by the enfeebled, shipwrecked,
abandoned human. Recognising the superior might of nature and conceding defeat in
advance, Odysseus wins his survival through internalising the dominating legality of the
powers of myth that he confronts, subduing the disintegrative impulses of his instinctual
nature through the emergent unity of that masterful self in the course of his adventures.
Because he cannot defeat the monsters in open combat, he escapes them by taking into
himself the power they represent, making himself akin to what he fears in order to
survive it; his universal rationality, which the epic celebrates, is an extorted homage to
the irrational force of law of the mythical powers, ‘the inevitability of fate’. His own
self becomes the dominating power, the giver of law. As the terrified mimesis of the
superior force of mythic power, Odysseus’s rationality can never properly escape myth
or transcend it, but can only except itself from it, ensuring its own self-preservation
while remaining trapped. What is dramatised in the wandering of Odysseus is the
process of the formation of the unified, sovereign self as a repeated state of exception,
the life-and-death encounters with the destructive forces of nature as a series of states of
emergency. Again and again, at the outer margins of the known, Odysseus is thrown
into extreme situations in which his very survival is at stake and in which, for the sake
of the preservation of himself and his companions, he must decide and act.136 What
Odysseus decides is to negate the power that nature has over him by imperiously cutting
himself off from it, rejecting its diffuseness and sensuality as irrational and chaotic. The
episode of the lotus eaters exemplifies the fateful historical dynamic unleashed thereby.
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‘Whoever tastes their food is as much in thrall as those who listen to the Sirens’ song or
are touched by the wand of Circe. … Self-preserving reason cannot permit such an idyll
… among its own people.’137 Intoxicated by the lotus flower, Odysseus’s men lose their
objectifying reason and regress to a more archaic condition, supine and passive, ‘an
illusion of bliss, a dull aimless vegetating, as impoverished as the life of animals. At
best, it would be an absence of the awareness of unhappiness. But happiness contains
truth within itself. It unfolds from suffering removed.’138 Self-abandonment in blind
nature is not truth but subjection to heteronomy. Odysseus’s decision, however,
contains within it the contradiction of the dialectic of enlightenment and of the state of
exception as the modes through which humans think to gain freedom and autonomy for
themselves:
The enduring Odysseus is … right not to endure life among the Lotus-eaters.
Against them he asserts their own cause, the realization of utopia through
historical work, whereas simply abiding within an image of bliss deprives them
of their strength. But in being exerted by rationality, by Odysseus, this right is
inevitably drawn into the realm of wrong. His immediate action is one which
reasserts domination. Self-preserving reason can no more tolerate this bliss “near
the rim of the world” than the more dangerous form it takes in later stages. The
indolent defectors are fetched back to the galleys: “I had to use force to bring
them back to the ships, and they wept on the way, but once on board I dragged
them under the benches and left them in irons.”139
In the land of the lotus eaters, as in the domains of Circe, Polyphemus and the Sirens,
where rational law does not reach, Odysseus learns to hold himself together,
maintaining the unity of his self through the denial of the seductive fascination of
diffuse nature, and achieving the all-important aim of self-preservation. Those who
have been enticed beyond the limits by the promise of sensual bliss, at the cost of the
destruction of their own reason and self-consciousness, are forcibly brought back within
the bounds of the little, vulnerable floating ship of state of which Odysseus is sovereign.
The line that divides the inside, safety and reason, from the outside, dissolution and
myth, is drawn by force, the principle of myth. Odysseus’s sovereign Gewalt is thus
both legitimate and illegitimate: legitimate because it breaks humans free of helpless
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enthrallment to the power of nature; illegitimate because in doing so it reinstates
dominating violence as the ordering principle of human freedom, establishing myth at
the centre of reason and cutting humans off from the utopia that the lotus also
represents, ‘the promise of a state in which the reproduction of life is independent of
conscious self-preservation, the bliss of satiety uncoupled from the utility of planned
nutrition’,140 the experience of the object as more than the drudgery of use value. In
separating humans from nature, sovereign violence forbids them to know it, definitively
placing the wildness and disordered materiality of the world beyond the border. The
universality of abstractive reason denies and blocks off the fulfilling experience of the
particular. Where, as in Polyphemus’s cave, Odysseus cannot use force directly, he
escapes through cunning, adapting himself and overthrowing the power of the archaic
monster with the trick of the name, a ruse of self-denying reason. In both cases,
Odysseus’s all-encompassing rationality is created only through self-delimitation and
estrangement from the nature that it seeks to master. By the very principle of its being,
it can never know the whole, the absolute, but is condemned only to be an exception.
The philosophy of history developed in Dialectic of Enlightenment thus fulfils the
Benjaminian injunction, from the Eighth Thesis, to develop a conception of history in
which the state of exception is understood not as a passing, momentary phenomenon in
a linear progression, but as the rule. As Adorno and Horkheimer construe it, in the epic
the diverse myths of Odysseus’s wanderings are unified into a coherent narrative in
which is enacted the movement by which human rationality frees itself from subjection
to the repetitive cycles of overpowering nature and becomes its own master, sovereign
and self-determining. What their reading reveals is that this freedom, the security of the
rationalised inner space, is no such thing because it comes about only through the
modality of the state of exception; that in setting himself apart from nature Odysseus
remains captive to it. Ever since the cunning Odysseus, history has been a permanent
state of exception.
 State of Nature
Odysseus’s mimesis of death, his rejection of the substantiality of nature in
favour of the unifying power of the abstract self, is emblematic of the development of
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the generality and order of the concept. The sovereign becomes the sovereign because,
without shrinking back in fear, he is able to take into himself the negative power of
death and make himself a self through it, sacrificing his natural being and objectifying
himself.141 If the concept – abstraction, the self, the political –, is the means of escape
from nature, it arises through natural violence, internalised to produce ordered
rationality. In Homo Sacer Agamben traces this conjunction back to sources almost as
ancient as the Homeric narratives, citing passages from Hesiod, Solon and Pindar. Of
the Pindaric verse on sovereign nomos he comments: ‘What is decisive is that the poet
… defines the sovereignty of the nomos by means of a justification of violence. The
fragment’s meaning becomes clear only when one understands that at its center lies a
scandalous unification of the two essentially antithetical principles that the Greeks call
Bia and Dike, violence and justice. Nomos is the power that, “with the strongest hand,”
achieves the paradoxical union of these opposites.’142 These early Greek poets and law-
givers articulate what the Odyssey describes, the implication of order and justice with
violence. For Agamben, ‘Pindar’s fragment on the nomos basileus contains the hidden
paradigm guiding every successive definition of sovereignty: the sovereign is the point
of indistinction between violence and law, the threshold on which violence passes over
into law and law passes over into violence.’143 The contradiction contained within this
paradigm is what, in Agamben’s account, animates the controversy between Plato and
the Sophists over the priority of nomos or physis and then reappears, unresolved, in the
modern epoch in Hobbes’s theory of sovereignty, so influential within IR. In Hobbes’s
contractarian conception, all the members of the commonwealth, for the sake of their
survival and the possibility of leading a civilised life, cede their own particularity, their
own natural violence, to the sovereign, who stands both above and within them all.144 In
this way, the citizens are removed from the dreadful condition of the state of nature and
given a regularised, lawful and determinate existence. The logic of sovereignty in the
Hobbesian account is that of exception or exclusion: one is set apart so that all others,
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by being identical to him, may be identical to each other.145 In the sovereign, as the
fount of law, is summated all the natural violence of society, which in the course of
history is not overcome or left behind as archaic so much as massively concentrated into
a single point of unity. Agamben observes: ‘It is important to note that in Hobbes the
state of nature survives in the person of the sovereign, who is the only one to preserve
its natural ius contra omnes. Sovereignty thus presents itself as an incorporation of the
state of nature in society, or, if one prefers, as a state of indistinction between nature
and culture, between violence and law, and this very indistinction constitutes
specifically sovereign violence.’146 The Hobbesian logic of exception means that the
sovereign both stands at the centre of the ordered space of identity, the scene of the
progressive movement of history, and is external to it, still within the timeless and
anarchic condition of the state of nature. The clear distinction between inside and
outside, subject and object, marked by the border, can only come into being through the
figure of the sovereign, in whom precisely that distinction is blurred or rendered
meaningless because he exists simultaneously in both spheres. The historical attempt of
society to separate itself off as a secure inner space decisively distinguished from
disparate nature is thus continually brought to ruin because through its own principle of
constitution it remains caught within the state of nature. Try as it may to free itself, to
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harden itself against the outside, it remains trapped. ‘Insofar as it is sovereign, the
nomos  is necessarily connected with both the state of nature and the state of
exception’.147
The account of the development of identity given in Dialectic of Enlightenment,
and developed throughout Adorno’s work, explains this paradoxical, inside/outside
position of the sovereign and the continued existence of political being within the state
of nature. Because Odysseus’s self-preserving reason is created through the imitation of
what threatens him, repressing diffuse nature within himself and compelling his
companions to do likewise, it cannot truly free itself from the encompassing power of
nature that it only mimics. Hence the combination in Odysseus of force and cunning,
the two modalities of his success, neither of which is able to liberate the hero
permanently from what is experienced as the prevailing disintegrative or destructive
threat of non-identity. As Hobbes’s theory of sovereignty so compellingly suggests, the
constituting principle of political reason is the same as that of the unreason against
which it was created. It can therefore only be a limited exception, because as parts of
nature humans cannot break nature. It is too powerful. For so long as the universal,
abstractive rationality of sovereignty results from the hostile and antagonistic rejection
of the material specificity of the world – the attempt to dominate nature –, it can only
take a delimited, bounded form.148 And for so long as the order of society is founded
upon power and domination, the internalisation of mythic violence, it remains caught
within the state of nature, necessarily attached to that from which it attempts to seal
itself off. The sovereign, as the fount of unity, may be able, through the force of
identity, to guarantee the ordered and restricted political space that seemingly removes
the citizens from the state of nature, but he cannot free himself from it: he is fixed
paradoxically athwart the divide, both inside and outside. Sovereignty, the condition of
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freedom, is also the condition of continued entrapment.149 As much is suggested by the
episode of the Sirens in the Odyssey. The call of the Sirens’ song is inescapable; their
‘allurement is that of losing oneself in the past.’150 However, Odysseus is intent upon
securing his survival through separating himself from the world of the Sirens,
establishing ‘a fixed order of time … to liberate the present moment from the power of
the past by banishing the latter beyond the absolute boundary of the irrecoverable and
placing it, as usable knowledge, in the service of the present.’151 To listen to the Sirens’
song is inimical to this striving for stable order. To do so would be to lose one’s
identity, ‘suspending … the boundary between oneself and other life’. But not to listen
to it would also be fatal, because the song contains something that may not be
definitively lost or denied, something in the absence of which the self-posited human
systematic order is rendered senseless: the substantiality and compelling
meaningfulness of the materiality of nature, the non-identical that contains ‘a promise
of joy which has threatened civilization at every moment.’152 Odysseus’s reason is
contradictorily tied to what the Sirens represent – to establish itself it must both break
itself free from the fascination of nature and remain in connection with it.153 His solution
combines cunning and power. He blocks the ears of his companions with wax, stunting
their sensory capacities and cutting them off from the allure of nature so that they may
be removed from temptation, from what threatens their identity. Submitting in this way,
they are kept safe, in their restriction, fixated on rowing in unison with all their might:
‘Workers must look ahead with alert concentration and ignore anything which lies to
one side. The urge toward distraction must be grimly sublimated in redoubled exertions.
Thus the workers are made practical.’154 Himself, as the only one who is permitted to
listen, he has lashed tightly to the mast, so that he may hear the Sirens’ song but escape
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its destructive spell, experiencing, longingly and at a distance, the bliss of non-identity
that is at the same time rendered forever unattainable.155 Forcibly delimiting himself,
held secure by the bonds that physically draw the boundary, as the sovereign, he is
situated both inside and outside the state of nature. Through such desperate measures,
he and his men survive, as an exception.
The Turn to Non-Identity
For Hobbes the awful power of the sovereign makes him a ‘Mortal God’;156 in
Schmitt’s political theology, looking to the 17
th
 century, the sovereign, with his
‘unlimited power’, is God secularised, the decision a miracle. Although, as Adorno and
Horkheimer note, he was ‘regarded by many as a deity’,157 Odysseus’s wanderings
suggest something less exalted. So far from being the majestic, self-constituting locus of
meaning and truth, the sovereignty of Man comes into existence solely through violence
and cunning. Only over agonising millennia was freedom, laboriously and with infinite
pains, wrested from nature: ‘Humanity had to inflict terrible injuries on itself before the
self—the identical, purpose-directed, masculine character of human beings—was
created’.158 Reflection on the character of that freedom, the inclusive exclusion of the
concept, shows it to be a fraud, the desperate transfiguration of the self-violence needed
to produce the break from subjection to the natural context. Viewed thus, the
philosophical tradition’s abstract systems of metaphysics and ontology are the reflection
forms, unaware of themselves, of the drive to dominate nature.159 The truth of the
sovereign self is blind and terrified self-preservation, the compulsion of identity the will
to survive at all costs.160 ‘Without the act of violence of method, society and spirit,
substructure and superstructure would hardly have been possible. And that subsequently
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grants it the irresistibility which metaphysics reflects back as trans-subjective being.’161
In the section of Negative Dialectics entitled ‘On the Interpretation of the
Transcendental’, Adorno incisively formulated, in natural-historical terms, this critique
of the means of freedom as perpetuating entrapment, the status of sovereignty as only
an exception:
that which is solidified, persisting, impenetrable in the I is the mimesis of the
impenetrability of the external world, as perceived by primitive consciousness.
… In the intellectual supremacy of the subject, its real powerlessness has its
echo. The ego-principle imitates its negation. … The primacy of subjectivity
spiritually perpetuates the Darwinian struggle for existence. The subjugation of
nature for human ends is a mere natural relationship; that is why the superiority
of the reason which controls nature and of its principle is appearance.162
In imitating brute nature, out of fear, the sovereign subject remains part of it, still caught
within the struggle for survival, Realism’s law of the jungle in the anarchic condition of
the international. The sovereignty of the self, like political sovereignty – and, if the
Odyssey, in its narrative of the development of the self, is ‘the basic text of European
civilization’,163 so all Western political concepts derive from ancient Greek thought –
ultimately bespeaks the weakness and vulnerability of humans not their strength,
mastery as subjection. The order-giving power of the subject in its various modes – the
self, the concept, the political, metaphysics –, written in the history of philosophy and
perpetuated, in his way, in Schmitt’s thinking on sovereignty, leads not to a self-aware
humanity in control of its own existence but to one trapped within objective structures
of its own making that it cannot control and that perpetuate bondage in myth. Sovereign
freedom remains under the spell of nature: ‘In the exertion of its domination it becomes
part of what it intends to control. … What comes to light in it is, how very much it is in
thrall to the object, by consuming this latter. What it does, is the bane of that which the
subject imagines to be under its bane. Its desperate self-exaltation is the reaction to the
experience of its powerlessness, which prevents self-reflection; absolute consciousness,
unconscious.’164
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All this changes the meaning of the exception. For Schmitt, for whom political
order has absolute primacy, the exception appears as a disturbing element at the border,
and through the decision that reinscribes the division of inside from outside, in the state
of exception, the sovereign guarantees the security of the juridico-political space.
Adorno turns this inside/outside structure itself inside-out. What his metacritique of
epistemology shows is that thought that assumes the priority of the concept is forever
incapable of producing a coherent and non-contradictory systematics out of itself. It
cannot resolve the mediation of subject and object from within the subject. Rather, the
more consistently it follows the logic of its own matter-at-hand, the more it is
ineluctably brought up against the element that simply cannot be brought within
conceptuality, an element with which it remains in hostile antagonism. It is this aporia
that Schmitt seeks to exploit with his arbitrary and authoritarian gesture of banishment,
the decision. But that only perpetuates the delusion, the bondage to brute natural,
Darwinian existence.165 The truth of epistemology and the logic of sovereignty, as
Schmitt himself perceived but immediately cut short, is that conceptual order has its
being only in and through the non-conceptual. Non-identity is essential to identity,
which does not exist without it. The concept, like Schmitt’s sovereign, lives off and
denies non-identity.166 This implies the solution to the problematic that epistemology
labours in vain to resolve: it is the presumption of the priority of the concept that blocks
the truth that, as the philosophy of history in Dialectic of Enlightenment makes evident,
it is in fact the subject itself, the concept, that is the exception.167 Insistence on the
primacy of the concept, on what is derived as what is originary, inevitably involves the
violence exercised in the state of exception, in which it is revealed that the subject is
perpetually at war with the object. However, in continually exposing the break, despite
itself, epistemology shows that the concept, born of force and cunning, nevertheless
possesses the key to freedom from its self-imprisonment, through its self-critique: ‘It is
rationally cognizable, where a detached rationality which has run away with itself
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becomes false, turns truly into mythology.’168 Through reflection on itself, the concept
can understand its own limitation and the self-defeating delusion of its ‘unlimited
power’. Negative Dialectics is Adorno’s sustained attempt to induce thought to do that,
to think against itself for its own sake – the critique of conceptual generality out of the
consciousness of the necessity of non-identity as what is substantial. This is Adorno’s
materialism, the attempt to bring the concept, the means of ideality, to awareness of its
dependence on what is other than itself. If the concept has always been hypostatised as
the instrument of subsumption and homogeneity, ‘to change this direction of
conceptuality, to turn it towards the non-identical, is the hinge of negative dialectics.
Before the insight into the constitutive character of the non-conceptual in the concept,
the compulsion of identity, which carries along the concept without the delay of such a
reflection, dissolves. Its self-determination leads away from the appearance … of the
concept’s being-in-itself as a unity of meaning, out towards its own meaning.’169 If the
concept were to fulfil its own concept, as a generality that did justice to the object rather
than cut it short, the spell might at last be broken and release achieved – from the
paradox of the sovereign ban, from the violence of the state of exception and from
entrapment, as a mere exception, within the mythic, anarchic international state of
nature.170
***
Conclusion: This chapter has sought to develop a theory of political form that could
account for the Realist conception of the necessarily delimited nature of the political,
and thus the existence of the international. Bringing Carl Schmitt’s and Giorgio
Agamben’s thinking about the inside/outside structure of sovereignty into a
constellation with Adorno’s thinking about the contradictory structure of the concept, it
sought to show that the political should be understood as a basic form of ideality, an
objective abstraction. Then, turning to the ‘debate’ on sovereignty between Walter
Benjamin and Carl Schmitt, it demonstrated how the thematics of law, sovereignty,
myth and the exception at issue there were subsequently taken up by Adorno in the
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account of the origins of conceptuality given in Dialectic of Enlightenment: because the
concept is modelled on natural domination, in can never escape the context of nature
that encompasses it, but can only be an exception. This theorisation of the constitution
of political being explains both its necessarily delimited nature, its inadequacy to the
whole, and why it remains trapped within the Realist state of nature.
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Conclusion
It is now possible to return to the research aims of this thesis and state some
conclusions. First, the critical theory of political form and its relation to capital. The
overall argument of this thesis – bringing together Marx’s theorisation of capital as
abstraction-in-motion with Schmitt’s, Agamben’s and Benjamin’s thinking about
sovereignty and the exception, mediating these two through Adorno’s critique of
conceptuality – has been intended to show that what underlies them all is the problem of
ideality and the contradictory structure of the concept. A plausible way to read the
opening two chapters of Dialectic of Enlightenment is to understand the first as the ur-
history of capital – how the subject makes the world identical to itself – and the second
as the ur-history of self-identity – how the subject makes itself identical to itself. These
two processes go together: the subject’s identifying of the object is identical to the
creation of self-identity, the latter being the movement by which the subject-as-object, a
material thing, becomes the subject-as-subject, an ideal thing. They are two moments of
the same, single movement of the making ideal of the world. The first moment is one of
incorporation, bringing the outside inside so that there is nothing left that is subject-
alien. The second is also a process of universalisation, but one that is achieved through
delimitation and exclusion: the subject’s self-identity, its extrication from the natural
context, is formed through the reflective split between self and world, reflection-into-
self and reflection-into-other, to use Hegel’s terminology. The subject becomes
determinate by virtue of the boundary between it and the world, and it is through this
split that it is able to conceptualise the object, in the dialectic of reflection and
speculation.1 Only by way of the subject–object division can the absolute subject–object
be produced; the limit is integral to the unlimited power of the subject, so that the
infinite self must be bounded and finite. If the political space is the human sphere of
self-determination decisively separated from nature, and such separation is intrinsic to
the autonomy and freedom of the sovereign self, then the boundary line is necessary for
the constitution of political being. The inside/outside dichotomy is therefore inalienable
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from the political.2 Further, if capital, as the generalisation of the commodity form,
represents the completion of the historical development of the subject’s identifying of
the world with itself, then the seamless global capitalist system, the world-spanning web
of exchange, is tied to localised, delimited political existence: capital’s world of
subjective immanence can come about only through the subjective mastery, the capacity
to dominate the world through identity, that is constituted by bounded political being.
For the object to be a commodity, it is necessary for the subject to be political. This is,
at least conceptually, the answer to the many-states problem that Marxist IR has posed,
the question why capital does not produce a unified global political authority
corresponding in its reach to the world market but instead exists through a fragmented
global political space composed of a multiplicity of discrete entities.3 Many further
mediations would be required to demonstrate the necessity of precisely the modern
nation-state form to capital’s existence, more than there is space to develop here, but if
this theoretical argument holds, it can be said that delimited political space is in no
sense contingent or accidental to capital but is, to the contrary, intrinsic to its concept.
Nor should political form be thought of, in the manner of orthodox, ‘classical’ Marxism,
as somehow functional to or derivative of capital, as if the economic had ontological
priority over the political. Although in IR such thinking rightly wants to break through
the Realist autonomy of the political, the latter’s insulation from the wider field of the
social, it nevertheless not only fails to account for the specificity of the political but
cannot help but reduce capital, in the end, to ‘economics’ as an apparently natural
determination of human existence, the base as opposed to the superstructure, and
thereby remains trapped by fetishism.4 If, however, the political and the economic are
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grasped as modalities of ideation, forms of abstraction through which the subject
masters nature, both internal and external, then it becomes possible to understand them
as truly dialectical, identical in their difference. To the extent that the object becomes an
economic thing, the subject becomes a political being. Logical or causal hierarchy thus
becomes unnecessary, in fact misleading, and each moment can be comprehended in its
determinacy without occluding the other. This perspective is at least implicit in Marx,
especially when he is read in the context of his idealist forebears, but is brought closer
to theoretical consciousness in Adorno.5
Secondly, the materialist critique of Realism. The theoretical perspective
developed here, in which the political is understood as an objective form of ideation,
opens a different view of the meaning of Realism for IR. Through Adorno’s critique of
the concept, the truth content of Realism can be grasped without the danger of critical
thought’s falling prey to Realist essentialising. If the political is intrinsically idealist,
then Realism’s understanding of the limits of political form, and thus of the necessity of
the international, has distinct critical elements that should be recuperated for radical, in
particular materialist, thought. These critical aspects, though, are the very elements of
Realism that Marxist IR, and in fact much radical thinking in the discipline, has always
tended to reject as regressive. The implication of the Realist discourse is that the
political per se is irrational, in that, while it may be the medium of human self-
determination and sovereignty, at the highest level each political entity finds itself
caught within the ungoverned and ungovernable state of nature of the international, a
heteronomous condition that it cannot master. Because of its delimited and
particularistic form, the universality of political being is never adequate to the whole
and, as a result, the totality of humanity’s political existence, what should be the scene
of its freedom, has always been and remains blind, uncontrolled and riven by conflict.
According to the argument developed here concerning bounded political form, the
exception and the state of nature, these Realist themes are exactly congruent with a
materialist critique of the political and should be taken up and pushed further. If
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materialism reveals idealism as mythical, still trapped within oppressive nature, then
there is a whole side of Realism that can be wrested for critical theory. In truth,
Realism’s philosophy of history has in any case always had a deep affinity with Marx’s
perception that bourgeois society is the ultimate development of class society,6 and that
capital, along with all the history that leads up to it, is still nothing but prehistory
because the realm of freedom can only be attained by transcending social being based
upon class exploitation. It is fundamental to Marx’s understanding of capital as an
objective system of mythic entrapment, as it is for Realism’s thinking about the
international, that the mode of bourgeois society’s self-reproduction is anarchic,
uncontrolled and unconscious, that the individual is not yet free and self-determining
within the universal, and that the reason of the society that is enthralled to the
movement of value is unreason. Doubtless Marx never fully reconciled or brought to
theoretical consciousness the contradictions between the static and dynamic elements
within his thinking, but from this historical distance it is the thematics of stasis, of the
continuity of prehistory, that stand out most strikingly and demand reflection. They
have survived what history has done to Marx and the contemporary radicalism of his
thought lies in this Marx, the one in fact closest to Realism.
In IR theory, Marx after Realism, therefore, is the Marx of modernity as ur-
historical, capitalist society as myth. This is how, in the mid-20
th
 century, after the First
World War put an apocalyptic end to the liberal European age, and after fascism,
Stalinism and Auschwitz, Adorno, acutely sensitive to the way in which the meaning of
great intellectual works unfolded and changed through time, read Marx. Adorno’s
speculative identification of myth and modernity, together with his critique of the
structure of the concept, unlocks the puzzle of Realism, before which radical thought in
IR has so often foundered: its combination of spareness and import – ‘if so thin, why so
powerful?’7 According to the argument of this thesis, the political is, literally, a concept;
society becomes specifically political when it attains a certain degree of conceptual,
ideal determinacy over and against nature; and the political-as-concept, a mimesis of
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mythic universality, is inextricably tied to the exception and the state of nature. Thus, it
may be said that what Realism firmly grasps is that the political, through its very form,
remains entangled in myth. In IR, Realism, although far away from him in most
respects, shares something of the Benjaminian revocation of subjectivity to mythic
turmoil. It recognises that the universality and sovereignty of the bounded political
space are false,8 just as it instinctively perceives the falseness of the universality of
capital, which does not overcome but rather lives through the antagonistic
fragmentation of the states-system. The strength of Realism is the strength of the chain
that keeps political reason tethered to mythic unreason. If, in IR, the relationship
between liberalism as dynamics and Realism as stasis ‘is somehow more complex—and
more paradoxical—than any simple contrast of “rich” and “thin” implies’,9 then to
understand Realism is to grasp, as with static and dynamic, the identity of ‘rich’ and
‘thin’. Realism’s continual return, the impossibility of vanquishing its stubborn,
timeless and abstract, spareness with the seemingly limitless abundance of historical
movement and material, means that the richness should itself be conceived of as thin,
that all the wealth of history is still just poverty and that through all its change history
stays the same, the continuity of prehistory. This, in essentials, is the materialist
philosophy of history that Adorno developed through the critique of the Hegelian-
Idealist one.10
Viewed in this light, Realism’s conception of the past as nothing but an
enormous storehouse of empirical illustrations of its invariant principles – history as a
gigantic analytic judgement – can be seen to have an important element of truth to it:
Within the sphere of influence of the system, the new—progress—is, like the
old, a constant source of new disaster. Knowing the new does not mean adapting
oneself to it and to the movement of history; it means resisting its inflexibility
and conceiving of the onward march of the battalions of world history as
marking time. Theory knows of no “constructive force” but only of one that
lights up the contours of a burned-out prehistory with the glow of the latest
disaster in order to perceive the parallel that exists between them. The latest
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thing is always the old terror, the myth, which consists in that blind continuum of
time that continually retracts itself, with patient, stupidly omniscient malice, just
like Oknos’s ass, which eats the rope as fast as he twines it.11
Admittedly, Realism tends to conceive this as an abstract identity rather than one
achieved through difference, but the identity itself is real enough. If enlightenment has
never escaped myth, then the new is always really just repetition of the same old thing.
Adorno suggests that Marx’s theory of capital, the analysis of the first truly universal
social form, affects the meaning of the totality of history: ‘by exposing the historical
necessity that had brought capitalism into being, political economy became the critique
of history as a whole’.12 After Marx, history must be viewed through the prism of
Capital. In the same way, it could be said that contemporary Realism’s perception of
the international as an invariant state of anarchy becomes the critique of the history of
humanity’s political development. Much of IR theory, not least Marxism, appalled at
the implications of Realism’s sober and impassive depiction of the invariance of an
‘empty, meaningless struggle for power’,13 has turned away from the shocking thinness
of anarchy towards the apparent vitality of the stuff of history. But this recourse both
falls short of Realism and fatally misrecognises the combination and contradiction of
static and dynamic in history. The theory of capital already irresistibly suggests the truth
of Realism’s vision. Humanity’s immemorial struggle for self-preservation in the face
of nature culminates in the absolutisation of the empty abstraction-in-motion of value;
and the corollary to the infinite self-expansion of value is the anarchic global system of
abstract, neutral political states. Both are equally senseless, and each denounces the
history of which together they are the culmination as only empty and meaningless.14
These considerations also throw a different light on the internal development of
Realist thinking in IR. From the beginning, neo-Realism has been reviled by radical
critics as a sterile horror, ahistorical and lifeless, a betrayal of everything intellectually
compelling in the older, more humanistic, classical Realist tradition.15 Recently, within
Realism itself a similar rejection of the Waltzian reformulation has developed, with the
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explicit intention of a return to and rearticulation of venerable Realist virtues.16
However, the intellectual cry of ‘back to …!’ can only understand neo-Realism, in
nominalist fashion, as a subjective aberration, the misguided result of scientistic hubris,
without being able to perceive any historical necessity in it. This ahistoricism, of an
approach that purports to return historical sensitivity to Realism, fails to grasp the
significance of the evolution of Realist thought and cannot account for the suggestive
force of Waltz’s paradigm, why it has maintained an almost hypnotic hold over IR
theory (even theory that is actively hostile to it) for so long. In fact, neo-Realism
precisely bespeaks the historical epoch. The rise of globalising neo-liberalism, which
dissolved the semi-independence of the Second World and fully integrated the Third
into the international circuits of capital, creating for the first time a truly unified global
system, the New World Order proclaimed in triumph at the end of the Cold War, can be
dated from the 1970s. So, Waltzian neo-Realism, developed during that decade and
placed before the public in 1979, is the enunciation of the political existence of the neo-
liberal order – an abstract, frozen theory for an abstract, frozen world. In its way, neo-
Realism is confirmation at the level of the political of Adorno’s assertion that the
fixated inner drive of the concept is ‘the extirpation of animism’:17 the compulsion of
identity is to nullify the substantiality of the object, its qualitative in-itself, because such
intrinsic meaningfulness is experienced as mythic and subject-alien, provoking fear.
Identity seeks to make the world the same as its own abstract self in order to control it
for the sake of security. This sacrificial process encompasses both the external world
and the subject’s own being, as a part of material nature, and reaches its culmination in
the wholly abstract world of capital. Just as the limitless explosion of financialisation
that has accompanied neo-liberalism signifies the fulfilment of ideality’s dream of the
world stripped of qualitative specificity and turned into numbers,18 so Waltz’s drastic
reduction of political existence to qualitative sameness – so many hardened, abstract,
identical ‘units’, mere empty shells – precisely expresses what has become of the
political through the historical unfolding of its own principle, the relentless ‘corrosive
                                                
16
 See Forde 1995 for an early statement of this tendency, and Lebow 2003 and Molloy 2003 for
subsequent contributions.
17
 Adorno and Horkheimer 2002, p.2.
18
 ‘Availability establishes the bond between philosophy and mathematics that has lasted ever since Plato.
… His later doctrine that ideas are numbers is no simple orgy of exotic speculation. One may almost
always read off what is central from the eccentricities of thought’ (Adorno 1982, p.9). What was once
eccentric, the furthest reaches of idealist speculation, has become emphatically central: financial
speculation rules a world whose Idea really is number.
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rationality’19 of enlightenment. Waltz is explicit that his theory makes only one
assumption about the motivation of the units: that they pursue their own survival.20 But
that one is fateful enough. The rigidity of Waltz’s theory and its cancelling of living,
human subjectivity are true to the endgame of the logic of self-preservation. For, as
Adorno’s theory of sacrifice shows, the compulsive will to survive turns against itself
‘because the substance which is mastered, suppressed, and disintegrated by self-
preservation is nothing other than the living entity, of which the achievement’s of self-
preservation can only be described as functions—in other words, self-preservation
destroys the very thing which is to be preserved.’21 What Adorno identifies as
compulsive self-preservation through self-denial leads, in advanced capitalism, to a
situation in which the subject, in order to survive, is forced to nullify itself in adapting
its being to the increasingly overwhelming weight of objectified dead labour, such that
‘the will to live finds itself dependent on the denial of the will to live: self-preservation
annuls all life in subjectivity.’22 This self-destructive pursuit of survival through self-
sacrifice is what drives the seemingly unstoppable process of the hollowing-out of the
state, the voiding of the substance of political being, a tendency that has become
unmistakable even to non-radical theory during the neo-liberal decades. The self and the
political eviscerate themselves through the ruthless and inexorable pursuit of their own
logic.23 This latest development of the concept indeed ‘lights up the contours of a
burned-out prehistory’ and reveals the truth of Realism’s understanding of history as an
‘empty, meaningless struggle for power’:
With the denial of nature in human beings, not only the telos of the external
mastery of nature but also the telos of one’s own life becomes confused and
opaque. At the moment when human beings cut themselves off from the
consciousness of themselves as nature, all the purposes for which they keep
themselves alive—social progress, the heightening of material and intellectual
forces, indeed, consciousness itself—become void, and the enthronement of the
means as ends, which in late capitalism is taking on the character of overt
madness, is already detectable in the earliest history of subjectivity.24
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 Adorno and Horkheimer 2002, p.43.
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 Adorno 2005a, p.229.
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 It is therefore not the case, as so much broadly left-wing commentary has it, that economics has,
regrettably, subsumed politics, the state becoming cravenly subservient to global capital; rather the
globalisation of capital and the state’s self-emptying are two sides of a single process.
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 Adorno and Horkheimer 2002, pp.42–3.
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In its unflinching setting-out of the extreme results of the drive for self-preservation, the
senselessness that ensues when sheer survival takes precedence over what is to survive,
neo-Realism has its historical validity.25 Cold, abstract, ahistorical and rebarbative it
may be, but Waltz’s theory is the contemporary world.
The force of Realism’s understanding of the condition of the international, the
continued contradiction between inside and outside, is in itself virtual proof of Adorno’s
thesis that the escape from nature fails. The concept remains trapped in what it can only
except itself from. The form of the modern international also confirms Adorno’s
contention that ‘Enlightenment is totalitarian’26 because it ‘tolerates nothing outside’.27
Through the iteration of the nation-state, a standardised form mass produced and
stamped on the material, political space has expanded to encompass the entire territorial
extent of the world. The boundaries go right up to each other.28 The current, neo-liberal
era succeeded the long 20
th
-century process of the break-up of the European empires
and the collapse of the communist  partial exception, which left behind them a series of
formally established, albeit more or less fragile, states. As such, what the recent decades
have witnessed is the completed totalisation of the world – there is now only one
identical, political form everywhere,29 and seemingly nothing left outside. This situation
is historically unprecedented, and perhaps provides an answer to the question posed
long ago by Martin Wight: why is there no international theory?30 For so long as the
world remained to be conquered, so long as there was an outside that was yet to brought
inside, and identity was not complete, the medium of conquest, the concept, was held to
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be an absolute good, the space through which freedom and security become possible.31
As against the priority given to the perfection of the inner space, itself an expression of
the urgency of identity and self-preservation, the international could only be marginal.
Further, just as the concept of society only really came into being in the bourgeois
world,32 within whose social form all members are formally identical as bearers of equal
rights, so the concept of the international, in the strong sense, coalesced only once every
political entity could be recognised as intrinsically the same, a historical situation that
arose on a global scale for the first time during the course of the 20
th
 century, and to
which Waltz’s theory gives the fullest testimony. ‘Society’ became conceptualisable as
such through being thoroughly and objectively bound together by way of the
generalisation of the exchange relationship, and perhaps solely as a result of the
functional interconnection that came about with the globalisation of capital could ‘the
international’, in turn, become an object of theory. Hence International Relations is a
20
th
-century discipline. Indeed, the emergence of IR as a subject in its own right is itself
a symptom of what has happened to the political. Concluding a recent volume
celebratory of Waltz’s work, Ken Booth argues forcefully that no political theory now
that does not fully acknowledge and think through the problematic of the international
can be taken seriously, and that within the social sciences IR should in fact be accorded
an ‘architectonic position’,33 as the discipline that encompasses all others. What this
recognises is the achievement on a global political scale of a principle that Adorno, in a
letter to Walter Benjamin, spelt out as basic to the social form of capital: that everything
is mediated through the totality.34 No political issue is in any meaningful sense narrowly
domestic anymore; the lines all lead back to the whole. In these circumstances, theory
that, on principle, limits itself to the space within the borders necessarily falls short. The
substantiality of the individual political entity has been ceded to the international.35
Through the achievement of its own principle of enlightenment, the continual extension
of rationalisation, order and sovereign power, the political has gone into eclipse. At the
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 Adorno and Benjamin 1999, pp.282–3.
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 There is not space to develop the point here, but, in brief, this accords with Adorno’s insight that in the
condition he designated, synecdochically, ‘the administered world’ the tension between the singular
subject and the whole that sustained the ideology of individual independence throughout the high
bourgeois epoch has evaporated. The whole is now so powerful that it allows no mediation but, rather,
directly overwhelms the individual. (See Hullot-Kentor 2006, pp.210–19.)
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same historical moment in which the subject’s mastery of the world reaches fulfilment
and political space comes to subsume the earth totally, it loses its meaning, and as a
result, it becomes impossible to believe any more, as traditional theory always did, that
the pursuit of the good life is viable within the delimited, singular political arena.
Yet, as Realism insists, the international remains anarchic and uncontrolled, a
scene of clashing power and the unreason of raison d’État. The bounded political entity
has been superseded as the site of freedom, but the whole that takes its place remains
ungraspable and unfree. This is the contemporary circumstance that Realism has
delineated with the most compelling force, and Booth pays it due tribute.36 Radical
theory in IR, thinking that will not rest content with the dismal Realist certainties, is
thus caught in Limbo, stuck ‘in the waiting chamber of the present’:37 social being has
developed beyond the assumption of freedom within the political as bounded entity, but
what might transcend it is shrouded in obscurity. The border at the same defines the
sphere of political reason, its identity, and keeps it confined within the irrational sphere
of the international; it is what makes the political both possible and impossible, free and
unfree. This is the seemingly irresolvable dilemma that confronts critical thought:
how to rethink the concept of community without thereby simply reproducing a
particularistic social ontology? Since most of our inherited conceptions of
community carry implicit connotations of boundedness and homogeneity,
attempts to project these conceptions onto a world which lack [sic] those
characteristics are likely to generate paradoxes that cannot be resolved within the
same conceptual framework. … But getting rid of the core connotations of
boundedness and homogeneity leaves us with little else. What could possibly
constitute a multitude of people into a community in the absence of both borders
and shared attributes among its prospective members?38
These reflections show critical thought catching up with what Realism has in any case
always said: that traditional political form, space as ordered, sovereign generality
produced through delimitation, cannot be made rational.39 Through the medium of the
boundary, the rationalised inside always implies the irrational outside. This problem of
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the border truly becomes urgent at a historical borderline.40 Just as Odysseus, wandering
at the rim of the world, stood on the limit between myth and enlightenment, so the all-
conquering process of ideality that Odysseus set in motion has reached its terminal
point: the world has become wholly political, the object totally subsumed to the
commodity form. But freedom has not come about. The progress of Spirit has reached
its limit, the identity of identity and non-identity has been achieved, but it has not
resulted in Absolute Knowledge. The groping confusion of contemporary IR theory
before the question of the political is just the reflection of a wider historical
bewilderment, the sensation of reaching the end of a line that has turned out to lead
nowhere.41 As a result, radical theory is at an impasse, in that it is absolutely unclear,
now, what a political practice would be that was not ultimately the reaffirmation of
liberal democracy, as it is equally unclear what would be a social practice that was not
just the reproduction of capital.42 The crisis of practice extends into its very concept. At
the origins of enlightenment, Odysseus’s practice was the conquest of fear, of the
outside, through the creation of sovereign identity by way of the exception, and the
practice of civilisation since has always been identity, which in turn has always been the
contradictory combination of universality and limitation, the abstractly general and the
narrowly particular. When the infinite subject reaches its limit, the totalisation of
identity leaves it objectless, floundering in its own empty arbitrariness. If Adorno was
right that the telos of enlightenment, as the extirpation of animism through mythic
universality, is neutralisation, its reduction to a hardened, reified thing, then it is futile
to imagine it possible to reanimate the political when its own principle, identity,
compulsively drives towards objectified neutrality, deadness. The political, like
everything else, has been subjected by enlightenment to relentless demythologisation
and cannot be compellingly reauthorised, any more than pre-capitalist society can be
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reconstituted, or the long-overthrown gods reinstated.43 To suppose otherwise is to fail
to recognise the objective logic of the historical process that has produced Realism,
which itself has anyway always had the correct critical insight: that the rational
intentionality of the political is also unreason, myth, and irredeemable as such.44
Nevertheless, Realism in IR, for all its critical elements, is still spell-bound by
the fetish character of the political in that the limit of its imaginary is generally a
knowing, world-weary acceptance of fallenness and inevitable insufficiency,
accommodation to irrationality as the best that can be achieved. It may be able to
perceive the problematic character of political form with greater clarity than any other
theoretical tradition in IR, but still it can conceive of nothing else and so, in the end,
remains enthralled to idealism, clinging to the limited security of the concept no matter
what. To escape idealism, though, as Adorno well knew, is much more difficult than
critical thought has generally understood. The challenge of thinking beyond the
bounded form of the political is that, if the political is a foundational structure of human
identity, its critique is the critique of what it has always meant to be a rational creature,
!"#$%$&"' ()"' as opposed to nature.45 The difficulty that Realism poses, and that
capital poses with it, is thus that of the critique of reason, the philosophical problematic
opened by Kant. If the twin systems of entrapment, the modern international and global
capital, represent the totalisation of identity, and identity is constitutive of human
reason, then the only escape would be through the transformation of the concept. This is
the single ambition of Adorno’s thought.46 His critique of epistemology calls a halt to
the totalising direction of thought. Where traditional philosophy had always sought to
demonstrate the priority of the subject, the ontological primacy of the order-giving
concept, Adorno shows that that very structure of subjective priority in fact relies upon
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an element of materiality it cannot absorb. Idealist thought is thus always caught in a
contradiction, striving to incorporate what cannot be incorporated because the form of
the concept is itself based upon exclusion. The self-critique of idealism thereby implies
its own resolution: the inside/outside structure that keeps the subject trapped within
myth is to be dissolved, and freedom achieved, through the renunciation of the
compulsion to identify the object, to make it the same as the abstract subject. Sovereign
mastery gives up its mastery for the sake of sovereignty. If the intention of the concept
is to know the object, this, Adorno argues, is the real telos of thought, what it wants to
achieve. So he writes in Negative Dialectics: ‘What is urgent for the concept is what it
does not encompass, what its abstraction-mechanism eliminates, what is not already an
exemplar of the concept.’47 The non-identical is the element through which the concept
can be made rational, and through the breaching of the magic circle of identity the
nature of the boundary itself would change: ‘The utopia of cognition would be to open
up the non-conceptual with concepts, without making it the same as them.’48 The subject
would be neither split off from the world nor always seeking to subsume it. In the
modern international the borders may go right up to each other, but there are still
borders, so something, some element, no matter how marginal, is still excluded for the
sake of conceptual-political order.49 Identity, the subsumption of the world, is complete,
and yet not complete; something still glimmers beyond the boundary markers. How to
experience this something, this exceptional, non-identical element? In the second
Concluding Corollary to The Nomos of the Earth, Schmitt asserts that the legitimacy of
a concrete order, of a bounded political space, is achieved only when the land taken has
been brought within discursive rationality: ‘A land-appropriation is constituted only if
the appropriator is able to give the land a name.’50 The right of seizure of the world,
turning it into property, is sealed through the act of naming, the sacralisation of the
subject’s power over the object. What Schmitt beholds with reverent awe, Adorno sees
through as delusion. For the latter’s speculative materialism,51 the true task of thinking
is not to bestow names upon the world as insignia of sovereign mastery, a self-
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exaltation that can only remain trapped within myth-making, but to release its own
compulsive grip, opening itself to what falls outside discursivity and has no name, ‘to
say what cannot be said’.52 Freedom can only be achieved, the concept as ordered
political space made legitimate and rational, through reconciliation with what it does
not encompass, the non-identical, a nameless no-man’s land, a non-place – utopia.
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